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ABSTRACT

This book examines how educational development occurs by analyzing the actions of policymakers and the decisions they make regarding educational change. The book introduces an analytical framework that moves from the predecision and postdecision activities. Four case studies are used to exemplify the process of policymaking. Part 1, "The Analytical Setting," provides a conceptual framework for the book. In part 2, "Country Cases," the conceptual framework is used as a guide for the analysis of decisionmaking in Peru, Jordan, Thailand, and Burkina Faso. The case studies simulate the dynamics of policymaking by recreating real situations describing real events, people, and issues as they pertain to the decisionmaking process. Part 3, "Synthesis," analyzes the lesson to be learned from these studies and identifies the factors that contribute to successful policymaking. This book can be used to: (1) assess existing country policies; (2) evaluate projected policies for probability of success; and (3) train education officers in policy analysis. Contains 9 pages of references. (EH)

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The Dynamics of Education Policymaking

Wadi D. Haddad
with the assistance of
Terri Demsky

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EDI Development Policy Case Series
Analytical Case Studies • No. 10

The Dynamics of Education Policymaking

Case Studies of Burkina Faso, Jordan, Peru, and Thailand

Wadi D. Haddad
with the assistance of
Terri Demsky

The World Bank
Washington, D. C.

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Foreword

Since 1985 the Economic Development Institute of the World Bank has given the highest priority to training for the improvement of policymaking in poor countries. Before that, EDI's training courses and most of its training materials were concerned with the analysis and management of investment projects. This change in priorities reflected a similar change of emphasis in World Bank lending operations where the success of projects was found to be dependent upon policy reforms at the sectoral level as well as economywide. Bank lending became increasingly conditional upon policy reforms.

The development of new curricula meant that new training materials were also needed; and the new subject matter required new thinking about teaching methods and the form that training materials should take. It is one thing to teach the techniques of the economic analysis of projects and project management and quite another to teach policy analysis. In the latter case, formal economic analysis must also take into account the historical context in which decisions are made. Decisions depend not only on economic analysis in a narrow sense but also on the political leverage of those who are affected by the decisions, such as different socioeconomic groups and institutions, or government cadres. A country's stage of development and its culture, including its political style, usually feature prominently in the decisionmaking process. In short, development policy analysis is an attempt to apply the tools of economics and other social sciences to policymaking in a practical and effective manner. The skills required for this kind of decisionmaking are often best acquired by analyzing case studies either real or simulated. This book is the result of one of EDI's first experiments in devising training materials for development policy analysis. It has been tested several times in the classroom and has been revised to reflect the experience of teachers and participants.

Amnon Golan
Director
Economic Development Institute

Preface

This book examines how educational development happens. It analyzes the actions of policymakers and the decisions they make regarding educational change; but it does not stop there. Although the point of decision is an important one, equally important are the activities preceding it (analysis, generation of options, bargaining, and so forth) and following it (implementation, assessment, and possible redesign), as well as the other participants in the process (the consumers and providers of educational services). In order to capture this process of decisionmaking the book introduces an analytical framework that unravels the predecision and postdecision activities. To provide a clearer understanding of the process, the framework is applied to case studies of policymaking in four countries.

Part I serves as the conceptual framework for the book. It offers a consolidated model of policymaking that places analytical rationality (the process) within the political and administrative realm of policymaking (the actors). Because this model presents only a snapshot taken at the moment a decision is made, it is supplemented by another framework that details the actual process of policymaking. In Part II, the conceptual framework is used as a guide for the analysis of decisionmaking in Peru, Jordan, Thailand, and Burkina Faso. The case studies are not historical records of educational developments in these countries. They do, however, simulate the dynamics of policymaking by recreating real situations and describing real events, people, and issues as they pertain to the decisionmaking process. Part III analyzes the lessons to be learned from these studies and identifies the factors that contribute to successful policymaking.

This book can be valuable to both the student of policy analysis as well as the development practitioner. First, it can be used to assess *existing* country policies within the context of environmental variables such as the country's socioeconomic situation, national perceptions about policy problems and policy "rationales." Second, it can be applied to evaluate *projected* policies, through a process of defining parameters of the environment, predicting outcomes of different policy options, and assessing the chances for the successful implementation of policy decisions within the country's elasticity for change. Finally, the book can be used for training purposes. A series of learning modules derived from these studies have been used in seminars at the World Bank for orienting country education officers in policy analysis.

Many people have contributed to the preparation of this manuscript. I would like to acknowledge the contribution of David Davies and Stephen Heyneman who originally identified the need for such a study and facilitated it. I am particularly indebted to Louis Goodman for his contribution to the conceptual framework and the case study on Peru and for his constructive critique of my ideas and interpretations. Others who assisted in the research and writing of this book include Jerald Hage (chapter 1), Kathleen Gorman (chapter 2), and Susan Coronis (chapter 3). I am also grateful to John Oxenham for his extensive and valuable comments on the manuscript. Others who have reviewed parts of the manuscript include Victor Billeh (Jordan Case), Ruang Chareonchai (Thailand Case), and Donald Hamiltón (Burkina Faso Case). They have all made insightful comments most of which I have used with appreciation. Any shortcomings that remain in this necessarily interpretive work are my own.

Wadi D. Haddad

PART I

THE ANALYTICAL SETTING

1

Framework for Education Policy Analysis

Introduction and Background

Learning begins at birth and continues through life. Over the years, societies have developed systems of education to provide their youth and adults with opportunities and settings to learn in a purposeful and organized manner. An older informal system is mostly in swift decline, for it answered the requirements of subsistence and relatively simple economies. It can be seen in urban informal and rural sectors of livelihood, where boys and girls learn trades and crafts through their families, friends and acquaintances. This system may still work for majorities of young people in many countries that have not yet achieved universal primary schooling, and may even allow small minorities to enter institutions of secondary and tertiary education. But it is steadily giving way to a more formal system, which is the system of schools, colleges, universities, and similar established institutions, organized and paid for mostly by governments. It is this second, more modern system that is the major focus of educational policy, and therefore of this book. We use the term "education sector" to mean only this second system.

The notion of educational development—the education sector and how it can be made to grow and function more effectively—implicitly suggests a well-structured field of unambiguous issues, clearly defined objectives, mutually exclusive choices, undisputed causal relationships, predictable rationalities, and rational decisionmakers. Accordingly, sector analysis has predominantly focused on the content—the "what" of educational development: issues, policies, strategies, measures, outcomes, etc. In contrast to this idyllic vision, educational development is actually a series of untidy and overlapping episodes in which a variety of people and organizations with diversified perspectives are actively involved—technically and politically—in the *processes through which issues are analyzed and policies* are generated, implemented, assessed and redesigned. Accordingly, an analysis of the education sector implies an understanding of the education policy process itself—the "how" and "when" of educational development.

The purpose of this chapter is to suggest a scheme or series of steps through which sound and workable policies can be formulated, put into effect, evaluated and redesigned. In later chapters, the scheme will be applied to the histories of real policies. The reader or policy analyst will be able to assess its usefulness in future real situations of policymaking.

Policy Definition and Scope[1]

Since the policy process is a crucial element in educational development, it is essential to clarify the concepts of "policy" and "policymaking" before we proceed any further. Understandably, competing definitions of "policy" are numerous and varied. For the purposes of this paper, we define policy functionally to mean: *An explicit or implicit decision or group of decisions which may set out directives for guiding future decisions, or initiate, sustain or retard action, or guide the implementation of previous decisions.*

Policies, however, differ in terms of their scope, complexity, decision environment, range of choices, and decision criteria. This range is schematically depicted below:



Issue-specific policies are short-term decisions involving day-to-day management or, as the term implies, a particular issue. A program policy is concerned with the design of a program in a particular area, while a multi-program policy decision deals with competing program areas. Finally, strategic decisions deal with large-scale policies and broad resource allocations. For example:

Strategic: How can we provide basic education at a reasonable cost to meet equity and efficiency objectives?

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[1] This section draws heavily from Michael Carley (1980). *Rational Techniques in Policy Analysis*.

Multi-Program: Should resources be allocated to primary education or to rural training centers?

Program: How should training centers be designed and provided across the country?

Another example:

Strategic: Should we or do we need to introduce diversified education?

Multi-Program: How should we allocate resources between general education, vocational education, and diversified education?

Program: How and where should we provide diversified education?

Issue-Specific: How should practical subjects be taught in diversified schools?

Obviously, the broader the scope of a policy is, the more problematic it becomes. Methodological and political issues such as definition of the problem in conflictive societies; use of analytical techniques and optimization; questions of proper theoretical base, measurement, valuation and aggregation; hard objective data vs. soft subjective data; and analysis vs. public participation become more pronounced.

Policymaking

The term "policymaking" like "policy" implies competing conceptions and assumptions. A study of the theoretical and empirical work of social scientists reveals the two essential dimensions of policymaking: who does it (the actors) and how (the process). Historically, the actor in policymaking has been considered unitary and rational; more recently policy analysts have introduced the organizational (public interest) model and the personalistic (self-interest) model. The process element has fluctuated between a synoptic approach and an incremental approach.

Lindblom (1977) lays out the differences between the *synoptic* and *incremental* methods of policymaking. According to him, the synoptic method entails in its extreme form, a single central authority for the whole of society, combining economic, political, and social control into one integrated planning process that makes negotiation unnecessary. It assumes: (a) that the problem at hand does not go beyond man's cognitive capacities and (b) there exist agreed criteria (rather than social conflict on values) by which solutions can be judged and (c) that the problem solvers have adequate incentives to stay with synoptic analysis until it is completed (rather than "regress" to using incremental planning).

Incremental policymaking, on the other hand, relies on negotiation rather than on a complete analysis of the situation to develop a blueprint for solving problems. The incremental policymaker is less concerned with "correctly" solving his problem than with making an advance. Consequently, he proceeds incrementally and sequentially and depends on trial and error, rules of thumb, and routinized and habitual responses to simplify problem solving. The incremental approach to policymaking is built on the following assumptions: (a) Policy options are based on highly uncertain and fluid knowledge, and respond to a dynamic situation (ever changing problems, and evolving contexts); (b) No "correct" solution can therefore be found, or technically derived from a diagnosis of the situation. Consequently no sweeping or drastic reforms should be attempted; (c) Only incremental and limited policy adjustments can be made; and (d) Policy adjustments are expected to remedy an experienced dissatisfaction with past policies, through improving the existing situation or relieving an urgent problem. Consequently these adjustments should be tentative—and in some cases temporary—and must be revised as the dynamics of the situation evolve.

History suggests that pure synoptic policymaking is not possible. Still, it remains attractive because of its use in depoliticizing decisions—it assumes that there exist "correct" solutions to problems rather than "political" accommodations of warring interests, and that these solutions can be discovered by the right technical experts.

Graham Allison (1971) develops two alternative models to the commonly assumed model of the unitary rational policymaker: (a) the Organizational Process model, and (b) the Governmental Politics model. The first model posits a complex government consisting of a "conglomerate of semi-feudal, loosely allied organizations, each with a substantial life of its own. Government leaders do sit formally and to some extent, on top of this conglomerate. But governments perceive problems through organizational sensors. Governments define alternatives and estimate consequences as their component organizations process information; governments act as these organizations enact routines. Government behavior can therefore be understood less as deliberate choices and more as outputs of large organizations functioning according to standard patterns of behavior . . . Thus government behavior reflects the independent output of several organizations, partially coordinated by government leaders." The second model carries this concept further. While it also assumes an organizational approach to decisionmaking, the Governmental Politics model plays up the part of individuals in the process. The leaders who head organizations reach decisions through negotiation. Therefore, government decisions are not made by a monolithic state based on rational choice, but rather are negotiated by various leaders in top positions of the organizations involved in that particular decisionmaking process. Each leader is compelled by his own conception of the problem as well as by the imperatives of his organization *and* his own personal goals. In sum, where one stands depends on where one sits and decisions are made by the "pulling and hauling that is politics."

A CONSOLIDATED MODEL FOR POLICYMAKING. Neither of the two dimensions alone (process and actors) fully captures the dynamics of policymaking. They need to be combined and restructured into a different configuration, as the topography in figure 1.1 illustrates. The actor in policymaking is placed on the horizontal-axis—at one end of the spectrum is the societal/personalistic mode, wherein decisions are reached by negotiation among a variety of interest groups (including government ministries, teachers' unions, etc.), driven by their own conception of the problem and individual values. On the other end is the organizational/bureaucratic mode wherein decisions are made within the organizational entity (i.e., the military, the ministry, etc.). The process of policymaking—from the incremental to the synoptic approach—is placed on the vertical-axis. These two dimensions generate a new topography. On the one extreme of this new topography (in quadrant I) is the rational model which is a composite of the synoptic method and the organizational/bureaucratic mode. Decisionmaking at this extreme is unitary, rational, centrally controlled, completely technical and value maximizing. On the other extreme (in quadrant III) is a composite of the incremental method and the societal/personalistic mode. Policymaking here is a political activity characterized by self-interest, political bargaining, value judgment and multiple rationalities. One can easily argue that most policymaking falls somewhere between these two extremes. Full rationality assumes comprehensiveness—all data, goals, and alternatives—as well as the possibility of establishing a social welfare function. Both assumptions are far from reality. Moreover, analytic techniques carried on in ignorance of political, social and bureaucratic realities do not go very far. Similarly, a pattern of vague and unsystematic political decisions loaded with self-interest, patronage and value judgments can lead to breakdown, if not to chaos.

Johnson and Clark (1982) observe that planners and academics in particular are infatuated with the rational (or intellectual-cogitation as they

Figure 1.1 Dimensions of Policymaking



call it) approach to development. This is because it serves the primary objective of those designing and formulating plans for policy implementation, which has been to perfect a blueprint specification of the "correct" development design, which can be executed by obedient cadres of development managers. However, this is impossible because of imperfect knowledge of the situation and because of the competing interests involved. This move from the view of the decisionmaker as "rational actor" corresponds with increased appreciation for the multiple rationalities which can be seen as relevant for any particular policy process. Rather than designing sweeping reforms deduced from a technical diagnosis of an educational system, policy analysts now recognize that educational providers and consumers as well as politicians each have their own legitimate "rationality" for understanding an educational initiative. Rather than assessing which rationality is "correct," policy analysis now seeks to understand the processes through which tradeoffs are accomplished among the interests underlying the various rationalities relevant for a given policy choice. In building such understandings policy analysts attempt to gain a " . . . realistic recognition of the political realities which constrain decision makers and a broader view of constraints and opportunities based on detailed and systematic analysis."

In sum, a balanced perspective of policymaking places analytical rationality within the context of the political and administrative aspects of policymaking. This balanced view of policymaking is most appropriate for education. Studies of educational policymaking all point to the complexity and multifaceted character of this process due to the nature of both the educational system and the educational change. One of the more important characteristics of the education system lies in its salient linkages with the socio-economic structure. Any policy changes, therefore, are not purely technical but have connected social, economic and therefore political dimensions. For instance, any attempt to modify the system, which is perceived by one group or another as lowering the chances of their children to progress socially or economically, will meet with strong opposition. Therefore, the whole notion of reform for democratization is essentially a political issue. Another set of linkages exists between the education system and the economy, whereby the school is seen as the solution to a wide range of economic problems. This belief is the source of much of the impetus for policy changes.

Internally, the educational system is an intricate network of institutions interlocking horizontally and vertically. A policy decision in any one component can have strong repercussions throughout the system. Externally, education seems to be everyone's business and nearly everyone feels qualified to have an opinion about it. Policymaking, therefore, involves balancing a number of contradictory demands, and soliciting support, or at least tolerance, from the many different segments of society which have an interest in education.

Policy decisions, however, are constrained not only by the socio-political environment, but by the institutional framework as well. Most developing countries are not well equipped to identify policy issues and to design policy options. Moreover, implementation implications are often secondary to adoption of new programs of "reforms." Policy decisions, therefore, are often not calculated solutions based on systematic analysis of policy options, but rather an agreed set of actions, within limiting factors (social, political, economic and institutional) that are expected to improve on the existing situation or to relieve an urgent problem.

Conceptual Framework

Although decision making is a crucial element in the policy process, clearly, it is preceded by analytical and/or political activities (analysis, generation of options, bargaining, and so forth) and followed by equally important policy-related activities (implementation, assessment, and possible redesign). This paper introduces a framework for education policy analysis that covers the pre-policy decision activities, the decision process itself, and the post-decision activities. This framework is not a description of *actual* activities. It is not a replica of reality but rather a conceptual model to catch from reality those elements that can be detected and analyzed. It therefore should be broad enough to capture and *integrate* the intricate process of any policymaking model, yet at the same time it should *disintegrate* the process into components to determine how they work and interact.

Figure 1.2 The Policy Cycle



Given the state of the art of decision theory and the nature of educational development and education policymaking, the education policy cycle may be described in terms of the main activities schematically summarized in figure 1.2. However, since the purpose of this framework is to provide a basis for policy analysis, the policy cycle is broken down further in order to highlight the dynamics (flow, procedure, interaction) of policymaking. The resultant framework, summarized schematically in figure 1.3, consists of eight policy processes:

- Analysis of the existing situation;
- Generation of policy options;
- Evaluation of policy options;
- Making the policy decision;
- Planning for policy implementation;
- Policy implementation;
- Policy impact assessment;
- Subsequent policy cycles.

Figure 1.3 Conceptual Framework for Policy Analysis


FORMULATION
EVALUATION
ADOPTION
IMPLEMENTATION
ASSESSING IMPACT
ADJUSTMENT
NEW POLICY CYCLE
CONCEPTUAL WORLD
PROCESS
EMPIRICAL WORLD
Policy Options
CONSEQUENCES
No
Feasibility Affordability Desirability
Yes
Policy Decision
Satisfactory
Assessing Impact
Unsatis-factory
Is Policy at Fault?
Yes
Policy Options
ANALYSIS
Research, Induction, Negotiations, Ad Hoc Opinions, Value Judgements, etc.
Planning
Implementation
No
Improved Planning
Improved Implementation
ANALYSIS
Research, Induction, Negotiations, Ad Hoc Opinions, Value Judgements, etc.
National Priorities
Interest Groups
Education
Economy
Socio-Political Structures
SITUATION A
SITUATION B
SITUATION B'

Each of these elements of policy analysis is discussed in the next section.

This framework looks complicated because, inevitably, it is multifaceted and covers a wide range of processes. However, any attempt to restrict policy analysis to certain elements or to disregard one element results in an incomplete approach to policy analysis, and leads to the old controversy of the rational vs. the political, or the bureaucratic vs. the organizational approaches in the literature and in public debate.

Elements of Education Policy Analysis

Analysis of the Existing Situation

A policy change is normally a response to a problem or set of problems in the sector, and must, therefore, start with an appreciation of the educational sector and its context. In addition to the analysis of the sector itself, policy analysis should consider a number of aspects of the total context including political, economic, demographic, cultural, and social issues which are likely to impinge in various ways on the education sector and its decisionmaking and even implementation processes.

COUNTRY BACKGROUND. The general character of a country (location, geography, population and culture) has obvious implications for education policy analysis. ·Perhaps the most important of these characteristics is the social grouping. Most countries include many linguistic, ethnic, racial, and religious groups. Within these groups exist social and economic stratifications, with the general trend of stratification (as measured by indicators such as the Gini Index of income distribution) increasing. This makes the process of educational policy making more difficult in a number of ways. Typically, different groups have different values about education. As a consequence, there is differential demand for it depending upon the location of these groups within the society. Insofar as education represents access to key positions of power, then different access or interest in education also means differential access to power. Resulting struggles are particularly acute in countries where the distribution of access to goods and services has become increasingly unequal. In such circumstances special efforts may be made by cultural groups or by a political figure and his loyalists either to sustain a pattern of privileged access to education or to break down such a pattern and broaden educational access. Many of the tensions between groups can be traced to differential levels of achievement, but those that are perceived to result from differential levels of ascription are the more sensitive.

Political Context. The preceding observation emphasizes that an analysis of the political environment is necessary for an understanding of the national decisionmaking process, the comparative value of education, and the role that education must play in the socio-political process. The importance of this context can vary depending upon how isolated the educational sector is from the government. But no matter how autonomous the educational sector may seem to be, it is worth knowing the ideological preferences of the national elite. Starting with the national priorities, it is worth distinguishing between the priorities of the national political elite relative to development, and those of the educational elite relative to education. It is not only that the head of the ministry of education may have different plans from those of the political elite which appointed him; in many countries the educational sector as a whole enjoys enough autonomy to promote its own distinct agenda. It is not at all unusual for development and education objectives to be at odds with each other or at least not to be tightly coordinated.

Many countries have placed differential emphasis on economic planning. The goals of these plans can vary as well, from a preference for rapid economic growth to a preference for redistributing income more equally within the society. The capacity of the state to do planning at the national level is another critical variable in the institutional analysis of the political sector. Research in Africa indicates that the technical competence of the planners was an important factor in explaining the more rapid growth rates of the Côte d'Ivoire and the failure of Mali, two former French colonies which both took the central planning route. Moreover, the professional background of the bureaucrats who do the policy planning can also affect the ideology of the elite. In many developing countries, the military have been in control (although again, this is changing rapidly in some parts of the developing world, most notably in Latin America). Where the bureaucrats have been trained can also provide a number of insights on their likely model of educational expansion and their sense of priorities. However, the role of ideology and how it impacts on the formation of policy may be overrated. For instance, Crawford Young (1982) analyzing the role of ideology on economic growth policies, argues that in the case of Africa the influence was not strong except in few instances.

Finally, the institutional structure of the political sector has implications for educational development. Many developing countries do not have well-developed parties but if they do, their values and preferences need to be calculated as part of the analysis of the political context. Typically educational policies do not become part of the political agenda of various parties. But when they do, it is important to understand why. Parties which represent the middle class or ethnic groups of an equivalent social status are likely to prefer educational policies that develop new tracks and which provide access to higher education. Parties which represent the farmers may be opposed to multiple tracks, while parties for the working class are likely to favor equality of opportunity and the development of free education for all and perhaps even the elimination of the private sector. In many African countries, there has been a tendency for different cultural groups to form their own political parties to represent their interests. Where parties are not well institutionalized, kinship patterns which tend to favor certain ethnic or racial groupings are more likely to be the key actors in the society. In such cases, knowing kinship patterns can be critical for understanding the extent of elite support for some educational policies. Moreover, if kinship patterns are important at the top levels of government, the impact of educational changes on that particular language or ethnic group is more likely to be critical. In particular, it is necessary to understand how new policies may affect the interests of the elite in control of the government.

ECONOMIC CONTEXT. In the economic area, the analyst wants to understand the present macroeconomic situation in general and the human resources situation in particular. More importantly, the analyst needs to estimate the likely trends in the various sectors in the future and the financial resources of the country in order to assess what the economy requires from the education sector and what the sector expects to face from the rest of the economy particularly in terms of general infrastructure and financial resources. First, variables such as demographic shifts, urbanization, and migration, coupled with the likely growth in various sectors of the economy, will have a significant impact on labor markets and consequently on needs for education and skills training. Second, the level of economic development will set constraints on the capacity of the educational system to build schools and to expand. It is difficult to build schools without the necessary economic infrastructure, to say nothing about the presence of firms with the necessary capabilities. The level of economic development also sets the range of possible taxation by the government, which in turn will influence educational expenditures. Third, the economic growth rate is important not only for estimating the likely need for certain kinds of skills but also for estimating the future amounts of slack resources. Studies of educational expenditures in some countries (Hage *et al*, 1986) indicate that educational expenditures are highly vulnerable to changes in political priorities. They are strongly influenced by the rate of growth because as this becomes greater it is easier to tax (Wilensky, 1976) and to allocate funds to education. As soon as this growth rate slows, then educational expenditures are likely to be the first to be reduced. It is, therefore, important to analyze the present level of resource allocation to education, the financial implications of present education policies, the cost of educational services, and the likely sources of additional funds—possibly outside the public budgetary domain.

The Education Sector. Sector analysis starts with an identification and understanding of the major sectoral issues relevant to the country. These issued may be explored under six categories: (i) access to educational opportunities, (ii) equity in the distribution of educational services, (iii) structure of the education system, (iv) internal efficiency, (v) external efficiency, and (vi) institutional arrangements for the management of the sector.

The problem of *access* has two sides: supply and demand. Most developing countries continue to suffer from insufficient student places to enroll the majority of school-age children. Some countries cannot provide enough schools to cope with the population growth, and consequently, the nonschooling gap is increasing. The issue is equally critical in the provision of basic education to the adult population. The supply of educational services is usually constrained by a lack of resources—not only financial, but also physical and human, often in the form of inadequate national capacity to plan and develop a broad-based system of education within what resources the country does have. In addition, geographic and demographic conditions may aggravate the situation—distance, low-density populations, harsh environment, and poor transport networks. In some countries, political policies may work against the expansion of enrollments for fear of a threat to vested interests and the status quo.

On the other hand, it is unrealistic to assume that if an educational service is supplied, there is always a demand for it. As discussed later, some groups, for social and economic reasons, may feel apathetic toward the education being provided, or may not consider it worth the opportunity cost involved. Some groups may be reluctant to send their girls to school. Others may find the school's curriculum incompatible with their religion. Others may not see the use of schooling for their way of life. Yet others may need the labor of their children with their flocks and herds, in their fields or in their homes and workshops. Simply supplying schools and teachers to such groups could be wasteful. Additional appropriately tailored policies would be necessary to assure that demand at least equaled supply.

In view of the extraordinarily rapid rate at which education systems have expanded all over the world, the factors which drive demand require much more attention. The public interest, expressed mainly through governments, views education as virtually the only means to create and sustain a modernizing labor force capable of realizing aspirations and plans for economic and social development. It may also view education as a means of democratizing the polity. Private interests are diverse in scale, but have two common threads, economic and social enhancement. Both have been studied by economists and sociologists.

Human capital theorists have stressed that individuals are likely to seek education because of the greater amounts of income that they hope to receive. That is economic enhancement. It will be discussed a little further in the section on "external efficiency". In parallel, the sociological literature on status attainment indicates that, while social status is not completely determined by income and education, both are indeed factors in influencing how people are regarded in their societies. Thus, people who acquire education are likely to enhance both their economic and social status, so the latter becomes a driver of demand for education. But status is influenced also by occupation. Consequently, forms of education that lead to occupations of lower status, will generate weaker demand than education that can lead to occupations of higher status. (See Kerckhoff *et al*, 1982 and the many curriculum battles in nineteenth century Europe, Ringer, 1979). In some countries the element of status achieved through education is so important, that unemployment is preferable to entering an "inappropriate" occupation. While income can indeed affect the choice of occupation, concerns about it vary with the status of the family; in general, middle class families are the most concerned about status. Since these families tend to have the highest educational aspirations for their children, status is a major motivation in the demand for education. Policy analysts and reformers need to take it carefully into account. The section on interest groups will take up the point again in a moment.

The issue of *equity* enters where legitimate demand is denied supply. Possible inequities in education may be identified through an analysis of the distribution of schooling according to various criteria—sex, region, rural or urban location, socio-economic status, and, sometimes, ethnic background. Where apparently equal access to educational facilities appears not to ensure equal participation in or equal use of these resources among population groups, it would be necessary to determine the factors that facilitated or hindered participation and learning; and then to tailor policies to mitigate or eliminate them.

Issues of *structure* of the education system center mainly on the number and type of tracks that exist at the different educational levels. The first issue here is that, typically, different tracks provide different access to higher education—or even secondary education—and hence to different life chances (more on this below). Consequently some tracks have more prestige than others, and generate stronger demand. Another related issue is the perceived definition of a well-educated person on the part of different providers and consumers of education. Such a definition reflects itself in the attitudes and consequently the use, of different educational tracks. Many policy reforms that involve new or revised educational structures may be resisted because they violate this definition of "educated person."

Issues of *internal efficiency* involve two interrelated areas. The first is the efficiency of the teaching/learning system itself, which is manifested in the student flow (dropout or survival rates, repetition rates, and input-output ratios), the utilization of teachers (class size and student/teacher ratios), and use of physical facilities (utilization index, and occupation rate). The second is the efficiency of learning which derives from the quality of determinants of achievement such as teachers, curricula and teaching styles, instructional materials, and quality of entrants.

Issues of *external efficiency* involve relationships between education (schooling and training) and the labor market. These relationships are intricate and diverse because they depend upon the nature of the economy and the interaction among its sectors. The issues can be summarized in four categories. First, *a competent* ***labor force:*** the education system should provide the country with a labor force capable of initiating and sustaining economic growth. This involves four sets of problems: assessing the labor market conditions and dynamics; determining the number and types of skills required by a total economy—modern, informal and traditional sectors—on the basis of the technologies and techniques actually used in the production process, plus those that could be introduced to improve productivity; selecting the most cost-effective ways of acquiring these skills; and ensuring that, once acquired, these skills are properly deployed and used.

Second, *the relationship between the education sector and the total economy*: in most countries, only sector of employment to require qualifications from the education system is the modern, and particularly that part of the modern sector controlled by the government. In most developing countries, the government is the largest employer in the modern sector and operates a system whereby entry positions, salaries and wages are determined by educational qualifications. Consequently, as the section on demand pointed out, the public perceive the education system as a preparation for employment in the modern sector and relatively enhanced incomes and standards of living. They generally do not appreciate the use of education for livelihoods in the informal and traditional sectors of family or self-employment, and can discourage educated people from entering those sectors. Considerable problems of unemployment and forms of underemployment can result.

Interacting with the first and second sets of issues is the third: *the problem of "qualifications"*. Because the growth of the education system often tends to outstrip the growth of the modern sector, the supply of "qualified" people tends to outstrip the jobs available for them. Three consequences follow, two in the labor market, one in the education sector. In the labor market, "higher qualified" people displace "adequately qualified" people at lower levels, and entry qualifications at both higher and lower levels are raised. This can affect educational policy, in that new decisions are required on the amount of education to be given to different numbers of people to achieve a given level of skills. In the education sector, the increased difficulty of entering the modern sector generates stronger demands for higher levels of education, since people can no longer feel secure with what used to be an adequate level of education. These stronger demands compete with existing demands for basic education for all. Efforts to make basic education terminal, in the sense of leading directly to employment, are undermined, and the natural tendency of education at any level to be only a preparation for the next is reinforced.

The fourth set of issues in external efficiency concerns the contrast between the social climate of the typical educational institution and the social relations and experiences to which workers are exposed. Does the education system adequately prepare its students for the responsibilities and expectations of working life?

External efficiency can include more than economic considerations of the labor market. Frequently, the justification for investment in education is its impact not on economic growth but on political development, and the creation of more stable polities. However difficult to assess, these aspects should at least be explored in the evaluation process to see if they factor in the calculus of the individuals making the decisions.

Institutional arrangements for the management of the education sector have many dimensions. We have selected only two basic ones that relate to decisionmaking, namely, the distribution of power or centralization and the degree of institutional autonomy for the educational system. It is difficult to measure the degree of centralization (for a discussion of the problem in a comparative context, see Hollingsworth and Hannaman, 1984) but if we take the simplistic approach of what proportion of the decisions are made in the central government, we have a rough approximation. An analysis of this issue, however, reveals most relevant actors in the policy process and the likelihood of standardized educational measures nationwide. For instance, some educational systems pride themselves on the similarity of the curriculum in all parts of the society. Other systems are more decentralized and allow much greater local variation. On the other hand decisions can be made quicker in more centralized systems, but they may be much more difficult to implement because of the lack of cooperation.

As to the degree of institutional autonomy of the educational system from other parts of the government, there has been a tendency for educational systems to be institutionally apart from the rest of society (Archer, 1979; Thomas and Meyer, 1984). This dimension becomes important in assessing the relative ease with which the educational system can implement a certain policy, as well as in understanding whether the policy is likely to be related to other institutional sectors of the society. Centralized and autonomous educational sectors are more likely to favor a classical view of education and be less open to the development of technical and vocational tracks which are directly related to the economic and political needs of the society.

Education systems also vary in the degree of privatization of educational services. Different ethnic, racial, religious, or language groups may not only be located in different tracks but also have a preference for private systems. Since many developing countries are marked by a great variety of different cultural and social groups, the private sector can be even more important than in the developed countries, despite the generally greater preponderance of the government.

An analysis of the above issues should take into consideration their *evolutionary* nature and examine how issues in the development of the educational system have altered over time. The meeting of one educational need or solution of one problem frequently creates another. For example, the expansion of the system and the provision of new facilities naturally lead to issues about the quality of the education provided and the capacity of the educational administration to handle a larger educational system. Also the analysis of education across time can sensitize one to the tendency for the system to oscillate between objectives which are somewhat incompatible. For example, Miller and Swanson (1959) indicate how permissive vs. restrictive socialization practices have altered in the United States during the past century. Inherent in each policy is some extreme, which then sets up a counter trend or tendency. The ebb and flow of advocacy between an emphasis on quality and excellence in education (relatively expensive) and equal education for all (at a relatively low cost) is an example. An historical and evolutionary perspective on the dynamics of policies across time within a specific country allows the analyst a better sense of why a particular policy is being advocated at the moment. By studying the past, one also learns the likely speed with which educational policies can be implemented.

DYNAMICS OF CHANGE. An assessment of the present situation cannot be complete without evaluating the forces for or against change in the event that further policy changes need to be made. Such an assessment has implications for the chances of success of different types of policies and for strategies that must be employed to promote and implement such policies. The dynamics of change are determined by socio-political dynamics and financial resources (national and sectoral). One key socio-political element is the presence and relative strength of interest groups.

Most studies of policy analysis in areas other than education (see Wilensky, 1975; Hage and Hollingsworth, 1979; Wilensky *et al*, 1985) indicate the importance of interest groups. In developing countries it is impossible to specify what might be all the relevant interest groups but at minimum one can start with the providers of education, most notably, teachers, and the consumers, most notably, parents and students. If the former are well organized—they often are—they can be a powerful force in supporting or opposing any educational change. The consumers can also be powerful, but are generally fragmented. They may be divided into different cultural or occupational, or socioeconomic groups. Frequently these will have quite different interests in both the quantity and quality of education. Consumer groups most closely connected with either political policymakers or decisionmakers within the education system will be able to exert disproportionate influence. And consumers who can organize themselves into forceful street demonstrations, as have some university students, can effect policy changes very favorable to themselves. Therefore, policy planners need to identify interest groups and assess their openness to reform.

The earlier section on demand for education mentioned the aspirations of middle class families. Sociologists have noted that it is the past achievements of parents rather than future opportunities for incomes which are likely to determine the aspiration level of the child (Blau and Duncan, 1967; Sewell and Hauser, 1967; Trieman, 1975). Concerns over status mean that these interest groups will resist changes which tend to diminish access to higher levels of education and may regard specialized educational tracks as deflectors against upward mobility (Heyneman and Loxley, 1983). However, they may also use these tracks not for their intended purposes, but as second best alternative routes to higher education. Studies have shown that many students in vocational education in developing countries do not enter the vocations they have learned, but find ways of gaining access to higher education, even in general, non-professional areas. Technical education which does not allow access to higher education may either fail to attract consumers or else provoke attempts to have the policy on access to higher education changed.

A separate interest group comprises the officials who administer an education system. Recent studies of them in developing countries (Klaus, Vanneman, 1979) suggest that bureaucrats find it in their interest to maintain a moderate expansion of the educational system. They tend also to value whatever configuration of education is current and to resist policies that would alter it. Therefore, one important element in policy analysis is to understand what the self-interests of the educational bureaucrats are and to recognize that these are not necessarily identical with those of the teachers, other educational professionals or consumers.

Finally, not all interest groups are equally well mobilized in any particular society. It is therefore important to determine how well formed they are, how much power they have in society, and how willing they are to exercise their power. There are a series of measures which can be employed to estimate the extent of their support or opposition (Merton, 1957; Olsen, 1983). Reformers should consider how their support might be mobilized or their opposition negotiated away.

The Process of Generating Policy Options

New policies are usually generated when the present situation of the sector and its context is perturbed by a problem, a political decision or a reorganization scheme (overall national planning). Policy options can be generated in several different ways to accommodate the disequilibrium. For analytical purposes one can group these processes under four categories: the systematic mode, the incremental mode, the ad hoc mode, and the importation mode. In concrete situations several of these modes may be combined.

THE SYSTEMATIC MODE. The title may suggest that this is the preferred or best method for generating policy options. That is not necessarily the case because under certain conditions this mode may prove to be defective or impractical. The systematic mode is characterized by three operations: generation of data, formulation and prioritization of options, and refining options. Data are usually derived from two sources. The first is sector analysis which involves identification and analysis of issues. The quality of analysis may vary between simple description and diagnostic treatment with projections and trend profiles. The second source is the existing body of professional knowledge (conventional wisdom, research synthesis, comparative indicators, etc.).

Formation of options under this mode is a fairly complicated process of induction. If based on data alone, a large number of options can be generated to fit the different "givens" of the sector and its context. At its extreme, intellectual induction seeks to anticipate all possible policy outcomes by thinking through all possible contingencies. It then proceeds to identify optimal or at least efficient options. Among the foremost selling points of this approach is its "rigor, rationality and relative freedom from the distortions of special interest pleading and power politics." (Johnson and Clark, 1982). However, a variety of intellectual, political, social and professional constraints limit the range of policy options. Moreover, options may be given different weights and prioritized depending on the perceived importance of the sectoral issues, the relative strength of the interest groups, and the possible combination of different options. It is important whether the relevant interest groups have been allowed to negotiate the type and scope of the options generated. A rationalistic approach is likely to decrease the involvement of such groups, and thus reduce the quality of data. Conversely, a participatory approach may prolong the process and produce a wider range of options.

Some of the policy options may be subjected to a microcycle of problem identification: policy formulation—verification—modification or retention. This is a blend of induction and sequential interaction. The experimentation or pilot studies approach adds an input into the data base and to the "weighting" of the policy options. Still a different factor which influences the number of policy options is the relative emphasis placed on doing such pilot studies or small scale experimental studies. A recent review of successful interventions in developing countries (Hage and Finsterbush, 1985) found that they all had first experimented with pilot studies and then adjusted their models, usually through problem solving groups of one kind or another. This combination of research and problem solving to improve on the model proves to be an effective device for organizational change. Its absence in the educational sector may explain the difficulty of generating implementable educational policies.

THE INCREMENTAL MODE. Once a problem within the educational system is recognized, a solution is frequently forced upon it. This is especially likely to occur when there is a public debate about a problem. Given widespread interest and discussion, the educational system is forced to do something to maintain its legitimacy. The sense of urgency necessitates a quick solution. The option is determined in one sense before the fact. Since the problem is likely to be located in one particular segment of the system, the question is: how to formulate a policy to adapt the system to the solution. This approach (Johnson and Clark, 1982) in which the policymaker seeks to adjust present difficulties rather than to anticipate future ones in order to promote incremental improvements is sometimes called the "acting out" approach. However, what is feasible is not always desirable, and in the long-term, policymakers may be blind to more appropriate options and pursuing policies with high opportunity costs.

THE AD HOC MODE. Sometimes the problem is outside the educational system. It may not even be a problem. For example, the emergence of a new elite or a major political event may require that the educational system make some adjustments or changes. Here the policy may have no rational basis within the education sector.

The Importation Mode. There are many innovations and fashions in educational systems around the world. These can be the source of the policy options considered elsewhere. Foreign specialists, operating as consultants for international agencies, can provide the stimulus for this mode. However, a certain policy adopted elsewhere can be imported only if it meets the needs of particular groups in the society, i.e., if there is an importer.

Evaluation of Policy Options

Policy options can be evaluated only if estimations of their likely implications are made. The "imaginary" situation that would be created, if a policy option were implemented, is compared with the present situation, and the transition from the existing to the imaginary case is evaluated in terms of feasibility, desirability and affordability.

Desirability. Under this heading, the analyst assesses the impact of the option on the various interest groups or stakeholders: who would benefit? who might feel threatened? how might the potential losers be compensated? what would make the option desirable to all stakeholders?

The potential implications for the political goals of the society and its economic growth will affect desirability and need to be drawn. For example, an educational policy option to promote excellence may entail an increase in inequality in a society that has pledged itself to promote equality. At least in broad outlines it is important to work through the basic thrusts of the proposed policy and test its compatibility with the dominant ideology articulated in national development plans. Where appropriate, attempts should be made to trace the likely effects beyond economic growth in general and to assess how they might answer the needs of specific sectors for educated human resources. (the current work in sociology has so far explored only the general analytical level, see Rubinson and Ralph, 1985; Walters and Rubinson, 1983; Meyer and Hannan, 1979).

Affordability. Assessing affordability requires looking at costs in several senses: monetary (public and private), opportunity, and political.

Monetary costs—Public. Estimating the fiscal costs of the change and whether they can be afforded faces the difficulty of forecasting the future. It requires the creation and consideration of alternative plausible economic and political scenarios, and what the public purse might or might not be willing to afford under each. One reason for this necessity is that current research has found that educational expenditures are much more vulnerable to changes in economic situations and political objectives than many other kinds of public expenditures (Hage, *et al*, 1986).

Monetary costs—Private. If the costs of a reform threaten to be larger than the public purse can bear on its own, they may require the consumers to share a proportion. That may raise the private costs of education to a point where they reduce equality of opportunity and make it more difficult for poorer groups to pursue education. Analysts may need to seek to distribute the private load in ways that minimize deterrent costs for the poorer, while not provoking strong resistance from the better off.

Opportunity costs. In reckoning the opportunity costs of a proposal, the analyst examines whether there are other measures which might benefit the education system, but which would have to be foregone to pay for the current proposal. If there are, issues of priority require resolution.

Political costs. These are frequently not included in the assessment of consequences and yet they should be. One reason for stressing the importance of interest groups earlier is the probability that any option will likely affect some interest groups favorably and others negatively. In turn, this may mean certain political costs for the government. They may be willing to pay these costs, but they certainly need to weigh them.

Feasibility. Assessing feasibility here means checking whether the resources of personnel and time are adequate to implement the proposal. Are the existing staff of the education system qualified and capable of implementing the reform? Might they need help in the form of training or imported technical assistance? Are qualified personnel available, and can they be attracted to join the education system? Will the costs of training, better qualified personnel or technical assistance reduce the affordability of the reform?

Another element in the calculus of feasibility is time. Most studies of education projects indicate that they frequently take much longer than planned. More realistic estimates of time need to be made and can only be done by the careful assessment of the implementation capabilities and experiences. The issue of time becomes even greater when it is necessary to do experimental studies and to train personnel to implement the change.

Making the Policy Decision

Ideally, the final policy decision would be the result of evaluating the different policy options in terms of the criteria outlined above, and selecting the most balanced compromise between the best technical indications of research findings and analyses of data, on the one hand, and, on the other, the realities of finance, personnel and time, and the demands of a variety of stakeholders. In real situations, optimal options will not be always selected and balances will probably not be perfect, so that the analyst would be wise to identify their weaknesses and prepare adjustments for them. The following questions should assist:

- How was the decision arrived at? Did it go through all the stages of policy analysis? What factors seemed most influential? What factors seem to have been ignored and why?
- How radical a departure is the decision from current policy?
- How consistent is this decision with policies in other sectors?
- Is the policy diffusely articulated or is it stated in a manner which makes its degree of success easily measurable?
- Does the policy seem operational or is its implementation implausible?

Planning for Policy Implementation

Once a policy has been chosen, planning for policy implementation should begin immediately. Although much of the work that must be carried out during this stage can be based in evaluations performed to make the policy decision, planning for implementation involves a concreteness absent in earlier stages of the policy process (IIEP, 1983).

A *schedule* for moving people, physical objects and funds must be drawn up with a clarity and attention to detail that leaves no doubt as to who will do what, when and how; *physical resources*, once the content of hypothetical lists, must be located and their availability assured; *financial resources*, once ear-marked for possible use, must be appropriated so that implementation delays are minimal; the *person-power* needed to put plans into action must be freed from other commitments and made ready to go to work; the *technical knowledge* needed to guide the policy implementation must be mastered by those who will employ it and the *administrative systems* within which the policy will be directed must be clearly structured and firmly in place.

Prodigious as are the tasks above, there is one planning task that is more difficult (and it is the most often overlooked). This is the task of *mobilizing political support*. If a policy planning process is realistic, the need to mobilize political support must be recognized as necessary for every aspect of policy implementation.

The mobilization of political support resonates most clearly when one thinks of the need to assure that the providers and consumers of a new educational initiative embrace it with enthusiasm. Plans must be developed to assure that students and their families are aware of the objectives of a new initiative, that communities learn of benefits for the collectivity; that teachers, educational administrators and their representatives are persuaded that the changes are in their interests. Since new initiatives usually mean some form of job redefinition, it is important that educators see this as beneficial and that those who object to the changes be isolated.

The "maze of competing and conflicting interests which lie between intention and successful implementation" (Johnson and Clark, 1982) is present not only among the providers and consumers of new educational initiatives. Political mobilization may also be necessary to assure that materials for school construction are available when needed, that necessary institutional administrative adjustments are carried out, and, especially, that funding proposals are approved. Each aspect of implementation will require cooperation which might be easily directed toward other ends. To assure a policy's successful implementation, political support for it must be garnered well before it is put into place and must be preserved for its duration.

One important strategy for mobilizing political support is that of involving groups affected by the new initiative in the planning process. At a minimum this involves the families and communities who will benefit as well as the teachers and administrators who will operationalize any initiative. It should also involve those who will have roles in providing the other necessities ranging from bricks and mortar to financial resources. Since new policy invariably involves making tradeoffs and accepting new patterns, giving those involved the opportunity to shape it will pay dividend when it is implemented. The dividends will not only be in the form of enhanced support, but more likely will be in terms of an improved policy design. Moving to make a policy concrete is the surest way to reveal some detail not taken into account during the evaluation stage and involving those affected improves chances that such problems can be overcome when discovered. It also improves chances that initiatives are not seen merely as "one-way conduits of implementation through which services, solutions, and prescriptions invented somewhere else are imposed" (Johnson and Clark, 1982).

Policy Implementation

The stage of implementation is included in this discussion of policy analysis because much policy formation, *de facto*, takes place during this stage. This is the case because, during implementation, the following is the rule rather than the exception:

- circumstances related to implementation constraints cause policy modifications to take place;
- feedback obtained during implementation causes reassess-ment of aspects of the policy decision and subsequent modifications by policymakers; and

- the mere translation of abstract policy intentions into concrete implementation causes reassessment and redesign. These changes occur with great frequency because, unfortunately, implementation problems are often greatly underestimated during the stage of policy planning.

When such problems arise they often seem like replays of issues raised during the stages of evaluating policy options or of planning. Seemingly solved earlier, they are resurrected in the realities of implementation. Very likely, they were not really solved earlier and were judged easier to resolve during implementation than experience warranted. Such problems can only be solved by taking a flexible approach to the stage of policy implementation.

No matter how well anticipated, policy implementation always brings some surprises. These shape the policy output, sometime in crucial ways. One way to use such surprises to improve policy outcomes is to design the implementation in stages. If a stage is completed satisfactorily then the next can begin. If unanticipated problems arise in a given stage, then a re-evaluation of the plans for implementation, and possibly of the policy decision itself, is in order.

Another technique for such sequential learning has been recommended by Johnson and Clark (1982). They suggest that pilot studies should precede full implementation of any project. This, they maintain, will reduce the possibility of "saddling village-level workers with impossible tasks and reporting responsibilities," and will permit policy implementation adjustments on a "learning-by-doing" basis. Furthermore, they argue, that the complexity of society-level policy implementation makes serious errors virtually inevitable and testing each step out through conducting well-designed pilot studies will, in the end, likely save both time and money.

Policy Impact Assessment

Once the policy has been in place long enough to produce results, a policy assessment check should be implemented. "Long enough" requires some sense of how long it should take for the policy to take hold. If a policy objective is, say, improved science skills, assessment must wait at least until one teaching cycle is completed.

If assessment reveals that the policy outcome is lacking, it does not necessarily mean that the policy design was faulty. Before coming to that conclusion, it is first necessary to check if shortcomings are the result of poor implementation. Human capital inadequacies, underfunding, or inadequate economic stimulus during the implementation stage are among the many possible causes of failure of a well-designed policy.

Thus, a policy should not be junked until the adequacy of its implementation is evaluated. On the other hand, if assessment reveals lacks in outcomes and if implementation can be shown to have been well done, then it is necessary to reexamine the policy decision and to determine what adjustments or new policies should be substituted for the original choice. Once this is accomplished, the planning for implementation and implementation stages of the cycle can be revisited.

Policy impact assessment is carried out using the same criteria employed during the policy evaluation stage. The difference is that, in the prior stage, these criteria were used to evaluate the adequacy of abstract policy. Here they are used to evaluate the adequacy of the concrete impact of these policies. Such assessment can test the adequacy of the assumptions held by policymakers at the original stage of policy selection. The criteria are: (1) desirability; (2) affordability; and (3) feasibility. The assessment process revolves around the following questions: What have been the actual *effects* of the policies in question? Are these effects *desirable* given the changes that were hoped for? Are the changes *affordable*? Did costs prevent their full implementation? Have cost over-runs made it unthinkable to implement them over a longer term or on a wider basis? Can the policy be lived with politically and socially? Under *feasibility*, have the personnel proven adequate to achieve the reform? Was the time sufficient to permit proper realization of intentions? Would impossibly large or specialized staffs and excessive periods of time be required to replicate reform in other circumstances?

Finally, even if the policy impact assessment concludes that the desired changes have been successfully implemented, policymakers should maintain vigilance for new changes required, as the environment of the educational system evolves. Just as scientific theories are never actually verified, only shown not to be disproved and always open to modification, so are policy initiatives always open to adjustment or reform. Given the rapid pace of contemporary change and the intimate links between an educational system and the rest of society, it is the unusual initiative which, even if successfully conceived and implemented, does not require significant adjustment, once in place and assessed.

Subsequent Policy Cycles

If a policy initiative is carried out systematically, the process of policy design, planning, implementation, impact assessment, and redesign will become iterative and, in theory, infinitely so, as figure 1.3 suggests. Policy analysis is best carried out continually, with knowledge accumulating from one cycle to the next. In this way an educational system can evolve with both respect for its past and in response to needed changes.

The conclusion, then, of policy analysis is never to conclude. Once implementation has been completed and policy outcomes are forthcoming, a policy impact assessment stage ensues which initiates a new policy cycle. If well institutionalized, this process should go on until society no longer needs education or educational policy!

Application of Policy Analysis

The above framework can serve as a guideline for the study of the dimensions of policymaking (processes and actors) over time. It can serve two major functions: (a) analysis *of* policy, i.e., analysis of existing policy content and its constructive process, and (b) analysis *for* policy, i.e., enlightening and influencing policies. First, it allows the introduction of a diverse set of variables and a detailed set of policymaking stages that provide approximation of the actual policymaking process. It can thus be used to assess existing country policies within the context of environmental variables: country situation, national perceptions about policy problems, policy "rationales", policy roots (spread and depth) in the national structure, etc. Second, policy analysis may be applied to evaluate projected policies, through a process of defining parameters of the environment, predicting outcomes of different policy options in a wide range of situations and under diverse conditions, and assessing the chances for the success of implementation of policy decisions within the country's elasticity for change.

In the next four chapters, the conceptual framework is used as a basis to analyze the process of education policymaking in:

Peru—where system-wide reform was introduced; the case study focuses on the integration of practical and academic subjects at the upper secondary level to resolve issues of equity and external efficiency;

Jordan—where a diversified curriculum was introduced at the secondary level to address the problem of high unemployment of general secondary school leavers and the growing need for technicians and skilled workers;

Thailand—where diversification was introduced to improve the external efficiency and equity of general secondary education; and

Burkina Faso—where rural nonformal education was introduced as a way of expanding access to primary education within a severely limited national budget.

Each case history documents the process of policymaking and recreates a real situation—it describes real events, people and issues and is typically structured around a decision or an action to be taken. The case tries to simulate the dynamics of decisionmaking and to represent as accurately but as economically as possible the factual background and setting of the event(s) in question, identify the key issues and players, present the information and actions leading to a policy decision, and documents the events that took place during implementation.

In all cases, the following questions are posed:

- Were the educational issues diagnosed and analyzed within the appropriate socio-economic and political context?
- Were all policy options to deal with these issues identified?
- Were the implications of such options properly derived?
- Were these implications fully evaluated in terms of their desirability, affordability, and feasibility?
- Was implementation of policy well enough planned and executed to allow for feedback and modifications?
- Was the impact of the policy properly assessed in order to determine whether to continue the policy, modify it, or go on to a new policy cycle?
- Were the countries' responses to assessment of the policy cycle appropriate?
- How were subsequent policy cycles similar to, or different from the initial policymaking cycle?

To answer these questions the policy *process* was analyzed, step by step, examining events within the context of the conceptual framework and the elements laid out in the previous section. The basis for the analysis was an extensive review of World Bank and other relevant reports of international and bilateral agencies, government documents, and research papers. Understandably, the scope of the information, analysis and conclusions are constrained by the availability, scope and nature of the data base. In order to make up for these constraints, interviews were conducted whenever feasible with participants in, or close observers of, some phases of the policy process.

Each case study follows the organization of the previous section, around the eight policy processes. In the summary section of each country study, a schematic diagram derived from figure 1.3 is developed illustrating the various processes as they relate to that case. The object of this approach is to depict how each step connects to another, which steps were overlooked or given short shrift, and to what extent a particular process was pursued.

PART II

COUNTRY CASES

2

Policymaking in Peru: Synoptic with Revolutionary Ideology

Introduction

Peru illustrates a case in which a government undertook policy reform in the synoptic mode. That is, a single central authority set afoot an integrated planning process that assumed that a rational, technical solution could be created and implemented to remedy the defects of the educational system. A chief interest of the case is that, twelve years after the radical reform program was begun, a succeeding government scrapped it. The span of events stretches from 1968 to 1980.

The Peruvian reform embraced the entire education system, from primary school all the way through to the university. It aimed at integrating practical and academic subjects in ways that would provide the country with

the intellectual power and the complete range of skills to achieve sustained economic and social development. It aimed equally at resolving issues of equity and external efficiency. This policy was well calculated and comprehensive, and was developed through a systematic process of diagnosis, response and action within a carefully planned program. The reform, however, was considered a failure. The following case study attempts to explain how this came about, employing the framework for education policy analysis developed in chapter one.

The Situation Leading to Policy Formulation in 1971

Country Background—Division and Inequity

A major background factor that helped explain inequity in the educational situation in 1968 is that Peru is a racially diverse country. Half its people—49 percent—are of pure Amerindian or aboriginal descent. One third—33 percent—are called *Mestizo*, because their ancestry includes aboriginal and European, mainly Spanish, strains. A further 12 percent are of European descent, again mainly Spanish, and called White; while the remaining six percent are African or Mulatto. As the inheritors of the Spaniards who invaded and conquered the Amerindians of Peru in the sixteenth century, and who imported the Africans as slaves over the next two centuries, the Whites and Mestizos held most political and economic power, and enjoyed most access to education. Their language, Spanish, was the sole medium of instruction in education, while the main aboriginal language, Quechua, spoken by more than 6 million people, was largely ignored.

Accentuating the racial division was the country's geography. Three very distinct regions divide the country not only physically, but also culturally, linguistically and occupationally. (1) Peru's coast, a mixture of large cities and farming zones, is the country's economically most advanced region; it is where most of the Whites and Mestizos live. (2) The Selva, or jungle area, is in the northeastern part of Peru opening up into the Amazon basin. This region is largely populated by indigenous peoples and tribes, and has been explored for riches since colonial times—most recently for oil; and (3) The Sierra, or Andean highlands, once the center of the Incan empire, is now largely a rural area of Amerindians scratching a living from subsistence agriculture. For hundreds of years these divisions and the social attitudes that accompanied them have contributed to a profound lack of communication, and have bedeviled the provision of social services such as education and public health.

Division was aggravated by disparity. Two percent of the agricultural estates, owned mainly by Whites and Mestizos, controlled 85 percent of Peru's land. The resultant inequality in income distribution was wide: in 1968, the richest 10 percent of the population received 50 percent of the national income, while the poorest 25 percent received only 3 percent. An emphasis on developing manufacturing industry for export had created a sector in the coastal region, which employed 15 percent of the labor force, but produced 21 percent of the country's income; whereas the 44 percent in the agricultural sector produced only 18 percent of that income. In effect, agricultural incomes were about one-fifth those in other sectors. These disparities had their reflections in inequities in education: Whites, Mestizos and urban populations enjoyed more access to education at all levels, and enjoyed better quality education than other groups. Within the Whites and Mestizos, the richer enjoyed more than the poorer. (See annex 2.2-2.5 for socio-economic profile.)

Socio-Political Context

In 1968 a military government took power from an elected civilian regime in a bloodless coup, and promised to redress the inequalities and inequities. It is helpful to know the events that led to this event. Since Peru took its independence from Spain in the 1820s, the dominant political forces had been the military and an oligarchy of some "forty families", usually ruling jointly to protect the interests of the latter. Despite sometimes bloody challenges, this alliance held power until 1963, when a liberal reformist government was elected with a very slim majority. The majority proved too thin to enable it to fulfill its promises of significant land redistribution, a more progressive rate of taxation and social reforms. Alongside, the political impasse induced financial problems: a balance of payments deficit, rising inflation and foreign pressures on the banking sector. Simultaneously, an adverse international economic climate reduced export earnings and brought the growth rate of the economy down from 6.4 percent in 1966 to 1.4 percent in 1968. Political opposition mounted to the point of threatening chaos, so in 1968 the military decided it must intervene once again.

This time, however, the military declared itself on the side not of the "forty families", but of the reformers and nationalism. It promised to undertake more effectively than the civilian regime had managed moves to greater equality, "social property," mass participation, nationalization and agrarian reform. It would reduce poverty and social inequity. For this, it won wide support among intellectuals, the Roman Catholic church and many interest groups. At the same time, it retained the support of the wealthy and business groups by aiming to restore economic growth and financial stability. Here, the new regime's strategy stressed immediate industrial development in the coastal region and improved infrastructure for the Sierra and Selva regions to integrate them more fully into the economy and to stimulate and diversify production in agriculture and forestry. To fulfill these objectives for growth and equity, the new regime declared that a more equal distribution of educational opportunities was essential.

The Education Sector

In 1968 Peru's population was approaching 14 million and, with growth in excess of three percent per year, was expected to reach 19 million by 1980. The education system therefore faced demands for an at least equally rapid rate of expansion. Further, slightly more than half of Peru's population lived in urban areas, with those areas growing, due to migration from the highland areas, at a rate over twice that of rural areas (1969 figures show a growth rate of 1.9 percent for the rural areas in contrast to 4.3 percent for urban areas). This fact presented one of many dilemmas for the policymakers: should urban education systems, already stronger than rural, be enabled to grow faster, or should rural systems be given compensatory attention?

A complicating factor was that those who migrated tended to have the highest educational attainment and economic positions in their rural communities: education was an accelerator of migration. It "brain-drained" rural communities, depriving them of both labor power and the benefits of an educated labor force; and added labor to cities that could not easily absorb them, despite relatively fast economic growth. In 1967, for instance, the national rate of unemployment was 5.2 percent, but in the metropolitan area of Lima-Callao it reached 26 percent. More important for policymakers to note was the signal that education was considered by its users and their families a preparation for lives and livelihoods not in rural areas and subsistence economies of self-employment and low incomes, but in towns and modern sectors of salaried employment with higher incomes. Demand for education was clearly associated with hopes for better occupations, incomes and status.

During the growth decades of the 50s and 60s, Peru's educational system had struggled to keep up with the mounting demand for educational services. Population growth, rural migration to the cities, and economic growth had combined to produce a situation where the social demand for schooling grew in overwhelming proportions. During the 1960s, average annual growth rates in enrollment were: 5.8 percent for primary, 13.0 percent for secondary, and 13.6 percent for university—all well ahead of the growth in population, and for the secondary and tertiary levels, well ahead of the growth of the economy also. Indeed, toward the end of the sixties, Peru was spending close to five percent of its GNP on education.

Expansion had not necessarily meant change, however. The formal content and structure of the system remained unaltered: a conventional ladder of primary, secondary and higher education, with secondary education branched into arts, sciences or technical fields, and higher education with two options—university studies, or professional training offered through polytechnic institutes.

Despite the impressive quantitative achievements, the education system which the new government inherited was found to have three basic defects that spelled serious social and economic problems for the future, namely, (a) insufficient supply of educational opportunities, (b) inequitable distribution of educational services, and (c) external inefficiencies.

First, regarding the issue of supply and *access*, primary schooling was still well short of universal provision. As the World Bank reports, about

2.4 million children were enrolled in primary school; though the figure represented over 100 percent of the 6-11 age group, it included some 20 percent of overage students. In effect, 20 of every 100 or some half million children were still not in school. Secondary education was even more limited: only about 30 percent of the age group of 12-16 years were enrolled. Higher education in the universities was available to only a very small elite (about 106,000).

Additionally, what supply there was, was poorly used, for *internal efficiency* was low throughout the system. Only 38 percent of primary enrollees completed the course. In secondary education, the graduation rate was even worse: just 12 percent. In university education, only 35-40 percent of entrants actually earned their degrees.

Second, the provision of *educational services* was uneven. Urban areas had benefited most from educational expansion. For instance, an OECD study in 1967 noted that in the Lima district only 18.4 percent of the population had not attended school, whereas in the southwest 70.3 percent had not. (The differences correlate strongly with the presence of large numbers of Indians having little or no knowledge of Spanish.) Similarly, the literacy rates in the early sixties were 85 percent in the urban areas and only 40 percent in the rural areas. Such disparities could be partially explained by topographical difficulties and wide demographic dispersion in the rural areas. Within urban areas, they coincided closely with socioeconomic status.

The issue of inequity was not restricted to the provision of schooling, but also to the quality of education. Differences existed in quality of physical resources, qualifications of teachers and availability of instructional materials. For instance, textbooks were produced by private companies and not supplied free to students. They were accessible only to those who could afford them. A similar situation prevailed amongst the 33 universities in Peru. A few private—expensive and accessible mainly to richer groups—universities in Lima (accounting for about 25 percent of the university population) had been able to get supplemental support from international sources and maintain academic standards by limiting admission and assuring the selection of only the best students (primarily graduates of the best private—again, expensive—secondary schools). The public universities, on the other hand, had come under rising pressure to increase enrollments beyond the resources afforded them, which had led to a perceived decline in the quality of the education they offered and assured.

This had not surprisingly had repercussions in the labor market. Large employers in the modern sector—including the government and public sector—used applicants' education as a first screen of suitability for employment. Low-level education screened for low-level jobs, high-level education for high-level jobs. Perceived disparities of quality led—or enabled—employers to discriminate between schools, and to favor the graduates of the better. For university level jobs, employers had created a two-tiered system, through which they graded graduates from the less prestigious universities as less qualified than their counterparts from the more select universities. Since university enrollments and graduations had been growing faster than the kinds of higher level posts university graduates were seeking, many graduates found that their educational investments and gains did not ensure them access to the occupations, incomes and status they had expected. However reasonable the employers' choices were, they unfortunately perpetuated the perception that the children of the wealthier groups still had unfair advantages over those from less privileged backgrounds. These private disappointments were regarded also as public losses, insofar as they represented a less than best use of human resources trained expensively at public cost. They could also be seen as seeds of political unrest.

This point leads to the third main issue, *external efficiency*. The education system was seen as overly academic and theoretical. Military and civilian experts alike saw it as isolated, irrelevant and incapable of preparing Peruvians for life. Specifically, the system was perceived as deficient in three respects: First, the subjects taught in school did not prepare the students for employment and participation in the economy. Second, the curriculum as well as the methodology of teaching and the values inculcated were grounded in Spanish-Mestizo high culture and economic privilege. Thus schools were not organized for the mass of students and the ranges of practical work they would eventually do; but for only a handful of fortunate adolescents whose futures lay through the university in a profession of the intellect, such as law or medicine.[1] Finally, a quite separate point of external efficiency, education was not used to forge a sense of national unity, but rather to preserve cultural divisions in the interest of the dominant class. In short, the education system was judged to serve neither the economic, cultural nor national interests of the society (See annexes 2.6–2.10 for data on Peru's education system prior to the reform.)

Potential for Change

The task the new regime defined for itself was to reform the education system to make it more accessible, equitable, internally and externally efficient. How difficult was this task going to be within the social, political, economic and institutional dynamics? In other words, what were the potential forces of resistance and accommodation and consequently what were the possibilities for initiating and sustaining an educational change?

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[1] The analysts of the time appear not to have examined the nature of the qualifications required by major employers for their more coveted positions, and the link between those and the demand for different kinds of education.

While the need for radical educational reform was a logical deduction from the analyses of both civilian and military experts, it did not flow as neatly from the interests of the various elements of Peruvian society concerned with education. Problems derived, in part, from the inability of some groups to adjust to radical reform, no matter how much they might desire it in the abstract. They also derived from genuine conflicts of interest among affected parties. Particularly vexing was the difficulty reconciling the egalitarian ideas of the "revolutionary" military government with desires for advancement—or "upward mobility"—of individual Peruvian citizens and families of virtually all social classes.

Government ministries, primary- and secondary-level teachers and their union, universities, community groups, parents and students each had their own notions of an educational reform. The differences among the interest of each, albeit sometimes slight, were enough to eventually slow down the pace of any reform. For example, while unanimously favoring reform, each ministry had its own priorities to advocate, with employees in the Ministry of Education especially concerned that their terms of employment not be eroded in the process. At the same time, the very strong and politically active teachers' union (SUTEP) was distrustful of the military government. While favoring reform, SUTEP had not been able to redress pay deficiencies with the former government and was suspicious of the military's intentions on this issue. Universities and private schools were concerned about maintaining their traditional institutional autonomy. Parents and students wanted reform to assure them that education, especially university education, was available and would guarantee economic gain and social status.

Additional complications concerned the Ministry of Education (ME). It was the obvious implementer of policy change. Yet it was highly centralized, overly complex, and with little appreciation of or sympathy for the needs of rural or provincial areas. More importantly, the military government identified the educational bureaucracy as itself both in need of, and a major obstacle to, change. Moreover, the military also regarded the teaching profession as "politicized," implying that the partisan leanings of teachers would make them, too, an impediment to reform. It therefore needed to identify some force which could compel the education profession to implement the reforms and maintain their impetus. In doing that, it would risk incurring the hostility of the education bureaucracy and teachers' organizations, but without that it would risk frustration.

The military sought the impetus from the people, particularly those from the lower socioeconomic strata, whose low level of education had hitherto excluded them from effective participation in decision making, and for whom the reform was created. Recognizing that such people were not organized to assert their views, the military promised to create associations of persons and "to orient the functioning of the associations, avoiding their manipulation by minorities or groups with interests extraneous to them." In fact, the regime created a variety of mechanisms, parallel to the public administration, to mobilize local initiatives in diverse domains and to channel communication between the local level and the military.

Finance was not seen as a barrier. Between 1965 and 1971, expenditure on education had increased at an annual rate of 9.2 percent, substantial but still less than the 13.7 percent annualized increase in total public expenditure for the period. The military's projected increase of 24.3 percent in education expenditure through 1975 was thought to be sufficient to fund the initial years of the reform. While some of these funds were expected to come from foreign loans and technical assistance, the bulk was anticipated from an economy bolstered by newly favorable terms of trade for export commodities.

Generating Policy Options

The military regime of 1968 was of course not the first to concern itself with educational reform. Peruvian educators, intellectuals and planners had long wrestled with the need to make the system better address equity and national development. Public studies done by civilians and confidential analyses carried out by the military at the start of both the 1963 Belaunde and 1968 Velasco governments pointed to the same issues and problems: inequitable access to education, insufficient relationship between education and work, outmoded and over centralized administration, inefficient use of resources, and inadequate servicing of national needs.

Policy options to resolve these problems of education were conceived as one component within a carefully planned program for reforming the whole national structure. This program, known as the "Inca Plan," was developed as part of the preparatory work by officers of the general staff school of the armed forces, the Center for Advanced Military Studies (CAEM). The plan contained 31 major areas, one of which was the "Reform of Education." Each area was characterized by a high degree of internal logical deduction and was divided into three parts: a critical diagnosis of the existing system, a statement of revolutionary objectives, and a list of specific actions.

Conceived as one means to achieve social transformation, educational reform could be fully effective, only if it were geared to all the necessary reforms in other sectors. This approach was emphasized by the Minister of Education in 1969:

> "We are convinced that there is an enormous disparity between our present education system and the needs arising from the social situation in Peru. For this reason reform must be total."

Similarly, the interdependence between educational policies and other reforms was emphasized in 1970 by President Velasco:

> "Unless there is an enduring, far-reaching and effective transformation of Peruvian education, there can be no guarantee of the success and continuity of the revolution's other structural reforms. Thus educational reform, the most complex but perhaps the most important of all, is a vital necessity for Peru's development and a major objective of our revolution."

Due to the revolutionary nature of decisionmaking, there was no question as to whether a policy change should take place in education or not. The real options were basically about which objectives were best suited to revolutionary goals, what educational policies should be adopted, and how best to effect these policies. As a first step towards generating policy options within the general revolutionary model, Velasco surrounded himself with a group of military advisors, called the Comite de Asesoramiento de la Presidencia (Presidential Advisory Committee) or COAP, whose members were widely recognized as the voices behind the scenes. The views of COAP members were, in turn, much influenced by a small number of civilian advisors. For example, Cornell-trained sociologist Carlos Delgado, considered by some to be the father of the educational reform, was one of the few nonmilitary persons to have the President's ear and was consulted frequently. The make-up of the COAP was not always known and in general the tendency of its members was to the left of the overall military's thinking. It happened also that, although a given ministry might propose a policy, the government's eventual decision reflected the influence of the COAP, causing controversy and jealousy among the military and civilians whose proposals had been set aside.

The 1968 promise of an overall educational reform met with such widespread skepticism, that in 1969 the government established a civilian Educational Reform Commission. Because the Inca Plan identified the educational bureaucracy as a target for change and the teaching profession as politicized, the Commission was predominantly made up of individuals who came from outside the Ministry of Education and who were mostly left-wing intellectuals with strong university training and ties. As indicated earlier, unless skillfully handled, this could create a solid alliance of opposition from the very people who would have to implement the Commission's proposals.

The Commission published its findings in a report entitled *Reform of Peruvian Education: General Report.* The Report epitomized the revolutionary style of generating policy options through rational deduction carried in three phases: diagnosis, response, action. From the identification of issues in the existing situation there followed the general objectives to be pursued by the State as a logical response; from which flowed an outline of the "logical" policies and actions consistent with the first two phases.

In its diagnosis, the *Report* identified the following defects in education:

- Inequities (neglect of children from marginal groups and minorities, lack of regional participation in education);
- External inefficiencies (lack of responsiveness to the training needs of the economy, disconnectedness from reality);
- Outmoded and rigid structure (rigidity, bureaucratism, routine, intellectualism, memorization, academizing tendency, administrative and financial distortion);
- Inadequate training and selection of teachers;
- Lack of Peruvian spirit.

The Commission's response was a set of overall objectives for education aiming to create "the new Peruvian man in a new Peruvian society." These objectives were:

- Education for work geared to the integral development of the country;
- Education for structural transformation and improvement of Peruvian society;
- Education for the self-affirmation and independence of the Peruvian nation within the international community.

To fulfill these objectives, any option short of a comprehensive reform was considered inadequate. For instance, expansion of academic education nationwide would have met the objective of equity but not external efficiency. Likewise, provision of either academic or vocational education would have created inequality in conditions for work. Finally, while the provision of vocational education for all would have met the criteria of equity and external efficiency, it would have negated the humanistic objective of education. The only logical option to meet all objectives, in the view of the Commission, was a thorough restructuring of the system to provide one type of broadbased and relevant education to everybody.

More specifically, the Commission's policy option called for a shift from a traditional primary, secondary and higher educational structure to one involving a basic education program followed by higher education. Centros de Educación Basica (CEBs) were to combine the previous primary and secondary education cycles and reduce them from 11 years to nine. In addition, the last two or three years of basic education were to focus on vocational or practical skills training. At the end of this time, graduates would be prepared for semi-skilled occupations and functions, or could continue with their education. After the completion of the nine-year basic education, students would begin higher education with a first cycle called Escuelas Superiores de Educación Profesional (ESEPs), or higher schools of professional education. These would combine obligatory academic and practical elements in a three-year program and would be open to all graduates of basic education. ESEPs would be the only form of public secondary education in Peru, and graduation from them would be a requirement for admission to universities.

In addition to serving as an instrument for the military's goals of making educational opportunity both universal and practical, the ESEPs were also consonant with an emerging trend in international education: the diversification of curriculum. By requiring the combination of vocational and academic teaching, the Peruvian military and its advisors had developed an option for secondary education which would attract enthusiastic support from international funding agencies.

From this point, the case history will focus on the ESEPs, rather than on the total package of educational reform, as they provide a clear and manageable example for testing the frame of policy analysis.

Evaluation of Policy Options

The policy objectives and elements were evaluated at three separate points prior to being presented for policy decision in 1972: (1) An option of "revolutionary" egalitarian reform was presented to the nation as a promise when the military seized power in 1968; (2) This promise was refined by the civilian-staffed Educational Reform Commission in the preparation of its 1970 blue-book *General Report;* and (3) It was reviewed by the military with a widespread public through both open and private, but informal, discussion with all interested groups for two full years.

At each of these stages implications were drawn for the impact the proposed policy would have on Peruvian society, and estimates were made of how it would be financed and how human and material inputs would be mustered. At each stage, however, a powerful *a priori* deciding factor was in the minds of the military. Educational reform was seen as the key to the realization of their goals of "the liberation of man" and "the creation of a new society" based on Christian humanist values and the equitable treatment of all citizens.

Desirability

This *a priori* desirability of reform convinced the military that any reluctance to embrace their policies would evaporate, once people understood that it would result in greater equality of both opportunity and the distribution of wealth. In an effort to promote that understanding, when the *General Report* was released, a group of young men and women, chosen for their support of the revolutionary social aims, were trained by members of the Reform Commission for about three months and sent to different parts of the country to sensitize and mobilize the public. Further, the military and their advisers thought that the benefits of the reform would become evident to inhabitants of rural and marginal areas when they saw the first ESEPs built in areas with little prior access to secondary education. Finally, they believed that the sanctity of the law establishing the reform would assure cooperation from university officials and would convince international donors to help with financing for teacher and administrator training.

Those affected by the proposed policy viewed the law quite differently. To begin with, university officials saw it as a threat to their interests. First, they had not been explicitly or officially consulted during the generation of policy options. Many felt that the military and the Education Commission had consulted only the few likely to favor the reforms. Thus, outsiders, probably unqualified, were settling their fate. Second, the proposed ESEP program would infringe on their right to determine what preparation university education required, since the increased emphasis on professional subjects would entail a reduction—in their eyes, a deterioration—of academic readiness. Third, the reform proposed to slow down the growth rate of tertiary education and decrease the overall number of students admitted to the university, and thus trespassed on their right to govern their own development. Fourth, perhaps most importantly, the orientation and approach of the reform transformed the traditional role of the university: from guardians and transmitters of eternal humanistic and academic values, the universities would become merely advanced vocational schools responding to the shifting winds of the economy. The universities drew this conclusion from one of the ESEPs' main objectives, the attenuation of the traditional separation and devaluation of technical vis a vis academic courses. If the ESEPs had to specialize in subprofessional fields, the universities would be required to follow suit at the professional level. Their academic mission would vanish.

The student body found itself allied with the university officials. Slowing the growth rate of the universities would cut back on educational, and therefore on economic and social opportunity for all social classes; while professionalizing the curriculum as early as the tenth year of education might both be premature for many young people and narrow the range of openings to the modern sector.

Even the intended main beneficiaries, the poorer and less educated people were also, at best, ambivalent to the proposed policy. Some saw plans to introduce instruction in their home communities in their native tongues not as an effort to reduce educational inequality, but as an attempt to keep them uneducated: learning Spanish was the only way they could see to integrate successfully with the larger society. Also, valuing a university education as a key to social and economic mobility, many stated a preference for traditional academics rather than the new ESEPs.

However, the military regime gave no weight to these objections to the desirability of the ESEPs.

Affordability

Systematic attempts to evaluate the affordability of the reform were given short shrift also. The 1970 *General Report* included only a short chapter on how the proposed reform would be financed, and even that analysis was more hortatory than evaluative. That chapter treated finances as a matter of distribution. It suggested that Peru's educational system could become properly balanced, hence financed, through improving the quality of educational materials, using existing teachers better, scheduling buildings and classrooms for multiple uses, implementing coeducation, using new technology and mass communication, and streamlining administration. Along the same lines it suggested that value transformation would inspire the most promising students to become teachers and to volunteer for a period of free public service upon graduation.

The Ministry of Finance did undertake more serious attempts to identify sources of revenue to finance the reform. Basic to the scheme was the requirement that local communities detail *both* their needs as well as their financial contributions to the education budget. While projections of expenditures and revenue flows for different levels of reform implementation were carried out well into the 1980s, assumptions about the economic bases of the revenue side were largely simplistic, or, at best, hazy.

Feasibility

The feasibility of implementing the reform was also evaluated hazily, at best. The reformers noted that sufficient numbers of properly trained teachers would be crucial to the success of the reform. However, they never squarely confronted how to provide incentives to undergo the needed training and to attract highly trained professionals to live in less desirable areas or regions. They recognized that pay for teachers was deficient and that support for training should be solicited internationally, but did no adequate analysis of how to provide the human resources basic to the reform.

Time was another feasibility factor analyzed hazily. A schedule for reform implementation was established, but few officials seriously considered that it could be met. The visionaries placed much reliance on popular enthusiasm for implementing the reform. As the time approached to make the policy decision, a Ministry of Education document noted the need to create a more realistic schedule, but the political urgency created by the delay of four years from the initial promise of reform swept away such considerations.

In short, the evaluations of desirability, affordability and feasibility required by an ideal model of policy analysis, and indeed consistent with the regime's own rational approach, were far from satisfactory.

Making the Policy Decision

Nonetheless, on November 7, 1972 the military government promulgated a sweeping reform law covering all levels and types of education, calling for the participation of the community in the education process, the reorganization of the country's education bureaucracy, and the establishment of a curriculum related to Peru's development requirements. The law, though not significantly different from the 1970 *General Report*, reflected a certain degree of feedback from the two years of public and professional informal discussions that separated the two documents. While there was no systematic discussion of other policy options, modifications had been considered indirectly when specific interest groups responded forcefully to the proposed policy. But in such cases the changes were ad hoc responses devised to avoid rejection or opposition, rather than integral components of a systematic effort at policy design. More importantly, however, the law reflected the Government's conviction that its diagnosis of the situation was accurate and comprehensive, and its response (policies and strategies) was desirable, affordable and implementable.

The policy decision—the Reform Law—had three unique characteristics: it was comprehensive, consistent with national policies, and radical. First, the law was comprehensive in scope covering all levels and types of education and called for the participation of all Peruvians in the education process and the establishment of a curriculum consistent with to the country's social values and economic needs. It specified objectives, functions, educational structure and content, methodology and physical resources. Unfortunately, the policy decision was announced before it had been supported by an equally comprehensive analysis of the practical steps required to implement it comprehensively. The consequence, discussed below, was that much of the real planning had to be done ad hoc during implementation.

Second, the policy makers had clearly striven to make the reform consistent with the reforms in other sectors. In spite of some obvious lack of coordination and communication among different sectors, there appeared to be one overall development plan, political-economic in nature, around which all of the individual sectoral reforms were shaped.

Finally, the new policy was radical. It launched such a substantial departure from the existing situation, that it was more of a revolution than a reform. It required rethinking education in all its aspects. This could be contemplated only in an environment where the society was redesigning its very self. Such radicalism demanded a proportionate reformation of the institutional infrastructure, and strong political backing. On both counts the government showed awareness, and attempted action. It did plan for infrastructural changes designed to foster change on a long-term basis, and before the law was passed, it carried out a campaign to mobilize public opinion behind the reform, as noted in the earlier section.

Planning for Policy Implementation

Once the reform law was passed, the Ministry of Education (ME)—so roundly criticized in the Inca Plan—was put in charge of planning its implementation. In its initial projection ME targeted 1978—a six-year period—as the date for realizing the reform. However, as planning and initial implementation progressed, ME appreciated that a much longer horizon was needed and that the reform would have to be implemented in stages. 1980 was the initial revised completion target date—an eight-year span. But as ME and its military backers began to recognize that more detailed planning was necessary and that financial and human resources were more limited than originally imagined, 1990—10 years more—was set as a more realistic target.

The result of this evolution of planning was a three-phase schedule for reform to be implemented over a period of fifteen to twenty years. The first phase was designed to focus on institutional changes, administrative reforms, and the transformation of primary education. Phase two, scheduled to begin in 1976, was to focus on transforming secondary education and establishing the ESEP system. Since the traditional and ESEP systems would have to run simultaneously during this phase, coordinating them would be essential. ME estimated, for example, that by 1980, 170,000 of Peru's 370,000 secondary level students would be enrolled in ESEPs, and the balance in traditional schools. Phase three, scheduled to take place between 1985 and 1990, would complete the reform and extend the new system nationwide.

To implement this schedule, plans were drawn up to mobilize the financial, human, physical, technical, administrative, and political resources needed to make the reform a success. Estimates of financial needs acknowledged that the reform would require increased education expenditures both in absolute terms and as a percentage of the government's budget. However, a critical weakness of the financial planning, especially in light of the comprehensive scope of the reform, was a lack of scenarios for different levels of expenditures and revenues—especially one for higher-than-expected expenditures and lower-than-expected revenues.

The experimental ESEP program, provides an example. It was crucial both to the government's hopes for skilled personnel to lead the society and economy, and to popular aspirations for social and economic mobility. So the wherewithal for its implementation had to be assured. However, it was put in a special category, with the bulk of its initial costs to be financed from international sources. Loans from the governments of Hungary and Canada and the World Bank were judged essential for its implementation. Yet the planners provided no fallback, should such loans be delayed or denied.

Building costs were expected to consume a particularly significant proportion of the budget for educational reform. While total education expenditures were planned to increase by 150 percent by 1980, capital expenditures were expected to increase 1,000 percent and to grow from four percent of the education budget to more than 15 percent. Here again, the ESEP was a major element, with huge calls for laboratories and workshops.

Skilled human resources were seen as critical to the success of the reform. So plans were outlined to train 72,000 primary teachers, 27,000 secondary school teachers, and 13,000 for universities by 1980. Even so, ME was concerned that an insufficient number of qualified university instructors would be available. Yet ME did not work out plans to meet such a contingency.

The key to the administrative aspect of the reform was its objective of decentralizing control of education. Plans were drawn up to create educational nuclei throughout the country. Each nucleus was intended to assess local needs, adapt existing resources to service them, and generate community support for the reformed educational system. The government and ME expected that this aspect of the reform would be particularly difficult due to the entrenched practices of the existing system and the lack of familiarity of local communities with support for and input into education. However, the planners were optimistic that the good fit of the educational component with the overall national reform would ensure its success.

Planning was also begun to mobilize political support for the reform. Planners clarified the objectives, benefits, and roles for teachers, administrators, and community members. They designed incentives to motivate teachers to gain additional training and to participate in the more innovative aspects of the reform, and they took steps to increase long-neglected teacher salaries. Guidelines were drawn up for the effective participation of educational administrators in the new programs, and community members were canvassed about the new opportunities and responsibilities embodied in the reform. (See annex 2.11 for data used to plan the reform.)

Policy Implementation

The "proof" of Peru's education reform was in the "pudding" of policy implementation. Despite its long development and careful articulation, the plan's haziness led to continual modification: schedules and completion dates; school sites; numbers of schools; purchasing procedures; personnel, both in terms of numbers and skill; funding provisions; in these and other aspects, unanticipated constraints and reactions compelled reassessment and adjustment.

The ultimate modification, withdrawal from the policy, occurred while implementation was still far from completion. Although there were many reasons for the decision to abandon the reform, implementation issues were among the most prominent. These were most salient in the government's decisions to delete a number of key institutions from the reform due to a combination of unanticipated fiscal constraints and growing doubt about its essential soundness.

In addition, even within a modified scope, a combination of factors caused a time overrun of 71 percent. For the ESEPs, management weaknesses, staff turnover, unavailability of counterpart funds, unfamiliarity with procedures for World Bank and other donor funds and insufficient field supervision, all contributed to slow implementation. Severe limitations existed within ME regarding the ability to let contract bidding, and months of delay resulted from a mutual lack of understanding of the complex laws and regulations by both the World Bank and the government. Furthermore, frequent complaints were made against the Peruvian government and international lenders about improper bidding and contract procedures. This reflected Peruvian difficulty with internationally accepted procedures and legislation.

For example, the necessity for training and preparing administrative personnel and specialized teachers was recognized from the outset. To assure this, the World Bank offered a loan for training abroad and for importing trainers into Peru. The loan was resisted, partly because the Peruvian government expected a grant for the same purpose from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). So the Bank's loan for training was reduced, and made contingent on the CIDA grant. When difficulties arose with the CIDA program, the Bank-financed technical assistance was further delayed and only became operational in a further reduced form in late 1976.

Aggravating the difficulties of implementation was a deteriorating political situation. In 1975, after Velasco's failing health had led to many internal government problems, public discontent, political repression, and a withdrawal from the populist reforms, an internal military coup replaced Velasco and a new president, General Francisco Morales Bermudez, took power. Although Morales promised to implement the reform fully, and was initially supported by some of Velasco's opponents, it was soon discovered that he did not intend to follow the reform. His government, plagued with economic as well as political problems, became increasingly more repressive and authoritarian, although the educational reform per se was not officially modified during the four years of his rule. To make matters worse, the international economic situation was also rapidly deteriorating and in 1978, Morales Bermudez had to implement severe austerity measures, causing extreme uproar nationwide. This finally forced him to acknowledge the military's failure in governing the country and to declare the end of military rule by setting a 1980 date for presidential elections.

Extreme financial problems obviously affected the country's ability to support educational reform. There simply were not enough funds available to pump into the new educational system, particularly not for new buildings and programs, when the existing system was greatly lacking in resources—financial, material, and human.

Another serious area of difficulty for implementation was the lack of deep support for the reform among interest groups: teachers, university students, parents, and ME's policymakers. As Velasco became sick, divisions appeared, and the death of Sebastian Salazar Bondy, a leading Peruvian intellectual and educational thinker, helped them to harden. The teachers, whose support was essential, were organized in their strong and politically active union, SUTEP, and opposed the educational reform, less because of any specific policy, than because of their overall opposition to the military government and their legitimate complaints of being underpaid, over-worked, lacking materials, and insufficiently trained.

Secondary and university students, likewise, tended to belong to the opposition or at least support it. They opposed the ESEP program particularly, because it would decrease the overall number of students admitted to the public universities, as noted above, and might make it more difficult to satisfy the academic requirements of the private universities. (One impact of curtailing the public universities had been the growth of private institutions which arose to meet the unsatisfied demand.) In addition, those politically on the left opposed the reform, since limiting enrollments was also seen as limiting the numbers of potential sympathisers.

In the end, (by the late 1970s) the objective of immediate overall reform was discarded in favor of setting up an experimental group of ESEPs. The planners had concluded that it was impossible to implement their original objective of offering ESEP practical/technical education to all secondary school students by 1980, and that what was required was a pilot project designed to test out the elements of reform before full nationwide implementation.

Policy Impact Assessment

In 1980, the military regime gave way to an elected president. The new president was the very person ousted by the military 12 years earlier, Fernando Belaunde Terry. He could have had the progress and impact of the educational reform formally assessed. Instead, he chose to allow the partially implemented reform to languish and to allocate to the traditional structures whatever support was available to education.

Had Belaunde carried out a policy impact assessment, his findings would likely have mirrored those of the World Bank team that evaluated the state of the Peruvian reform at the end of the military regime. The team noted that the impact of even the pilot project of schools providing basic education (CEBs) and higher schools of professional education (ESEPs) could not be evaluated because its implementation was so delayed, that it did not begin operation until 1980—actually after newly-elected President Belaunde had reversed the policy decision on educational reform. Thus the ESEP system was finally launched in a context in which it was clear that it would soon be either wholly abandoned or radically changed. Furthermore, since the first students would not graduate for three years, the idea of seriously assessing even a single cohort of students had to be delayed until 1983.

Despite this, it can be said that the pilot project did begin. By 1981 24 CEBs and 12 ESEPs were planned for operation. In part due to the existence of international funding for these projects, 22 of the CEBs and eleven of the ESEPs were actually functioning in 1981. Twenty-five thousand students were enrolled in the CEBs, although the basic skills portion of the curriculum was never implemented, and an additional 4,000 adults were enrolled in community-based informal primary programs. While experimental in nature, these operations were important for educational enrollments during the period. They accounted for 17 percent of all new enrollment in Grades one through six, and half of new enrollment for Grades seven through nine.

The ESEPs were less successful in terms of enrollments. Ten thousand places were available for Grades 10 through 12, but only 4,800 students registered. This under-enrollment was judged to be caused by two factors: (1) uncertainties regarding the future value of ESEP education, since by 1981 it appeared in danger of abandonment by the government; and (2) the weak articulation of the ESEP programs with the university programs. The early opposition of the universities over inadequate representation on the original reform committees had been reinforced by financial and academic concerns. The universities neither modified entrance qualifications nor agreed to guarantee ESEP graduates entrance rights. So, although the reform stipulated that ESEP graduates should have access to universities without entrance examinations, the universities declined to conform. Hence, while prereform secondary schools were still in operation, their graduates had better chances to enter universities than did the ESEP graduates. Obviously, then, parents opted, when given a choice, to send their children to prereform secondary schools instead of the ESEPs.

The World Bank evaluation team viewed the overall functioning of the CEBs to be satisfactory, although it cited equipment and specialist teacher deficiencies as well as persistence of traditional teaching forms in the new structure. The Bank team, however, evaluated ESEP implementation more harshly, echoing criticism voiced by a 1978 UNESCO report, which pointed out that, despite the stress the reform had placed on redressing regional educational disparities, the quality of teachers in rural and Quechua-speaking areas was below that of urban schools. Furthermore, the report indicated that, for all of its emphasis on practical education, ESEP training did not promise to match Peru's labor market needs (see annex 2.12). Finally, ESEP costs were cited as a significant problem, with some estimates placing them as three times as expensive as traditional secondary schools.

These problems were especially weighty in the early 1980s. Peru was experiencing extreme financial difficulty, and combined unemployment and underemployment rates were estimated at 50 percent of the labor force. Despite plans to reverse the 1965 to 1970 drop in government education expenditure, by 1979 allocations had fallen to 11 percent of the national budget, an all-time low in relative terms and lower in absolute terms than the 1970 figure. One of many consequences was that in 1980 teacher's salaries, despite the government's intention to increase them, stood at only 43 percent of their 1973 real level.

In sum, if a policy impact assessment had been carried out, it would have identified grave problems with implementation. More problematic, however, would have been identifying the root causes of the problems. In retrospect, fault could easily have been found with both the content of the original policy and with its implementation. Making constructive suggestions for alternative policies, which were not only desirable but also feasible and affordable, would have been much more difficult.

The New Policy Cycle

In 1980, President Belaunde had, theoretically, before him at least four options for the future of the reform: (1) continuing the reform as had been planned; (2) continuing the reform with modifications in addition to those which had already been introduced; (3) overtly rejecting the premises of the 1972 reform, the institutions it had spawned, and reinstituting traditional education; or (4) the course he adopted, allowing the reformed institutions to languish through neglect and committing the government's existing resources to strengthening traditional education.

Technically, the President might have been advised to opt for one of the first two choices, as the reform was only beginning to be implemented. As it had been long debated at all levels of Peruvian society, its abandonment would be seen as rejection of many years of effort and many million dollars of expenditure. The President's choice, however, was not made on strictly technical grounds. His election constituted a rejection of what the military government had stood for in Peru. Educational reform had been one of the central elements of the military program and one which had the most direct impact on Peru's population. Therefore, in response to the basis of his electoral support, options three and four were the only two seen as viable by the President and his advisers.

Belaunde's ultimate choice of neglect rather than overt rejection was based on the relative feasibility of the two options. Overt rejection would have meant confronting a still influential segment of Peru's polity—a distraction, no matter how discredited reform advocates had become during the last years of military rule. Furthermore, a policy of neglect allowed "events to take their course," and did not require special funding appropriations for highly visible programs of institutional dismantling and reassembly.

At the start of this new policy cycle, Peru was still poor and still severely divided geographically, ethnically and economically. The urban population was continuing to grow, reaching 67 percent in 1980 (vs. 40 percent in 1961). Peru was rapidly becoming an industrial and service economy in great need of development and faced with serious structural problems: a weak public administration, many poorly managed public enterprises, a large external debt, inadequately trained human resources, increasing unemployment and underemployment, a highly skewed income distribution, poorly structured public spending, a distorted price system, a repressed financial system, and inflation between 60-70 percent. Economic recovery became the primary focus of the new President and his advisers. The strategy to be implemented involved import liberalization, the modification of interest and exchange rates, promotion of exports, and modifications of labor and corporate laws.

In regard to education, President Belaunde, in his 1981 Address, stressed a literacy campaign and the elimination of inequitable distribution of educational services, particularly in rural and border zones. He also declared that a new Education Law would be proposed that was not intended to destroy previous efforts, but rather to reinforce the positive aspects from past experience and to improve on the negative ones.

In the months following this address, the implementation of the reform gradually came to a complete halt, and new structures were again introduced through ministerial resolutions pending the final approval of a comprehensive education law, which was not passed until 1983. The 1983 Law abolished the concept of a 9-year basic education followed by the ESEP, and reinstated the 6-year primary school followed by a 5-year secondary school divided into a general 2-year cycle and a diversified 3-year cycle. In turn, the ESEPs became Higher Technical Institutes.

With regard to administration, the reform's decentralization effort was amended through the replacement of its nine Regional Offices by 25 Department Offices, with its Zonal Offices remaining subordinate administrative entities for larger geographical Departments (20 Zonal offices in the new structure). Under the new system, municipalities were assigned an important role in school administration, supervision, and community participation, thus partly taking over the role of the school nuclei. Finally, the administrative structure of the Ministry of Education was overhauled once again.

Conclusions

In order to provide a fuller understanding of the policymaking conceptual framework developed in chapter one and applied to this case study, a schematic diagram based on the model (figure 2.1) summarizes the various processes as they relate to this case. The object of this approach is to depict how each step connects with another, which steps were overlooked or given short shrift, and to what extent a particular process was pursued. Some general conclusions follow.

The Peruvian reform clearly demonstrates a case of a highly calculated, systematic, internally consistent, and comprehensive mode of policymaking. The case pivoted on a "unitary, rational" revolutionary actor, the military government, who through a systematic and technical process of diagnosis, response and action went about finding the "correct" solutions to educational problems, and radically reforming the system. This synoptic method of policy development assumed: (a) that the problem at hand did not go beyond man's cognitive abilities, (b) that there existed "correct" solutions to problems rather than "political" accommodations of warring interests, and that these solutions could be discovered by the right technical experts, and (c) that there existed agreed criteria by which solutions could be judged, and that once people "saw the light" they would have adequate incentives to support and implement these solutions.

Indeed, educational policies were formulated on the basis of a serious diagnosis of the economic, social and educational situation. While earlier governments had been aware of the country's educational problems, the leaders of the Velasco government focused more clearly than any previous regime on the insufficient supply of educational opportunities, the inequitable distribution of educational services, and the external inefficiencies of the system. Moreover, they conceived their policies within a carefully planned program of action for reforming the whole national structure, and emphasized the interdependence between educational policies and other reforms. Their plans for the education sector itself were characterized by a high degree of internal logical deduction and comprehensive coverage.

Where was the fatal flaw? It seems that the apparent strength of the Peruvian approach to policy making was actually its main weakness. The initial mistake lay in the manner in which policy options had been generated by the military planners and their civilian advisors. Perhaps influenced by the top-down discipline of the military hierarchy, the government acted as if, once it had identified the best option for Peru, the



Figure 2.1 Policymaking in Peru

1968
FORMULATION
EVALUATION
ADOPTION
IMPLEMENTATION
1980
NEW POLICY CYCLE
CONCEPTUAL WORLD
PROCESS
EMPIRICAL WORLD
Restructured system: Universal diversified secondary schools (ESEPs)
Consequences
• Liberation of man
• Creation of new society
• Brings improved quality and efficiency
• Self-financing
Generation of options
Desirability: Yes by government, no by university officials and students. Poor, ambivalent. Affordability: maybe. Feasibility: ?
Yes
Policy Decision
Announcement of sweeping reform. Strategic, synoptic, radical, consistent with national reform
Policy Decision
Abandonment of reform. Reinstatement of traditional system
Planning
3-phase plan institutional, administrative, financial, political
Implementation
• Modification of scope
• Discarding overall reform in favor of pilot phase
Study by military within reform of national structure: "Inca Plan"
Analysis
• Reform-minded military government
• Income-inequality, rural-urban migration, poverty, unemployment, inflation
• Education system: chaotic, inadequate, inequitable, outmoded
• Potential for change high
• Limited implementation
• Reform resisted
• ESEPs more expensive than technical schools
• ESEPs do not match needs of labor market
Re-election of Belande (Ouster of military government)
SITUATION A
SITUATION B
SITUATION B'

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citizenry would listen and respond to the new orders. To the extent that this did not happen, they reasoned, public education would surely convince people that they should support the new plan with enthusiasm. Missing was an understanding of the difficulty of rapidly altering basic cultural values and the profound nexus in the family between these values and parents' aspirations for their children. While the egalitarian revolutionary objectives of the new regime were applauded in principle by Peru's citizens, they clashed sharply with deeply held individualist aspirations for securing social mobility. Rather than recognizing the importance of these values for its citizens and developing policy options which took them into account, the military regime concentrated on plans fitting with their deductively generated view of the needs of Peru as a collectivity. Despite elaborate efforts at consultation and public education, the Velasco regime could not convince enough Peruvian citizens that they and their families should, as individuals, actively participate in the government's revolutionary reform. This reluctance was particularly baffling to many of the government's military leaders because they noted broad support, in principle, for their reform.

While possible implications of the 1972 reform were discussed at length in both public and private, this stage of the policy process was similarly hampered by the narrow range of options under consideration. In fact, in addition to downplaying the depth of its citizens pre-existing personal aspirations, another aspect of Peru's future was also taken for granted by the Velasco government: the support of the international environment.

Plans for Peru's educational reform were drawn up at the same time that the OPEC-led oil price increase was contributing to rises and seemingly limitless horizons for world prices for Peru's commodity exports. Furthermore the regime was optimistic about enlarging sources of international support for its revolutionary reforms and aimed to combine not only North American and Western European, but also Eastern European loans and grants in implementing its plans. In evaluating policy options, it paid little attention to the possibility that commodity prices might level off or even drop and that important members of the international community might lose their enthusiasm for or even oppose the government's revolutionary reforms. By the end of the military government, both of these unforeseen eventualities had occurred. The fact that they had not been planned for or even anticipated, while less fatal than the misgauging of domestic support, further weakened the military regime's ability to make a success of its reform.

The process of making the policy decision was, itself, a mixture of strengths and weaknesses. The strengths largely derived from the broad based and lengthy attempts at consultation carried out by the military regime as well as the clarity of the ultimate decision as articulated in the 1972 decree-law. The weakness was in the inability of the military to see, as a result of the undercurrent of dissatisfaction present from the beginning to the end of its consultations, that the reform was too revolutionary to be accepted by its citizens, at least in the short run. And, to make matters worse, to the extent that the government was aware of the improbability of success, it decided on a process of staged implementation. This allowed citizens and communities who preferred Peru's traditional educational system to the regime's revolutionary reform to exercise their opposition.

Once the decision had been made and plans for implementation were drawn up, the process mirrored those of generating and evaluating policy options. Goals were set and committed reformers moved full steam ahead to make plans to implement them. Reluctantly they were slowed by signs of popular nonsupport and erosion of foreign support. Foreign help was particularly crucial for the most experimental aspects of the reform such as the ESEP professional education schools. Doubts about the feasibility of the reform's objectives slowed the flow of foreign technical and financial support which initially had hailed the Peruvian experiment as path breaking for its plans to implement diversified education full-scale. By the time Fernando Belaunde Terry had returned to power in 1980, only a ghostly skeleton of the 1972 reform had been implemented.

All this points to the vital linkages between the educational system and the socio-politico-economic structure. Any policy change, therefore, is not purely technical or unitarily rational. Different interest groups each have their own legitimate "rationality" for understanding and responding to an educational initiative. Rather than perfecting the "correct" reform to be implemented by obedient managers, and converting the public to the unitary rationality, it is certainly more productive, in the long run, to seek to understand the processes through which tradeoffs are accomplished among the interests underlying the various rationalities relevant to a given policy choice.

In unobtrusively dropping the military government's reform and pursuing a new policy approach, President Belaunde was hardly systematic. However, his *de facto* initiation of a new policy cycle was more closely attuned to the deep-seated preferences of Peru's citizens and the administrative and financial capacities of the nation. Nonetheless, the nonsystematic beginning of this new policy cycle presaged future problems with educational planning in Peru.

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
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Rio Huallaga
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Rio Urubamba
Rio de las Piedras
Rio Madre de Dios
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Tumbes
Talara
Paita
Sullana
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Cusco
Abancay
Pisco
Ica
Nazca
Juliaca
Puno
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Desaguadero
Arequipa
Mollendo
Moquegua
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Selected Towns
National Capital
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Peru: Annex 2.2

Peru: A Socioeconomic Profile, Selected Years

	1968-1970	*1980-1982*
Total population	14,000,000	17,389,000
Percentage of urban population	52.5%	74.0%
Average annual population growth (over decade)	3.1%	2.1%
Literacy rate	67%	89%
Birth rate per 1,000 inhabitants	41	38
Mortality per 1,000 inhabitants	10	10
Infant mortality per 1,000 live births	70	86
Years of life expectancy	61	60

Source: Inter-American Development Bank.

Peru: Per Capita GNP, Selected Years



Source: Inter-American Development Bank, World Bank.

Peru: Composition of Labor, 1960 and 1980



Source: Inter-American Development Bank, World Bank.

Peru: Work Force and Agriculture Sector Work Force, Selected Years



Source: Inter-American Development Bank, World Bank.

Peru: Educational Disparity in Schooling by Language Group and Region, 1972

Urban Quechua Population



Numbers in thousands.
Source: UNESCO mission to Peru.

Peru: Educational Disparity in Schooling by Language Group and Region, 1972

Urban Spanish Population



Numbers in thousands.
Source: UNESCO mission to Peru.

Peru: Educational Disparity in Schooling by Language Group and Region, 1972

Rural Quechua Population



Numbers in thousands.
Source: UNESCO mission to Peru.

Peru: Educational Disparity in Schooling by Language Group and Region, 1972

Rural Spanish Population



Numbers in thousands.
Source: UNESCO mission to Peru.

Peru: Annex 2.9

Peru: Percentage of the Population Completing Each Level of Education, 1961 and 1970



Source: Ministry of Education,
Office of Planning and Development, Lima

Peru: Annex 2.11

Peru: School Enrollment, Selected Years, 1965-80

	1965	1971	1975*	1980*
Pre-School	49.4	80.9	190.0	280.0
Elementary	**2,004.0**	**2,401.8**	**2,800.0**	**3,270.0**
Lower Secondary	246.0	429.1	500.0	620.0
Upper Secondary	**79.1**	**163.6**	**250.0**	**370.0**
Higher	79.9	140.3	160.0	190.0
TOTAL	**2,458.4**	**3,215.7**	**3,900.0**	**4,730.0**

(Numbers in Thousands) * Projected

Source: Ministry of Education and World Bank mission.

Peru: Education Expenditures, Selected Years, 1971-80

			1980		
	1971	1975	**Alt. A**	Alt. B	**Alt. C**
Education Budget as Percentage of GDP	**3.7**	4.8	**6.7**	5.9	**4.4**
Education Budget as Percentage of Total Public Expenditure	**21.1**	24.3	**29.8**	26.4	**19.6**

Alt. A: Enrollment in grades 10-12: 370,000 pupils, 170,000 in ESEPs schools.

Alt. B: Enrollment in grades 10-12: 370,000 pupils, 85,000 in ESEPs schools.

Alt. C: No Reform: 370,000 pupils, none in ESEPs schools.

Source: Ministry of Education and World Bank mission.

Peru: Unemployment and Underemployment, Selected Years

	1970	*1974*	*1978*	*1982*
Unemployment	4.7	4.0	6.5	7.0
Agriculture	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Non-Agriculture	8.3	6.6	10.4	10.6
Underemployment	45.9	41.8	52.0	49.9
Agriculture	64.3	65.4	65.4	60.9
Non-Agriculture	30.9	25.0	43.7	43.9
Percentage of Agricultural Labor	45.1	41.2	38.3	39.0

Source: Ministry of Labor.

3

Policymaking in Jordan: From Incremental to Synoptic

Introduction

In the early 1970s, the government of Jordan introduced an educational policy of secondary school diversification to resolve issues of manpower supply and employment. Fifteen years later, prompted by a deteriorating economic situation, the government undertook another reform that included the expansion of diversified education, but with substantial curricular changes. These aimed to increase the attractiveness of diversification to consumers and its relevance to changing domestic and international economic demands. Whereas Peru had used the synoptic approach in reforming education during the same period (see chapter 2), Jordan initially adopted the incremental path. The following account traces the decisionmaking process, employing the framework developed in chapter 1 for education policy analysis

First Policy Cycle: The Situation in the Early 1970s

This section lays out the situation which affected decisionmaking in education in Jordan in the early 1970s.

Country Background

The people of Jordan were and are predominantly Arab and Moslem. Historically, they have had a strong respect for education and learning, a view that the country's immigrant, refugee[1] and religious minorities broadly share. In recent times, they have associated education more and more with the school and university, so that by the early 1970s enrollments were high by international standards. About 80 percent of children aged 7-12 were in primary school, about 50 percent of the 13-15 year-olds were in the first stage of secondary school, while about 30 percent of the 16-18 year group attended the second stage of secondary education. A high proportion of those finishing secondary education proceeded to tertiary institutions: one study put the figure at 67 percent, which implied that some 20 percent of the 19-23 year group were still educating themselves. A signal of the value put on education was that only 15 percent of those in tertiary education were in Jordanian institutions: the other 85 percent were enrolled abroad, most in neighboring Arab countries, the rest in America and Europe.

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[1] Approximately one quarter of Jordan's population of 2.3 million were Palestinian refugees. Some 250,000 of them had come from Israel after the 1967 war.

Along with their respect for education, Jordanians have historically tended to associate it with occupations that are currently called "white collar." More recently, with advancing modernization in industry, commerce, and the private and public services, they have come to regard white collar occupations as paths for advancement in economic and social status, or socio-economic mobility. Correspondingly, they have viewed manual or "blue collar" occupations as the province of the less educated, and education oriented to such occupations as the province of the less academically able (see annex 3.14).

These values helped explain an incongruence between the structure of the labor force and the distribution of students in secondary education. Table 3.1 illustrates this. The table also suggests, however, that the values found reinforcement in economics, for the ratio of GDP to labor force and hence average incomes were highest in the services; and it was in the services that general rather than vocational education was useful. Pressing that point further was the government's practice of requiring general rather than specific education for white-collar entry posts in the civil service.

Equally powerful in drawing young people to general secondary education were the two facts that the best entry posts in the civil service and better paying employers were open mainly to university graduates; while the universities sought their students mainly from the general education streams. Indeed, industrial, commercial and agricultural secondary education were almost disqualifiers from entry to a university, and hence from possible entry to the best jobs.

Unfortunately, the combination of social values with the structure of economic rewards and opportunities led to a situation described by a 1972 World Bank document:

> "At present there is serious general unemployment with the home civil service and work in other Arab countries being the main employment outlets. At the same time the supply of technical and non-technical personnel is clearly unbalanced, the former group continuing to be in short

Table 3.1 Distribution of GDP, Labor Force and Secondary Education Enrollments in Jordan c. 1970

	GDP	*Labor Force*	*Sec. Ed.*
[c.1970]	*percent [c.1970]*	*percent [c.1970]*	*percent*
Agriculture	18	35	1[a]
Industry [manufacturing, mining, construction]	18	19	4[b]
Services	64	46	4[c]
[including workers abroad] General]	--	--	91[d]
Total	100	100	100

Notes: a. Proportion of secondary enrollments in agricultural secondary schools.

b. Proportion of secondary enrollments in vocational and technical secondary schools

c. Proportion of secondary enrollments in commercial secondary schools, that prepared mainly secretaries, junior bookkeepers or accounts clerks.

d. Proportion of secondary enrollments in general or academically oriented secondary schools.

> supply. This is due partly to the migration of trained personnel and partly to the deficiencies in the education system. On the one hand there are chronic shortages of well-trained middle level technicians and skilled craftsmen while, on the other, an increasing number of graduates from general secondary schools are unemployed . . . So far, the shortage of middle level technicians and craftsmen has been overcome by providing in-plant training, but the quality of this type of training is generally low and the program is often too costly for employers especially if the trained workers later leave Jordan to seek better paid employment abroad. The country, however, does derive some benefit in the form of remittances from abroad."

It appeared that the wages for technical workers in Jordan could not compete with those in accessible neighboring countries; and were also insufficiently attractive to persuade young Jordanians either to switch from general education, or, if they already had general education, to get further training for a technical occupation. A further complication was that the high demand for labor in the neighboring Gulf states enabled the majority (80 percent) of those who graduated from Jordanian secondary schools to find employment there. Thus the country could not provide waged employment for most of its generally educated young people, and simultaneously could not get enough young people to fill its needs for technical and artisanal workers.

The government expected the manpower issue to intensify with time, in terms of both demand and supply. In looking towards the future, government officials noted that the population was increasing at a high 3.2 percent per annum. A projection for the years 1973-1985 of demand for middle-level manpower (see annexes 3.6–3.8) indicated that the average annual demand (within the country only) for general secondary education graduates would be about 60 percent of the 1973 estimated outputs. So 40 percent would have to seek work outside the country, or face unemployment. At the same time, the 1973 supply of graduates of vocational training (craftsman level) would meet only 20 percent of the demand. Even after the projected investment in vocational education, the supply of vocational graduates would be hardly 50 percent of demand. This carried through to the post-secondary level. The projected average annual supply of university graduates (both in science and math, and the arts) would be 470 percent of the projected average annual domestic demand, whereas the supply of vocationally trained technicians would meet only about 33 percent of the domestic demand.

Two other trends were projected. First, although the current participation of women in the modern sector was low, about two-thirds of them had completed secondary education. It was quite probable, therefore, that more women would seek entrance to the labor market. Second, only about one-third of the population over 15 years of age was in the labor force and in occupations in the modern sector. The other two-thirds made their livings in the informal sectors of rural and urban self- and family employment. If education and employment trends remained the same into the 1980s, a large segment of educated young people seeking entry to the modern sector, where their education was thought to be most applicable, would have difficulty, and might find themselves forced to eke out livelihoods in sectors popularly regarded as the province of the uneducated.

Aside from manpower imbalances, inequities existed in the form of differences in income distribution and opportunities in education and hence in job markets between urban and rural locations. Together these drew young people away from the rural areas, and increased the pressures on the towns.

The Education Sector

As already noted, Jordan had a high rate of participation in its education system. This constituted an accomplishment with regard to social development, and a positive basis for the economic development of the country. Education had been credited with producing a work force that was industrious, eager to learn, competitive, and highly mobile. On the other hand, it had also been blamed for the growing divergence between educational attainment and employment opportunities. To understand this, we will look in more detail first at the structure of the educational system, then at the options it provided, and finally at the issues of external efficiency and equity.

In the early seventies, the Jordanian educational system consisted of six years of primary education (grades 1-6), three years of lower secondary education, called preparatory (grades 7-9), and three years of upper secondary school (grades 10-12) (see annex 3.9). University or post-secondary school courses were offered to graduates of senior secondary schools, and varied from two to six years. Most schools were run by public agencies, but there were a few private ones. The universities were wholly public. The state thus had virtually full control of the education system.

About 70 percent of students completing the preparatory cycle were entering upper secondary education, which was divided into four types of schools: general, commercial, industrial, and agricultural. Between 1960 and 1970, secondary enrollment nearly quadrupled, and, as Table 1 showed, its growth heavily favored academic education. For example, of the 51,720 secondary school students enrolled in 1970/1971, over 47,000 were pursuing a general education program. Fewer than 2,500 had chosen more technical programs for industrial arts or education.

Commercial education prepared secretaries and typists for business and office practice. Graduates from this course were in great demand, both in Jordan and the neighboring Arab countries, and found employment easily. Despite this, the number of commercial schools was small, and commercial education was handicapped by lack of equipment, and the absence of advanced courses. Industrial schools, on the other hand, had received considerable bilateral aid and were generally well equipped and staffed. Both craftsman and technician level courses were offered, as well as some evening courses. Even so, their graduates had difficulty securing employment in Jordan itself, so their several curricula had come to be thought unsatisfactory in meeting the requirements of future technicians or craftsmen. Yet, as with commercial schools graduates, many of the industrial education graduates found employment in other Arab countries. Agricultural education was provided in two secondary schools:

as fewer than 10 percent of their graduates actually worked in agriculture, the program was not considered very successful. This was ascribed partly to limited employment opportunities and partly to the quality of instruction and to the nature of the curriculum. Though practically oriented, the curriculum was designed by the Ministry of Education with little input from the Ministry of Agriculture. (Recently, however, to address this problem, an interministerial committee had been created to bring the Ministry of Agriculture into curriculum development.)

In addition to the quantitative imbalance between academic and vocational secondary education, the curriculum of general secondary schools was considered overly academic and theoretical. Its main objective was perceived to be preparation for university education and not direct preparation for occupational life. Not only that, but general education was considered unsuitable to produce people who were trainable in a broad sense, so that they could enter into a wide range of occupational activities that did not require university training. Although this view took its force from the high local unemployment rate among secondary school graduates, it did not take into account the kinds of employment that the majority of such graduates were finding outside the country. Similarly, the shortage of skilled workers, craftsmen and technicians was ascribed not to the uncompetitive wages in Jordan, but to the alleged misorientation imparted by the schools.

The issue of imbalance between academic and vocational education was not purely a supply issue but also one of demand. Were the country to reorient its educational system to favor vocational education, and to encourage vocational careers, it would have to deal with the priority given by the government, large employers, universities, the overall wage structure and society at large to academic education. The populace perceived academic education to provide status and upward mobility, and students overwhelmingly preferred the academic track. While the educational system did not fit the manpower needs of the economy, it reflected the values of the society.

Equity was another concern in secondary education. This was most clearly manifested as unequal educational opportunities in rural and urban areas, in both quantitative and qualitative terms. Although about 30 percent of the population lived in the rural areas, growth in the educational system took place almost exclusively in the urban areas. The advantages of the town-dwellers did not stop there. They enjoyed larger school buildings with better equipment, while their rural fellows used inadequate rented buildings with poor equipment. Further, the more highly skilled teachers preferred to settle in the towns, where the standard of living and the teaching environment were more attractive. Consequently, the town-dwellers were better prepared for and tended to do better on the secondary terminal examination, the *Tawgihi*. As the exam also served as a university entrance requirement, they enjoyed better chances of entering universities.

In summary, Jordan had attained in the early 1970s a higher level of education than most other countries of comparable economic level, and many Jordanians had been able to find remunerative employment within and outside Jordan. However, a growing gap was developing between the employment expectations of school leavers and the offers of the labor market, as well as between the demand of the economy and the supply of educated manpower. This issue of external inefficiency had aspects of both supply (imbalance between academic and vocational graduates) and demand (the low demand for vocational tracks).

Potential for Change

The government of Jordan in the early 1970s was convinced that the major issue of imbalanced supply of technical and nontechnical manpower, coupled with an imbalance between academic and vocational education, was going to increase in severity as the school-age population grew, and would undermine the country's economic development plans. A certain reorientation of the educational system was required. Any reorientation, however, would have simultaneous educational, political, social and economic implications. It would therefore necessitate an assessment of the potential forces of support, resistance and accommodation, and of the possibilities for initiating and sustaining an educational change.

Structurally, state's centralized control of the education system raised the potential for rapid decisions and change without major obstacles. The equally centralized political power structure could provide the necessary support for any policy decision. However, the government had recognized the many interests involved in education and had arranged that policy making for it should involve many players with different perspectives. The Minister of Education did not create policy on his own, but called for recommendations from an advisory Board of Education, which consisted of 15 members who represented the government—the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Labor, the National Planning Council, the Civil Service Commission, the Ministry of Rural Development, the Youth Welfare Organization—the private sector, parents and teachers. Each of these could affect the potential, direction and pace of change.

On the other hand, the representativeness of the Board was limited: the nongovernmental members were not elected by their constituencies, but actually appointed by the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Further, the Board did not operate independently, but relied on studies and recommendations made by organs of the Ministry of Education. Particular groups then could always charge that the Board had failed to take their views into account adequately, and attempt to alter the course of reform.

Nonetheless, the existence of the Board of Education signaled that the government acknowledged that teachers, universities, community groups, parents and students, employers—including different ministries and departments within the ministries—would have their own views and concerns about any change mooted. Besides these, the government of Jordan needed to take account of interests of three special groups. These were the religious fundamentalists, anxious about the effects of any curricular change on the moral and religious foundations of education; the Bedouins, oriented to the tribe and traditional values and watchful of any erosion of family ties; and the Palestinians, anxious about their place and prospects in Jordanian society. The government then did not regard itself as having a free hand to introduce whatever reform it might on its own judge beneficial.

Quite apart from the social or political constraints on the potential for reform, there was the question of finance. The education expenditure of Jordan in 1971 was estimated to represent about five percent of GNP and over 15 percent of the central government's domestic revenue. Jordan needed an educational reorientation that would accommodate the growing demand for education and respond to the manpower needs of the country, without requiring significant increases in budgetary allocations.

Generating Policy Options

In the early 1970s, the Jordanian government commissioned several studies to explore the manpower situation and its implications for education and training. In 1970, the Manpower Planning Section of the National Planning Council, with assistance from the Ford Foundation, conducted a major survey of manpower needs and provided the baseline data. A related sample household survey followed in 1971. Simultaneously, both the World Bank and UNESCO assessed the situation in the course of sector work and project preparation and reached similar conclusions about manpower shortages and educational imbalances.

The planners' dissatisfaction with the existing educational situation in Jordan was in line with a prevailing international mood, which attributed the problems of unemployment and manpower shortages to the inappropriateness of the widespread model of academically oriented education. This proposition was shared by leading educators, aid donors and international agencies. The World Bank Policy Paper in 1974 articulated it well:

> The upward push of demand reinforces the built-in tendency of education at any one level to be preparation for the next. As a corollary, the content becomes more theoretical and abstract and less practical; experience drawn on is more universal and less local; and cognitive, or purely mental, skills are emphasized over attitudes and manual, social and leadership skills. This education is dysfunctional for most types of employment—wage or non-wage—and for playing other roles needed in a developing society.

The conventional wisdom to deal with the problem was to reorient the content of education by relating skills taught to jobs in the market. This reorientation took the form of diversifying secondary school curricula to introduce practical and/or occupational subjects into an otherwise completely academic program.

Education policy makers in Jordan were fully attuned to the international mood. Educators and policy makers were mostly educated in Western universities and were allowed, due to the open nature of the Jordanian system, to stay in professional contact with the centers of research and development around the world. Moreover, the World Bank and UNESCO were both actively discussing the concepts of diversification and work-oriented education with Jordanian authorities.

The government had set for the country an ambitious strategy of economic development, emphasizing the following long-term objectives:

- Increasing employment opportunities to keep pace with population growth and educational expansion;
- Achieving an eight percent annual growth rate of GDP with priority placed on agriculture, mining and manufacturing;
- Improving the distribution of economic gains among the different regions and population groups, mainly through rural development programs, improved public housing and other social services; and
- Eliminating the economy's heavy dependence on foreign budget support by reducing the budget and trade deficits through expansion of domestic revenues and foreign exchange earnings.

The fulfillment of these objectives placed a heavy burden on educational development, and raised policy concerns for three interrelated educational variables: output, content and relevance. To address these issues within existing institutional, social and financial constraints, the government faced four policy options:

OPTION A: Continuing the existing approach to educational development; that is, the parallel development of two distinct institutions, each with its own objectives for socio-economic and manpower development: general academic secondary schools and vocational schools. Growth would respond to increases in school-age population and to social demand for the different institutions, without attempts to rationalize costs or influence student flows.

Option B: Modifying the system with a view to improving the external efficiency in terms of economic or manpower requirements, while introducing minimal changes in the content of the system. This option would restrict the growth of academic secondary education, while greatly increasing vocational secondary schools.

Option C: Modifying the system with the view to improving the content and relevance of education, combined with measures to control the output. This option involved the adaptation of the school system to manpower needs through: (i) the reform of preparatory school curricula by introducing pre-vocational subjects, (ii) diversifying the secondary school curriculum, and creating comprehensive secondary schools that would combine academic and vocational courses in one institutional setting, (iii) reorientation of vocational education, (iv) controlling the growth of academic output while increasing the growth of vocationally-oriented output and (v) introducing a new type of post-preparatory vocational educational institution, the trade training center. This option was generated by the Ministry of Education, with the strong influence and support of the World Bank, and had high respectability because it was in line with the prevailing wisdom of the international educational community.

Option D: Structural overhaul of the system to achieve improved economy of operations simultaneously with better internal and external educational functions. This option was generated and recommended to the government by UNESCO. It involved a full redirection of the educational system from the production of people who *know* to the education of people who *do*. This comprehensive approach called for practice facilities, as distinct from traditional school facilities, where learners of different age groups would work on real-life situations, which in themselves would constitute a contribution to development. In addition, an emphasis on preparation for specific and specialized occupational functions was considered entirely compatible with the principle of work- and community-oriented education. (Although this option was alive in the early 1970s, it was officially articulated in 1973.)

Evaluation of Policy Options

These policy options were evaluated informally rather than in a systematic comparative manner. The first two options were examined in terms of the desirability of their output and their financial affordability, while the third and fourth options were examined with certain *a priori* biases and external influences.

Option A did not offer a solution to the problem of the disequilibrium between job availability and employment expectations. Thus, Option A was undesirable by reason of its proven external inefficiency. Moreover, it was financially unaffordable, for if the percentage of primary graduates going on to preparatory school continued to increase and if the existing transition rate from preparatory to secondary schools of about 70 percent was maintained, secondary school enrollment in 1980-81 would be more than double the present enrollment. The investment needed would be about 170 percent of the projected investment for the whole field of general education in the national plans. Quite obviously, such investment for secondary education could be made only at the expense of other educational services, or other development sectors. Therefore, this option was not favored.

Option B would greatly increase vocational education at the expense of general education. While such an option at first sight would appear logical, its desirability and the implementability were not obvious. A simple increase in vocational schools was not considered a satisfactory solution to the needs of the modern sector, because if training in certain fields exceeded demand, the existing problem with regard to graduates with academic qualifications would be recreated for graduates with certain vocational qualifications. Moreover, small establishments were expressing preference for people to be trained on the job. In such a case, vastly increased vocational education could create social demand for technical education at higher levels. Finally, the issue of vocational education was one of demand as much as supply. The low status associated with vocational and technical education by students and parents meant that such an approach might yield only empty schools.

With Options C and D, the government faced two respectable alternatives, supported by external agencies and consistent with the country's aspirations. However, the choice was between a comprehensive synoptic option (Option D) that called for a full reorientation and restructuring of education, and a less ambitious option (Option C) that called for incremental adjustments in the existing system in a manner that could be observed, tested and modified. This made Option C more desirable in terms of managerial requirements and potential for implementation. Consequently, Option D was disqualified *a priori* on the grounds that the country was not in a position to jump into a comprehensive reorientation of its educational system.

Option C called for controlling the growth of general secondary education in favor of vocational education. To achieve this objective, prevocational courses were to be introduced in preparatory schools, comprehensive secondary schools were to be introduced gradually, and some technical schools were to be built. This option was considered desirable for the following reasons:

- Prevocational orientation would improve the perceived status of technical education and manual work by fostering positive attitudes toward manual labor, by providing students with exploratory and guidance opportunities, by laying a foundation for vocational secondary education, and by strengthening the relationship between education and work.
- The comprehensive school model would provide different types of education—science, humanities and technical subjects—within one institutional setting to a wide range of students, thus breaking the perceived barriers among the different specializations and equating the status given to them. Further, it was felt that exposing academic secondary students to prevocational subjects (four hours per week) might interest them in the study of technical subjects. Finally, this model would also provide a flexible basis for meeting the needs of sectors of the economy where patterns of development and specific skill requirements could not be forecast in advance. Graduates would either proceed to more advanced studies or be rapidly trained, either formally or on the job.
- This option also offered an alternative form of post-preparatory apprenticeship training in the form of trade training centers.
- The experimental nature of the option, being considered a pilot phase, was expected to minimize risks and allow phased implementation, feedback and modifications with time.
- This option was considered affordable financially. When translated into a project format by a World Bank mission, the financial implications were analyzed and found to be within government resources, especially since the capital expenditure would be mainly financed with a World Bank loan.
- The availability of teachers of vocational subjects was assumed. The government, with the World Bank, did not actually examine the point closely, but reckoned that enough such teachers would be graduating from Jordan University or returning from Syria and Egypt.

While government authorities and World Bank missions gave preference to Option C as the most desirable, affordable and implementable of all options and as the logical answer to Jordan's educational problems, other groups affected by the proposed policy had reservations and apprehensions. Middle class parents and students had their eyes on the university: as long as that institution did not require competence in vocational subjects, they preferred schooling in strictly academic branches. From another angle, influential fundamentalist conservative groups were concerned that vocational subjects might enter preparatory and secondary schools at the expense of religious and related studies.

However, the National Board of Education did not choose to stimulate a public debate. Instead, its members accepted the internal evaluations of the Ministry of Education and those of UNESCO and the World Bank, and made its recommendations accordingly to the Minister of Education.

Making the Policy Decision

The government then chose Option C, the incremental approach to policy change. Its policy decision was articulated in the Three-Year National Plan for 1973-1975, reaffirmed in the Five-Year National Plan for 1976-1980, then reaffirmed again, though with modification, in 1981 and 1983. The educational component of the first two plans came to be known as the educational plan of 1970-1980, which could be summarized as follows:

- Continuous expansion of elementary and preparatory education to provide nine years of basic education to all children by the end of the present decade;
- Expansion of adult education and literacy programs;
- Better adaptation of secondary education to the quantitative and qualitative manpower needs of the country to be achieved through: (a) continuous development and reform of curricula emphasizing scientific and technological contents; (b) progressive reduction in the transition rate from preparatory to secondary education (from 77 percent in 1970 to 50 percent in 1980) with a concomitant increase in the proportion of secondary students enrolled in vocational education (from about eight percent to 30 percent) and two-year trade training centers; (c) introduction of the concept of comprehensive education; and (d) reorientation of vocational and technical streams to strengthen industrial programs, develop new specializations and methods of training consistent with the increasing diversification of the economy, and correct the theoretical bias of curricula;
- Increase in the proportion of professionally qualified teachers, particularly for science, technology and mathematics; and

- Improvement in the stock of physical facilities, by: (a) gradually replacing uneconomically small rented school buildings; (b) regrouping government-owned schools to phase out unsuitable buildings and increase efficiency of operation, and (c) providing the schools with adequate workshops, science laboratories and other teaching aids.

The policy decision of 1972 had four major characteristics. First, it was not the product of national debate or local research, experimentation and comparative analysis (though two manpower studies had been commissioned, the decision was made before the results of the studies were in). It relied heavily on the prevailing international thinking and wisdom of the time. Second, the policy was modest. It did not call for a comprehensive sweeping or radical reform. It rather called for adjustments to the existing system and introduced a few innovations on a limited scale. Third, the policy option reflected a tacit compromise among different approaches (representing different internal and external rationalities). Finally, it embodied a flexible, experimental and phased approach. The policy itself would *unfold* with time. Consequently, the 1972 policy decision, part of which was translated into the first Education Project financed by the World Bank, represented only a first phase, which included the following:

- In East Jordan, where government control was feasible, vocational enrollment was to be increased six-fold by 1980, while the increase in general secondary enrollment was to be restricted to about 50 percent.
- Prevocational courses in agriculture, home economics, commercial and industrial education were to be introduced in some schools.
- The government *wished to experiment* with new forms of secondary education and planned to introduce comprehensive schools in a gradual way. The two schools opened under the First Project included a science stream, a literary stream, and four vocational streams (industrial arts for boys, home economics for girls, commerce and crafts). Students in the vocational streams followed exactly the same curriculum and used the same textbooks as those in vocational secondary schools. Similarly, students in the academic tracks followed the same curriculum and used the same educational materials as those in regular academic secondary schools. However, academic students took an additional four hours each week of prevocational courses. Backers of the reform hoped that this would encourage more students to pursue vocational studies.
- A National Vocational Training Council was to be established to help translate manpower requirements into training programs.

- New institutions were created for vocational education—polytechnics at the post-secondary level and trade training centers at the post-preparatory level.

However, the government did not alter the system of qualifications through which young people earned eligibility for different forms of advanced education, such as the university, and different streams of employment.

Planning for Implementation

Since the government opted for an incremental, rather than a comprehensive approach, the long-term plans for the implementation of policy were made in broad terms, leaving the detailed planning for specific projects over an 8-year trial period. Within this time frame, three World Bank projects, in 1973, 1975 and 1979 respectively, provided opportunities for working out the details. Two later projects, in 1981 and 1983, allowed for modifications in the original policy.

Overall plans were limited to prescribing projections of enrollment up to 1980-1981 by year, grade, and type of education (mainly to control growth in general secondary school enrollment, and increase growth in vocational education in a significant manner), and their implications for resources. These estimates called for an additional 30,000 student places at the secondary school level, more than half of which were for vocational specializations. Correspondingly, the need for secondary teachers was expected to double over the period 1970-1980. However, although plans were made to increase the supply of general secondary teachers, such plans were thought unnecessary for teachers of vocational subjects: it was felt there would be sufficient graduates from the Faculty of Science and the Faculty of Economics and Commerce to supply the need. Even with the expansion of comprehensive schooling provided for in the 1975 and 1979 World Bank projects, no provision was made to increase the supply of vocational teachers, except for those of the industrial stream. On the financial side, estimates acknowledged that policy implementation would require a reallocation of resources between general and vocational secondary education from a 1970 ratio of 3:1 to a ratio of 1:2 in 1980. Moreover, additional allocations to education would be required to cover capital expenditure and recurrent costs. While total educational expenditure was planned to increase between 1970-1980 by 230 percent, the overall level for 1980 was expected to remain at 17 percent of total government expenditure and 6.5 percent of GNP, if GNP growth was sustained at the high level of eight percent per annum. However, if GNP grew at only four percent per annum, and the new policy were protected, education expenditure would amount to nine percent of GNP and 24 percent of the government's budget.

A mechanism was set up to provide the detailed plans successively. A Project Implementation Unit (PIU) was established in 1973 as an integral part of the ministry of education with a direct link to the undersecretary of education, and with sufficient status and authority to oversee the planning and implementation of the different education projects. The PIU, in close collaboration with World Bank and UNESCO missions, drew plans for the construction of schools, training of teachers, development of curricula, provision of instructional materials, and recruitment of technical assistance.

The incremental way in which the policy was implemented is reflected in table 3.2.

Policy Implementation

The implementation of the physical components of the policy, i.e., the construction of comprehensive schools and vocational centers, went according to plans, although with some delays. The concept of diversification, however, was modified somewhat as implementation proceeded. In the first project, the curriculum of the comprehensive schools was to consist of two parts: a core program of courses that was required of all academic stream students, and another core program of required courses (the same subjects, but covered in less depth) for the vocational stream. These core programs were to cover about two-thirds of the weekly schedule. The remaining third was to be allocated to a specialized program that was diversified into scientific, literary and vocational streams. The vocational stream was supposed to offer any of the four areas: industrial arts (for boys), home economics (for girls), crafts and commerce. However, during implementation, the distinct core programs were omitted. Instead, all students spent two thirds of their time in common exposure to some general education and some pre-vocational education, and the remaining third, as intended, on their specialized streams.

The government also modified the pace of implementation. Although the first project was experimental, the government started the implementation of the second project and plans for the third project, before the first project was completed in 1979, let alone evaluated. The reason was not educational, but economic. The quadrupling of oil prices in 1974 had given the nearby Gulf states the wealth with which to drain away all the surplus labor in Jordan: the problem of unemployment among the generally educated was transformed into an acute shortage

Table 3.2 Introduction of New Education Institutions, 1973-1983

Type of Institution	*1973*	*1975*	*1979*	*1981*	*1983*	*Total*
Comprehensive Secondary	2	3	5	—	—	10
General Voc. Secondary	–	–	–	4	15[a]	19
Trade Training Center	2	1[b]	1[b]	1	--	5
Polytechnic	–	1[b]	1[b]	–	–	2
Hotel School	–	1[c]	–	–	--	1
Rural Development Center	–	1	–	–	--	1
Agricultural Secondary	–	–	1	–	--	1
Prevoc.Teacher Institute	–	–	1	–	--	1[d]
Total	4	7	9	5	15	40

Notes: a. Ten of these schools were for girls, 5 for boys.

b. In these cases, a trade training complex included a trade training center for the secondary level of vocational training and a polytechnic for post-secondary vocational and technical training.

c. The hotel school offered both post-preparatory and post-secondary levels of training.

d. This figure does not include the expansion of existing programs of teacher training.

of personnel of all kinds. In response, the government strove to bring educated women into the labor force. Two out of the three comprehensive schools in the second (1975) project were for girls.

As with the first project, the comprehensive schools offered four streams of specialization: science, arts, commerce, and industrial arts or home economics. The curriculum, however, was slightly different from that under the first project. It now consisted of three, rather than two, segments: common core subjects, specialized fields, and elective studies. All students were to study the common core (divided according to academic or vocational stream) in each of the three years, thus becoming acquainted with the contents and skills of a wide range of subjects. Within the specialized streams, the sciences, arts and commerce were to spend about 35 percent of their time on practical work. In contrast, such work would occupy some 75 percent of the time of the industrial arts and home economics streams. The elective segment aimed at introducing supplementary information and skills through a wide range of half-year, nonexaminable courses with predominantly practical, life-long application which would not be covered otherwise in the formal program. Academic students continued to be obliged to take four hours per week of prevocational subjects. This balanced curriculum aimed to enable students either to proceed to more advanced studies or to be rapidly trained (either formally or on the job) in more specialized skills.

The third project (1979) aimed at introducing comprehensive education in less urbanized areas. In addition to the two academic streams, the boys' schools had an industrial stream with options in four trades (electrics, metalwork, woodwork and general mechanics, or, in one school, auto mechanics). The girls' schools had commercial and home economics streams with options in six vocations (beauty culture; child care; clothing; art, weaving and ceramics; secretarial and office practice; and librarianship). The curriculum remained the same, which meant that those selecting the vocational streams took nearly half their class periods in practical work, while those selecting an academic stream were required to take about 15 percent of their periods in one of the vocational options.

The division between academic and vocational education in comprehensive schools wherein each stream followed its own curriculum nearly amounted to running separate self-contained academic and vocational schools under one administration and within one complex. Consequently, the social and pedagogical integration which is normally expected from comprehensive schools did not take place.

In 1980, the prime minister, who had been at one time ambassador to the United States and was greatly in favor of the reform measures, established a Comprehensive Education Committee to prepare fresh proposals to advance them. The committee's proposals were essentially as follows:

- in each grade there would be a common core of studies for both academic and vocational streams along with specialized and elective subjects;
- the common core would consist of both academic and vocational subjects, and it would be mandatory for all students;
- the common core would represent 80, 60 and 40 percent of the class periods in the first, second and third years respectively;
- the first grade would help students assess which stream would be most suitable for them, and so would offer the core and electives, but no specialization, during the first grade;
- from the second year onwards, the student would choose one of three tracks—scientific, literary or vocational;
- it was expected that graduates of the vocational track would qualify for productive employment—an euphemism for suggesting that the less academically able must expect the less well paid jobs;

- specialization courses would absorb 20 percent and 50 percent of the class periods in the second and third years respectively, and the electives correspondingly would absorb 20 percent, 20 percent, and 10 percent of the class periods in the first, second and third years; and
- the increased time allocated to specialized subjects in the third year would help to strengthen the students in the subjects they would be tested on during the school leaving examinations.

A conference was convened to discuss these proposals, attended by both government education officials and Bank observers. Unfortunately, however, the Prime Minister died shortly after, and with him, died most of the curriculum reform. The Minister of Education formed a follow-up committee, but never activated it; and no one in either the National Board of Education or the Ministry of Education took any initiative in the matter. A major reason may have been the economy: as noted above, economic growth was good, the country was prospering and unemployment had almost disappeared. The need for further change perhaps did not appear urgent.

Even so, three modifications were made to the policy. First, the target date for enrolling 30 percent of secondary students in vocational streams was extended from 1980 to 1987. This clearly reflected both the continuing pressure for more secondary education and the continuing preference of families to have their young take academic courses. In 1984 indeed, to secure the target, the Ministry of Education felt constrained to decree that students, who had scored in the lower 40 percent of the examinations at the end of the preparatory stage, would automatically enroll in the vocational streams of the secondary schools. Second, the need for teachers of vocational subjects, which had been underplayed at the introduction of the diversification policy in 1973, had become well recognized by 1976. To attract and retain qualified vocational/ technical teachers, the government adopted various incentive measures, including according overtime pay for the additional hours spent in practical studies.

Finally, the education authorities decided to pilot another type of vocational institution, the General Vocational Secondary School (GVSS), to accommodate the enlarged numbers of vocational enrollees. Like the comprehensive schools, these GVSSs were intended to provide vocational training opportunities to communities that otherwise would not be served. In more thinly populated areas, a GVSS could provide agricultural, commercial and industrial education, or any combination thereof, all within the same institution. The principle behind this was that one center offering two or more vocational programs keyed to local economic needs would be more cost effective than several schools with only one specialization each. Though overall the enrollment would be smaller than for vocational schools in the urban areas, the curriculum followed would be exactly the same as that for vocational secondary schools, and vocational streams within comprehensive schools. The Fourth and Fifth Education Projects supported the construction of GVSSs.

Policy Impact Assessment

The impact of the educational policy of secondary school diversification was never systematically evaluated. However, in 1985 it was scrutinized within the context of a movement to reform the entire education system—this will be treated more fully in the next section. The findings of the scrutiny contained no surprises.

On the positive side, between 1980 and 1985, the compulsory enrollment of the lower 40 percent of exam achievers in vocational streams had succeeded in raising secondary vocational enrollments (including trade training centers) as a share of total secondary students from 19 percent to 29 percent, a mere one point short of the target for 1987.

Further, because most of the comprehensive schools had been financed through World Bank loans (until around 1982, when the last loan for comprehensive schooling was made and the government began to establish comprehensive schools through attaching vocational programs to academic schools), they were well built and well supplied with both equipment and good teachers, which made them more attractive to some students and parents. Also, in their examination results and success in preparing their students for post-secondary education, the comprehensive schools had proved the equals of the rest of the secondary system.

On the less successful side was the status of vocational education. One of the original goals of comprehensive schooling had been to improve it, in part through associating it with academic schooling. However, despite expanding employment opportunities and increasing wages for skilled workers (bid up from competition with the Gulf states), students and parents continued to avoid a vocational education. One of the major reasons was the association with lower academic ability, coupled with the virtually terminal nature of such study. Although secondary vocational graduates were technically permitted to apply to post-secondary institutions (such as community colleges) in contrast to graduates of trade training centers who were not, in practice very few were admitted. They were found ill equipped to compete with graduates of the academic track for post-secondary places. The greater number of options open to general secondary graduates influenced students to prefer the academic track.

Further, the value ascribed to an academic education had not changed for most of the population. White collar, preferably civil service positions continued to be valued more than even better paid blue collar jobs, and most large employers, like the government, continued to require general rather than vocational qualifications for them.

In addition, the early neglect to provide properly for qualified vocational teachers had led to the perception that the vocational streams were inferior in every way.

The New Policy Cycle

The real impetus for the scrutiny and a new policy cycle came not from the education system, but from the economy. The expansion of the economy and the disappearance of unemployment in the mid-1970s have already been noted. Indeed, during this time, continued emigration of highly trained Jordanians to the Gulf states became a growing concern to officials; by 1980 there were about 300,000 working abroad. This had prompted several studies to determine whether the tradeoff in terms of workers' remittances outweighed the unrealized benefits of education, when highly trained people left the country for work abroad. In addition, Jordan itself had to import workers to meet labor shortages.

However, this situation had turned around and unemployment, climbing to eight percent, had reemerged as a concern for Jordan (see annex 3.10). Young adults made up the largest group of the unemployed; over two-thirds of those unemployed were between the ages of 20-25. Secondary school graduates accounted for fully one-quarter of those out of work (see annex 3.11 for distribution of the unemployed by level of education). As the Economics Research Department of the Royal Scientific Society spelled out, the problem had both external and internal causes.

On the internal side of the equation, from 1982 there had been a decided slowdown in economic growth in Jordan. This was reflected in an average annual GNP growth rate of 4.8 percent (see annex 3.12) between 1981-1985 as compared to 12 percent between 1976-1980. Reasons behind this slowdown included: (i) the economic slowdown in the Gulf States which had created a decline in unrequited transfers to the central government, as well as a decline in the demand for Jordanian labor and consequently a decline in the growth rate of remittances of those working abroad; and (ii) a decline in demand for Jordanian exports (particularly in Iraq). These factors caused public and private investment to fall with obvious consequences for job opportunities.

The unemployment problem resulting from the economic slowdown was aggravated by four additional factors: (i) the rapid increase of 82.5 percent in the number of college and university graduates between 1980 and 1985. Many of them were unwilling to accept available jobs, insisting on high-paid professional positions in desirable areas; (ii) the large number of guest workers (numbering 143,000 in 1985) who had been welcomed during the boom period, but were now competing with Jordanian workers; (iii) following the government's earlier encouragement, the large number of women entering the work force. The 1986-90 Development Plan indicated that the women's participation rate had increased from 3.1 percent in 1961 to about 12.5 percent in 1985; and (iv) many of Jordanian workers who had migrated to work in the Gulf states had begun to return. In 1985, fully 365,000 Jordanians were working abroad, or 40 percent of the total labor force. Of these, about 85 percent were working in the oil-exporting Middle East countries, and about one-fourth were professionals and technicians and almost two-thirds were skilled workers. The government's Five Year Plan for 1986-1990 anticipated that on average about 5,000 workers would be returning each year.

Due to all these factors, the World Bank Staff Appraisal Report of the Fifth Manpower Development Project (1985) forecast:

> The contrast is sharp between the net manpower deficit situation of the past decade and a prospective net surplus situation for the remainder of the 1980s and into the 1990s. Jordanian nationals' labor force growth in the East Bank is projected to exceed six percent per annum because of rapid population growth (3.4 percent p.a.), increasing female labor force participation, and reduced migration for employment opportunities in the Gulf labor market. By 1990, the net surplus could reach some 180,000, or 23 percent of the labor force.

This labor surplus was projected to be largest among those seeking white-collar pursuits (see annex 3.14): the greatest oversupply by 1990 was forecast in office and service occupations, both skilled and semi-skilled (nearly 200,000); next was for teachers and other professionals (40,300), followed by working prospectors, trade and agricultural managers, and white collar supervisors (31,800); and finally, a small excess number of scientists, engineers and related technicians (2,600). The greatest shortages were projected—once again—in blue collar supervisors and foremen, skilled and semi-skilled workers (83,200) followed by health professionals and technicians (3,900), high level managers (2,900) and unskilled workers (2,300).

The imbalance in labor supply and demand was reasserting itself despite years of government attempts to correct it. The introduction of comprehensive schools, 2-year trade training centers (subsequently called vocational training centers) and later general vocational secondary schools had been intended, at the very least, to ameliorate the undersupply of skilled and technical workers. Once again, the economy and its perceived needs furnished the incentive to bring about change.

In 1985, King Hussein appointed a reform committee, the National Commission to Assess Educational Policies. This step suggested by implication that the National Board of Education and Ministry of Education on their own were inadequate for the job. The King highlighted the importance he accorded the Commission by appointing his brother the Crown Prince to head it. The Commission set up a Central Task Force (comprising both private and public sector representatives), and appointed field committees to collect data. Committees of Experts were also convened and a series of workshops and seminars was held to explore and discuss various aspects of the education system. This was followed by televised documentary seminars presided over by the Crown Prince himself.

In generating policy options, the Commission held firmly in mind the changes needed in Jordan's economy, and the changes taking place in the economies of the Gulf States, which so greatly affected Jordan. They were also well aware of the importance of human resource development. Because the country lacks natural endowments and relies heavily on imports of raw materials and food, human capital "exports" were considered critical in maintaining macroeconomic balances. As a measure of the importance of such "exports," external factor income (consisting mainly of remittances) was nearly 25 percent of GNP in 1982. So the need to be able to remain competitive in the international labor market was clear.

Further, the government's Five Year Plan for 1986-90 articulated intentions to change the national economic structure in favor of the commodity producing sectors, through supporting the development of domestic industry. In developing a human resources strategy to complement this effort, the government hoped to: (a) improve the education system so that new Jordanian labor-market entrants could provide the domestic economy with the high quality human resources needed; and (b) reduce Jordan's dependence on the health of Gulf Cooperation Council states' economies by broadening the skills mix demanded in domestic labor markets. Related to this, studies were being undertaken to examine ways to expand technical/professional employment in the domestic economy, preferably in skill-intensive, high value-added activities.

In summary, the government was seeking to develop a strategy that would utilize human capital resources for both reviving domestic growth and assisting in maintaining external balances over the long term. It was understood that to maintain their comparative advantage in the international labor market (as Gulf countries instituted their own training programs), Jordanians would need to be more highly trained than in the past. In addition, through scientific and technological capacity building the government wanted to prepare people for domestic production activities, and the eventual export of high value-added goods and services. The options open to the Commission to assist in bringing about these goals included:

A. maintaining the status quo, offering communities the choice of academic high schools, vocational high schools, comprehensive high schools, general vocational secondary schools (GVSSs), and trade training centers;

B. placing even greater emphasis on vocational education, increasing the number of vocational schools, GVSSs, and vocational tracks in comprehensive schools, while decreasing the number of academic schools;

C. introducing incremental reform as in the past. This could take the form of modification of the vocational curriculum, introduction of more practical applications, etc.; and

D. introducing major reforms including restructuring the system to expand basic schooling by one year; reforming the examination process; creating three streams in comprehensive schools, math/science, arts/humanities and technical/technology; and changing the curricula through the introduction of pre-vocational courses at the preparatory level, and strengthening the core courses in the technology stream as well as updating the curricula for all other levels

Because of the economic situation and the threatening future, the Commission was predisposed to attempt more radical change. In addition, it felt that rapid quantitative increases in educational services over the past decade had caused quality to suffer. Further, the curriculum at all levels was considered without a doubt to be out of date and inadequate to meet the needs of a modern economy (the last complete curricular revision had taken place in 1966; the comprehensive secondary schools and other changes had not affected the curriculum substantially). Finally, there was a feeling that the education system would need to undergo some fundamental structural changes in order to produce school leavers and graduates who would be ready to take whatever jobs were on offer, or create their own livelihoods to make a positive contribution to changing the economy.

Therefore, options A, B, and C were not fully pursued. Reform was in order, and a major reform it would be. Option D would be *implementable* because there was a political will to see it happen. King Hussein himself stood behind the reform. In addition, the Crown Prince had spent many weeks observing schools in operation in many different localities, and speaking to local and regional administrators. As noted above, data collection and analysis were extensive and there was also a free exchange of ideas concerning the system amongst education authorities, parents and teachers and members of the Commission (via workshops and seminars). The reform was therefore well grounded in reality.

Governmental authorities resolved that they would make the reform *affordable* by mobilizing the resources behind their political commitment. Once an initial implementation strategy had been developed, the World Bank was invited to collaborate in seeing it through in the form of a sector investment loan. That is why the Crown Prince approached the Ministry of Planning to request that all Bank financing in 1988 for the entire country be focused on education. (Until 1985, Bank financing for Jordanian education projects had been quite small, ranging from US$5.4 million to US$25 million.) Consequently, the Human Resources Development Sector Investment Loan was extended in the amount of US$73 million to implement the first phase of the reform (1989-92). The Japan Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund matched the World Bank figure, and a smaller amount (US$1.4 million was offered by the United Kingdom Overseas Development Administration (UKODA).

In view of Jordan's constrained budgetary position, the World Bank appraisal mission was also concerned about the *affordability* of the reform over its full 10-year life span. The mission ran a series of computer programs to determine the estimated capital and recurrent expenditures necessary with and without the reform based on optimistic, moderately optimistic, and pessimistic sets of assumptions about the rate of growth in GDP over the 1989-98 period. The mission found that the program required an average of an additional one percent of GDP for education during the 1990s under all three scenarios. During the peak expenditure years under the pessimistic scenario, the reform program would require an additional 1.6–1.8 percent of GDP. With the reform, the absolute share of education expenditures in GDP could be expected to rise from about 4.5 percent in 1988 to over seven percent. It was expected that government spending for basic and secondary education, with the reform, would have to grow in real terms at an annual average rate of over six percent over the decade. In the end, the affordability of these financing requirements was thought to rest on two factors: the expansion of external assistance flows, and implementation of cost recovery and cost saving measures set out in the reform.

In the event that Government funding were to falter, a contingency plan was developed whereby the reform could be scaled down (the number of new school buildings constructed could be reduced and double shifting in certain schools could be retained) but maintaining its core. Alternatively, implementation of the reform could be spread over a longer period of time.

In terms of *desirability*, the reform had much to offer to students and parents. It promised a much stronger grounding in basic knowledge and skills to all students through expansion of the basic schooling cycle. Most importantly, because it would prepare them better, it would give vocational students (including those in the technical/technology stream of comprehensive schools) a better chance to go on to post-secondary schooling. Such students were expected to attend any one of a number of new institutions established by the government, for example, applied engineering or administrative sciences, or community colleges. This was expected to enhance the social prestige of vocational schooling as well, even though nothing was done to alter the relations between education and the labor market.

After two years of discussion, a National Conference for Education Reform was held in September of 1987, which adopted the proposed measures. In essence, the reform would continue with the comprehensive schooling concept originally introduced in the early 1970s, but with several important changes. To develop a system that could produce graduates with a high-quality general education that emphasized problem solving, critical thinking, analytical skills, and the ability to apply information in creative, productive ways and thereby better meet the needs of the economy, the government proposed:

- The school system would be restructured so that all students would be required to take 10 years of basic education, then pass on to two years of senior secondary schooling. This would enable those students choosing to leave school upon completion of basic schooling to enter the work force immediately, since they would have achieved the legal working age of 16;
- Based on their performance over a three year period in grades 8, 9, and 10 (instead of on one exam), students would be placed in a vocational or an academic stream. The lower 40 percent would continue to pursue a vocational program, in vocational secondary schools, comprehensive schools, or general vocational secondary schools. The facilities in the VTCs would be upgraded and expanded, and students interested in pursuing more craft-related

courses such as hairdressing, etc. would attend these schools which would offer terminal programs;

- Curricular changes would be extensive. Prevocational courses would be introduced at all levels of basic schooling, beginning in the first grade. In regard to the curriculum for comprehensive schools, many of the changes proposed in 1980 by the Comprehensive Education Committee were adopted. First of all, students in comprehensive schools would be divided into three categories: math/science, arts/humanities, or technical/technology (vocational) education. In an attempt to strengthen the education of students in the technology stream, all students, regardless of their stream, would take 40 percent of their basic courses from a core program. This was in marked contrast to the earlier curriculum wherein vocational students had a less intensive base program than academic students. Students from all streams would then take courses in their field of specialization, as well as a few elective courses. In this way, vocational students could take a greater number of academic courses than previously, and academic students were free to choose a number of technology courses, if they so desired. Both the core program and the elective courses were intended to form a bridge between the two streams.

Although concerned that education should supply the economy, the. Commission limited its reforms to education only. It did not examine how the requirements of the labor market might influence the demand for certain types of education, or the preferences of parents and students.

The Ministry of Education was entrusted with the responsibility of formulating an *implementation plan* as a follow-up to the conference. However, the National Board of Education was given no role in supervising or monitoring the implementation. Instead, apparently in an attempt to circumvent the bureaucracy and those who had a vested interest in the existing system, the Crown Prince established an independent body, the National Center for Education Research and Development, to oversee implementation of the reform. This body comprises high level representatives of the Ministries of Education, Planning, and Higher Education as well as the Vocational Training Corporation, the Universities, the Higher Council for Science and Technology, and Economists and Educators. Its role is to maintain the momentum of the reform movement, as well as to evaluate its effectiveness, conduct policy-based research and analyze human resource development requirements. By situating the Center outside of the traditional educational structure, the government hopes to ensure a speedier implementation of the reform.

Conclusions

As with Peru, a schematic diagram based on the model for analyzing the decisionmaking process developed in chapter one (figure 3.1) illustrates the various processes as they relate to this case, together with a summary and critique of each step. Some general conclusions follow.

This study of the policymaking process in Jordan illustrates how the process itself (and the actors involved) can change over time. The process evolved from a limited incremental approach, essentially directed by the international community, to a comprehensive synoptic approach, with input from all of the relevant interest groups, domestic and international. These concepts are elaborated below.

The government took the more conservative incremental approach to introducing comprehensive education in the 1970s, in large part due to the murkiness of situation A. Therefore, it was more sensible to proceed in a cautious manner.

From the beginning, the international community played an important role in the process. In those early days the Ministry of Education had not yet built up its administrative capacity. Because of this, it was in a position to be significantly influenced by international organizations and ideas (note the importation mode of generating policy options as described in chapter one), particularly where project money was attached. This created an opening for multilateral organizations; the "experts" arrived (both the World Bank and UNESCO), analyzed the situation, and recommended that comprehensive education be given a try. The actual decision to introduce comprehensive education was reached through consensus of the participants in the policymaking process, in this case including the Ministry of Education and international development agencies. The World Bank then developed a means of implementing the policy.

The decision, then, to introduce comprehensive education in the seventies was far from a drastic change. The concept of comprehensive schools was opted for in a tentative manner and was introduced incrementally, sequentially and in a limited scope. The decision was not to replace all senior secondary schools with comprehensive schools, but rather to introduce these into communities in need of both academic and vocational educational facilities in a trial and error fashion. Likewise, the concept of general vocational secondary schools was introduced in an additive manner, again experimenting to see what might work.

Certainly this approach to policy development proved advantageous in many respects: (a) there was no need for long-term and elaborate planning at the national level—only at the project level; (b) implementation would be relatively easy because no national or

Figure 3.1 Policymaking in Jordan


1970
FORMULATION
EVALUATION
1972
ADOPTION
CONCEPTUAL WORLD
PROCESS
EMPIRICAL WORLD
A
Same system
C
Diversification
B
More vocational schools, less academic schools
D
New structure
Generation of options
• Meagre data
• Commissioned studies
• General observations
• World Bank and UNESCO Sector work
• Philosophy of international actors
Analysis
• Country in transition
• Shortage of skilled workers
• Surplus of unskilled workers and academically educated
• Education system disfunctional, unequally distributed
• Potential for change good
SITUATION A
A
Same system
B
More vocational schools, less academic schools
D
New structure
C
Diversification
Desirable, Affordable
Desirable, Affordable
Feasible
Desirable, Affordable, Feasible
Policy Decision
Multi-program urged by UNESCO and World Bank
Incremental
Pilot case

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Figure 3.1 Policymaking in Jordan (continued)


1985
IMPLEMENTATION
IMPACT ASSESSMENT
NEW POLICY CYCLE
EVALUATION
1987
ADOPTION
A
Status quo
C
Improving diversified schools
B
More emphasis on vocational schools
D
Restructuring education system
Not seriously pursued
Policy Decision
Planning
Policy inadequate to deal with new economic situation
Unsatisfactory
Desirable
Feasible
Affordable
Yes
Major reform entrusted to new entity for implementation
Generation of options
Loosely structured reform, detailed plans by project
Implementation
• National Commission
• Task Forces
• Collection of data, workshops, discussion.
According to plan with some modifications
Analysis
• Performance of diversified schools mixed
• Economic slowdown
• Increasing unemployment, surplus of whitecollar workers
SITUATION B

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conceptual reform was involved; (c) no political mobilization or intense bureaucratic negotiations were necessary; and (d) no major institutional changes were needed to accommodate the policy modifications. In addition, little political opposition was anticipated; because of the limited risks involved, no group felt the need to present its case in terms of comparative advantages and disadvantages of the policies under consideration. This process permitted the Jordanians to gradually develop the senior secondary education structure, including the introduction of comprehensive schools, trade training centers (vocational training centers) and general vocational secondary schools, giving a wide choice to both rural and urban communities.

On the negative side, there were disadvantages to the incremental approach: because it was very "low risk," the government was not as inclined to invest much in terms of political capital or other resources to carry it off successfully. This resulted in poor planning (for example, the number of vocational teachers needed), which impeded implementation. Further, because it was an "isolated" response to the imbalance between the needs of the economy and the output of the education system, apparently affecting only a subsector of the system, implications for the rest of the system were not drawn.

In comparison, the second cycle demonstrates a more highly calculated, systematic and comprehensive mode of policymaking (described in chapter one as "synoptic"). The second cycle diverged from the earlier policymaking cycle in three major ways. First of all, it was reached after an exhaustive process of review, assessment, and analysis of the education system that included high level representatives from both the public and private sectors. In addition, policymakers in the mid-1980s benefited from the earlier policymaking process—since comprehensive education had been introduced on a pilot basis, decisionmakers during the second policy cycle were able to assess the major problems of the policy and address these in formulating a new policy. Second, even though restricted to the education system itself and not concerned with the connections between education and the labor market, this was a strategic policy: it called for a sweeping reform of the system, from restructuring to curricular changes to teacher and administrative staff training to textbook revision. That contrasted sharply with the earlier limited and incremental approach. However, as in the earlier cycle it also incorporated a phased implementation plan; experience in each phase was to be systematically monitored and evaluated and the results used as feedback for modifications of future phases. Finally, the dimensions of the reform required that an individual with sufficient power be committed and have the perseverance to see it through—in this case it was the Crown Prince, on behalf of the King. Through structuring the reform process, the Crown

Prince was able to facilitate the participation of all the relevant interest groups and to build a consensus (the societal/personalistic mode, as discussed in chapter 1). At the same time, he anticipated some resistance in the Ministry of Education in seeing the reform through, and therefore created a separate body to oversee implementation.

Jordan: Annexes

Jordan: Annex 3.1

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
LEBANON
Mediterranean Sea
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC
IRAQ
Lake Tiberias
Jordan River
Irbid
Al Mafraq
Jarash
Mahattat al Jufur
Mahattat al Hafif
As Salt
Az Zarqa
AMMAN
Madaba
Azraq ash Shishan
Dead Sea
Al Mazra'ah
Al Qatranah
Al Karak
SAUDI ARABIA
As Safi
ISRAEL
At Tafilah
Ba'ir
Ash Shawbak
JORDAN
Ma'an
Al Jafr
Ra's an Naqb
Aqaba
Gulf of Aqaba
Al Mudawwarah
Roads
Railroads
Rivers
Selected Towns
National Capital
Occupied Territories
0
25
50 Miles
0
25
50 Kilometers
36°
38°
32°
30°
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MAY 1994

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Jordan: Per Capita GDP, Selected Years



Source: World Bank.

Jordan: Composition of Labor, 1960 and 1980



Source: Ministry of Labor.

Jordan: Student Enrollments, Selected Years



Source: Ministry of Education.

Jordan:
Total Work Force and Agriculture Sector Work Force, Selected Years



Source: Ministry of Labor.

Jordan: Projected Annual Demand for and Estimated Output of Semi-Skilled and Skilled Workers, 1973-85



Source: World Bank.

Jordan: Projected Annual Demand for and Estimated Output of Technicians, 1973-85



Source: World Bank.

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135

Jordan: Projected Annual Demand for and Estimated Output of Professionals, 1973-85



Source: World Bank.

Annex III. Jordan: Structure of the Educational System


AGE
4 5
6 7 8 9 10 11
12 13 14
15 16 17
18 19 20 21
SECONDARY
POST SECONDARY AND HIGHER
COMMERCIAL
10 11 12
INDUSTRIAL
10 11 12
AGRICULTURAL
10 11 12
GENERAL (ACADEMIC)
10
11 12
LITERARY
SCIENTIFIC
11 12
10 11 12
RELIGIOUS (ISLAMIC)
ASSISTANT NURSES SCHOOL
10 11 12
COMPULSORY CYCLE
KINDERGARTEN
1 2
PRIMARY
1 2 3 4 5 6
PREPARATORY
7 8 9
TEACHER TRAINING INSTITUTES
1 2
HIGHER COMMERCIAL INSTITUTE
1 2
JUNIOR COLLEGE
1 2
INDUSTRIAL TRAINING INSTITUTE
1 2
SOCIAL WORK INSTITUTE
1 2
CHILD CARE AND MIDWIFERY INSTITUTE
1 2
NURSING COLLEGES
1 2 3
FACULTY OF ARTS
1 2 3 4
FACULTY OF SCIENCE
1 2 3 4
FACULTY OF COMMERCE & ECONOMICS
1 2 3 4
FACULTY OF AGRICULTURE
1 2 3 4
SHARIA (ISLAMIC LAW) COLLEGE
1 2 3 4
UNIVERSITY OF JORDAN
PREPARATORY EDUCATION CERTIFICATE
SECONDARY EDUCATION CERTIFICATE
UNIVERSITY BACHELOR DEGREE

Source: Ministry of Education

Jordan: Unemployment Ratio, 1981-85

Year	*Unemployed*	*Percent*
1981	22,421	5.2
1982	30,684	6.8
1983	33,673	7.2
1984	36,839	7.6
1985	40,191	8.0

Source: Ministry of Planning, Five-Year Plan of Manpower and Labor Sector, 1986-90.

Jordan: Distribution of the Unemployed by Gender and Level of Education, July-August 1986

Level of Education	*Male*	*Female*	*Total*	*Percent*
Less than Elementary	93	0	93	4.51
Elementary	202	3	205	9.93
Preparatory	411	12	423	20.49
Secondary	397	115	512	24.81
Lower diploma	184	327	511	24.76
B.A. or B.Sc.	125	148	273	13.23
Higher diploma	17	21	38	1.84
M.A. or M.Sc.	9	0	9	.44
Ph.D.	0	0	0	.00
Total	1,438	626	2,064	
Percent	69.67	30.33		100

Source: World Bank.

Jordan: GNP Growth Rate, 1981-85



Source: Ministry of Planning

Jordan: Per Capita GNP Growth Rate, 1981-85



Source: Ministry of Planning.

Jordanian Manpower Supply and Demand

Occupational Category	*Supply*	*Demand*
Scientists, Engineers	28.3	25.7
Health Professionals	13.0	16.9
Teachers, Professionals	108.1	67.8
High Level Managers	21.7	24.6
White Collar Supervisors	54.9	23.1
Blue Collar Supervisors, Skilled, Semi-skilled workers	174.9	258.1
Office, non-manual workers	299.5	100.5
Unskilled	84.0	86.3

Source: World Bank.

4

Policymaking in Thailand: From Issue Specific to Strategic

Introduction

Around 1966, the government of Thailand introduced a scheme to pilot a new policy of secondary school diversification. The aim was to resolve a single specific issue: a perceived mismatch between general secondary education and the needs of a swiftly changing labor market. Initially, the policy was limited to that one issue and a few schools. About 10 years later, it was expanded on two levels: geographically, to cover the nation, and politically, to resolve strategic issues of equity, democratization and national unity. The broadened policy has since been well received and implemented, and has been relatively successful in meeting its main objectives. The following analysis attempts to explain what has led to the success of the diversification policy in Thailand, when the experience in most other countries has been disappointing.

First Policy Cycle: The Situation Leading to 1966

Country Background

By 1966 the population of Thailand had reached 32.9 million, almost half of it under 15 years of age; the population was growing at a rapid rate of 3.1 percent per annum. Ethnically, Thailand was not homogeneous. The predominant ethnic groups, Thais and Thai-Laos, formed about 83 percent of the population. Many of the minority groups were not fully integrated into Thai society and lived in areas bordering on other countries. This had implications for both security and education, and will be discussed more fully below.

The majority of Thais of most ethnic groups, about 80 percent, lived in the rural areas, in scattered small towns and villages with poor communications. The rest lived in cities of 10,000 inhabitants or more, and 60 percent of them lived in the metropolitan area of Bangkok-Thonburi, the main economic and administrative center of the country. The urban population was growing at twice the rate of the rural population, due mainly to the migration of rural dwellers, the cause of which will emerge in the next paragraph (see annex 4.1-4.5 for socio-economic data).

The predominant rural population meant that agriculture was the largest sector of the economy, employing 80 percent of the labor force and producing 90 percent of the country's exports. On the other hand, it accounted for only 33 percent of total national output. The other two-thirds came from manufacturing, mining, construction and the services. The inverse relationship between labor force and product makes it clear that incomes and living standards were superior, where industry, construction and the services were located, i.e. in the towns. Further, the divide was widening: while agricultural output was rising at an average annual rate of 4.8 percent, the industrial and construction sectors were growing by 12.1 percent a year and had rapidly increased their share of GDP from 18.3 percent to 24.8 percent. The result is illustrated by regional income data for 1966: against an overall national per capita income of US$135, the region including Bangkok enjoyed $225, while the Northeastern region, with considerable proportions of ethnic minorities, had only $69. The Northern region's per capita income was $100, and the Southern region, with its rubber, tin and export crops had $148. Evidently, for the rural dweller, life in the urban areas appeared better and appeared to be getting better all the time.

Socio-Political Context

In 1932, Thailand became a constitutional monarchy. Since that time, the power structure in the country had consisted of three major groups—the generals, top bureaucrats and the Bangkok-based business-financial leaders. In 1958 the Thai military was able to take power and established the Revolutionary Government. Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat attempted to accelerate the economic modernization of Thailand through a political ideology of indigenous principles of authority, a traditional type of social and political hierarchy, and established paternalistic styles of rule. Upon Sarit's death in 1963, Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn and General Praphas Charusathien, both of whom had held key positions in the previous regime, took power. The transition was smooth and policies continuous, so that the period 1958-1966 was relatively stable. The concern of both governments with economic development meant a rapid increase in the growth of the economy. The country's rising prosperity generated public tolerance for the regime. It can be said that political stability and economic growth reinforced each other—the military realized that growing prosperity was good politics and so was willing to give civilian technicians considerable influence, while the public in general was willing to tolerate a nondemocratic regime that brought prosperity to the country. Still, Thailand's intellectuals, university students and other politically minded urban groups kept some pressure alive to return to elective government and to institute a permanent constitution to replace the provisional constitution imposed by Sarit.

Beginning with World War II, insurgency was a growing threat in Thailand primarily due to the deterioration of the security situation in neighboring countries. Most of this political activity centered in the Northeast where about one-third of the country's population lived. This area had long been one of uncertain loyalty, at times even of open hostility, to the central government in Bangkok. The poverty in this region made it a stronghold for Thailand's Communist Party, which drew support from the communist powers of China, the Soviet Union and North Vietnam. To a lesser degree, there were threats to national unity from the South, a predominantly Muslim area of Malayan extraction, and the North, populated mainly by hill tribes. The insurgency threat moved into high gear at the end of 1964 with the joining together of the old leftist political opposition with the Communist party of Thailand, in an attempt to coordinate their efforts and broaden their base. The threat at this time arose mainly from the Northeast and was guided by North Vietnam and Laos. Consequently, Thailand made increasingly larger expenditures on defense and focused efforts on raising incomes and bringing more and better public amenities to the people in this area in the form of roads, water supply, schools, public health facilities, etc. The insurgency problem, together with the escalating civil war in Vietnam, and the rapid build-up of the U.S. military in Thailand served to strengthen the position of the military government.

Within Thai society there existed great differences between the conservative, rural sector of farmers still centered on the ancient culture and the modernizing, urban groups with their class divisions. The pattern of life in rural society was similar from one village community to another and largely free of a hierarchical class system. Buddhism, practiced by 94 percent of the population, was the foundation of the culture. Honor and respect was accorded to religious figures (i.e. the local abbot and monks) the aged, and the educated. However, "educated" in Thailand did not ordinarily mean "produced by school and university": it meant "learned in philosophy and virtue". But the new schools introduced by the government attracted some of the traditional respect for education, and for this reason parents encouraged and supported their children in school, at least in the early stages. However, problems with retention and dropout after the introductory grades, coupled with the observation that successful students tended to move to the provincial cities or Bangkok in search of employment brought the relevance of the curriculum to rural students into question.

In contrast, urban society, particularly in Bangkok, was more socially stratified and those with royal rank or a civil service position enjoyed much prestige. In fact, during the time of absolute monarchy the only means of entering the upper-status groups for those not of noble birth was through government service. In 1966, state employment accounted for 25 percent of the waged labor force in Bangkok, and governed entry mainly by educational qualifications. This practice was shared by most large employers, so that, as economic development increasingly permitted social mobility, young people saw an academic education as an important means to move up the social and economic ladder. Public service employment continued to be considered the most desirable employment objective. An earlier effort expanding secondary education in order to provide the country with needed middle-level manpower had backfired, when this led to an increase in the demand for tertiary education for upward mobility.

Economic Context

Despite rapid economic growth and an unemployment rate of about one percent overall, very low incomes among the agricultural population and the poorer groups in municipal areas were becoming a problem. More importantly, government authorities believed that manpower shortages during 1961-66 (the First Five-Year Plan period) had constrained economic growth. The result was, as a World Bank review of its lending operations in Thailand notes, from the Second Economic Plan onwards (1967), ". . . educational policy in Thailand was heavily geared towards manpower."

The manpower forecast in the Second Five-Year Plan, covering the period 1967-71, expected the economy to continue to expand at an annual rate of 8.5 percent and sectoral growth rates to produce substantial structural changes in Thailand's economy. For example, agriculture was expected to grow by 4.3 percent a year and manufacturing by 11 percent a year in terms of GDP, so that agriculture's share of GDP would drop from 31.6 percent in 1965 to 26 percent in 1971 and the share of manufacturing and construction would rise from 17.3 percent to 19.4 percent. These structural changes had obvious implications for future manpower requirements and the government anticipated a shortage of middle- and high- level technical personnel over the next 5-10 years, while they expected increasing unemployment among those educated in the liberal arts and humanities.

Education

In the early sixties, general education in Thailand consisted of a basic 4-3-3-2 structure with the first seven years comprising the lower and upper elementary levels (grades 1-4 and 5-7 respectively), and the last five, the lower and upper secondary levels (grades 8-10 and 11-12 for general college preparatory schools and 11-13 for vocational schools.) Access to lower secondary education was determined by performance on an entrance examination and a quota of places available in both government and private schools established by the Ministry of Education. There were several avenues available to those continuing to upper secondary education, including general high schools with both general and vocational streams (traditionally oriented to college preparation), vocational high schools (accounting for 15 percent of secondary enrollment in 1963), or 3-year teacher training schools according graduates the lower teaching certificate and permitting them to teach in the elementary grades. At the tertiary level, students could continue to a two-year post-secondary diploma in one of a few technical institutes or to the Master degree level at university. Total enrollment in 1966 was 5.2 million, of which 4.8 million were in primary schools and 390,000 in secondary education. 38,000 students were enrolled at the university level.

Considerable impetus was given to education after the 1932 coup by the newly evolved constitutional requirement for a literate populace able to participate in electoral politics. Ambitious government plans were formulated, but accomplishments were limited, and in the aftermath of World War II, the educated segment of Thai society continued to consist mainly of a small elite in Bangkok, trained far beyond the standard of the remainder of the population in a college-oriented, traditional curriculum. These educated few were mainly employed in the government.

In the late 1950s, UNESCO, the World Bank and the Thai government all conducted studies which highlighted a need for skilled and semi-skilled manpower, and called for an increase in trades and industry schools output, as well as improving training for future farmers. In response, the government introduced the National Education Scheme (NES) with the objective of accelerating the pace of economic and social development. The curriculum was to be made more modern and practical, and less academic. In addition, compulsory education was to be expanded from four to seven years. In order to relate education plans to overall development policy, the NES placed greater emphasis on vocational education. The World Bank and UNESCO assisted in Thailand's expansion of vocational education in the World Bank's First Education Project (1966).

The major problems in education in the early 1960s were related to issues of access, equity, internal efficiency and external efficiency.

Access to education was expanding but still available mainly to those in urban areas. The government which had come to power in the 1930s had made primary and literacy education a priority, and restrained secondary education. A limited number of government secondary schools had been maintained to serve as examples for private schools. By the early 1960s, private schools accounted for over 50 percent of secondary enrollments, attesting to the demand for this level of education. Secondary schools were mainly found in Bangkok and the provincial capitals.

The implication for *equity* is clear. Bangkok and the neighboring provinces enjoyed most of the educational resources, while the border provinces of the Northeast, North and South had very few. (See annexes 4.6-4.10.) The gap between the areas was aggravated in the upper levels of education. For example, in secondary education, Bangkok had 36 secondary students per 1,000 inhabitants, while the Northeast only had four and nationwide the ratio was 9.3.

Regarding *internal efficiency*, there was a low progression rate at the elementary school level. Though most Thai children entered lower elementary schools (approximately 95 percent of the age group began the first grade) the vast majority of students stopped their education at the fourth grade, which had originally marked the end of compulsory schooling. The transition rate from Grades 4 to 5 was only 18 percent and a study of human resource development conducted in 1963 attributed much of this to failure, repeating and retention in the lower grades. It is important to note how the transition rate differed between areas: for example, in Bangkok, 85 percent of fourth graders proceeded to fifth grade, whereas only 14 percent of students in the Northeast did so.

Access to lower secondary school was also controlled through quotas of places in government schools; admittance was determined by a student's performance on an entrance examination. Only about 30 percent of those graduating from lower secondary schooling went on to upper secondary, again partly because of quotas. Of those who did reach the final year of upper secondary, about one-quarter failed to graduate, half entered the employment market or some form of training, while the remaining quarter went on to colleges and universities. The large number of failures at this level were mainly from the academic (general) track, which meant that they were disqualified from clerical work and largely unprepared for technical or artisanal occupations.

In the rural areas, high dropout and repeater rates at all levels could be attributed in large part to a serious shortage of qualified teachers and inadequate availability of instructional materials.

Regarding *external efficiency*, the education system was believed to be failing to prepare its students for either the gradually modernizing agricultural sector, or for the rapidly expanding industrial sector. In particular, secondary education was faulted on two counts. On the one hand, it first permitted too many students to choose the college preparatory stream, which accounted for 85 percent of the enrollment, then produced too many dropouts and failures, who could be fitted nowhere. Further, even the graduates who did not proceed to college were too many to be accommodated by the commercial, service and government sectors. On the other hand, the secondary technical and vocational streams, which should have answered the growing needs of the economy, were also producing unemployables. One indicative study, conducted by the Department of Public Welfare in the early sixties, pointed out the ineffectiveness of vocational training. It surveyed a sample of 1960 and 1961 graduates of vocational schools of different types in the Bangkok-Thonburi area and found that 45 percent were unemployed, 22 percent were in jobs unrelated to their training, and only 33 percent were doing what they were supposed to do. One of the reasons advanced for these unsatisfactory findings was that the Thai authorities had "academicized" the curriculum to enable even vocational graduates to continue to higher education.

Potential for Change

If change in the present system were necessary, how difficult would it be to bring about? Two factors would facilitate reform. First, the rapid growth of the economy meant that financial constraints would not pose a great barrier to change. Though funds for education were not unlimited, the government would have the scope to allocate more resources to secondary education. Second, the centralized structure of the education system would make change relatively easy to implement. However, the planning abilities of the system were not yet adequate. As a UNESCO report of the time illustrates:

> . . . the national educational planning mechanism of Thailand is in a developmental stage in that the planning process is not yet conceived

> generally as a continuing research-based function requiring leadership and direction from a high level planning unit supported by the coordinated efforts of several agencies with explicit, complementary planning tasks . . . educational planning at present may still be characterized as a two- fold process involving a periodic, part-time *ad-hoc* committee approach to prepare five-year plans and largely fragmentary, semi-independent planning and development efforts conducted by various ministerial departments and university faculties on behalf of their particular sub-sectors of the system. . . . Given conditions such as those described above, objective decision-making on the basis of priority national development needs and the optimum means of meeting them is difficult if not impossible.

Reinforcing an impediment in planning and administrative capacity might be a factor on the demand side. It could arise from a combination of the traditional view of education, a modern use of educational qualifications and the traditional way of training young people for employment. As the introduction suggested, the main purpose of education in Buddhist thought was to study the virtuous life and how to attain it. The society prized goodness over material wealth, and regarded knowledge as a desirable end in itself rather than as a vocational tool. In addition, it gave much status to the learned, as these were historically holy men. Therefore, an academic education was a satisfaction in itself: it did not need to qualify a person for employment. However, it also did just that: the government and large corporations required academic education from applicants for entry to their upper echelons. Academic education was thus a double good.

On the vocational side, most employment in Thai industry was to be found in a large number of small family firms. These hired staff on the basis of personal ties, not educational qualifications, and trained their recruits on the job. In this context, formal vocational training did not carry much weight. The government and large corporations, which offered the remaining opportunities for vocational graduates, confined these offers to their less well paid and prestigious positions. Vocational education was thus a double handicap.

Engineering a change of value away from academic education and toward vocational education would therefore require one of two things. Either the employment system would have to change, or the education system would have to do much better what it was already trying to do in "academicising" the vocational curriculum: namely, succeed in making its students both academic and vocational.

Parents, students and employers could be expected to be nervous about radical changes. In addition, other interest groups might also object to a fundamental change in the curriculum: the Ministry of Education which would be responsible for implementing the change; teachers, who would need to be retrained; and the private schools, many of which were Chinese and Islamic.

Generating Policy Options

In the early sixties, the Thai authorities were well aware of the need to modernize the education system, to make secondary school dropouts and graduates more employable, and to meet the manpower requirements of the changing Thai economy, as well as to address the rural/urban inequities.

Analysis of the situation had come from several fronts. First of all, a 1963 joint Thai-USOM (United States Operations Mission) Task Force study on human resources development in Thailand (entitled, *A Preliminary Assessment of Education and Manpower in Thailand*), conducted by a team from Michigan State University with the assistance of UNESCO, pointed strongly to the need for a change in the education system. This led to two further studies related to secondary education, manpower and educational planning, undertaken by the Thai government and funded by the USAID (entitled, *Secondary Education, Manpower and Educational Planning in Thailand*, and *Current and Projected Secondary Educational Program for Thailand: A Manpower and Educational Development Planning Project*). The 1963 *Preliminary Assessment* made projections for manpower needs in the years 1963 and 1970 and determined that there would be an increased demand for secondary graduates during these years: "The economy of Thailand, as it develops, is changing in composition. These changes give more prominence to those economic sectors which depend upon a work force made up of a larger proportion of those who have a good general education (as opposed to college-preparatory) through secondary (level) or who have secondary level vocational training. Such people either have middle-level manpower proficiencies or are trainable on the job to such proficiencies." They foresaw the heaviest demands in professional and technical occupations as well as clerical workers, agricultural workers, administrators, salesmen and craftsmen. The study found that at the secondary level, technicians were in largest demand, followed closely by skilled and semi-skilled workers. However, it did not suggest how this demand might be reconciled with employers' preferences to engage unqualified family members rather than qualified strangers.

During this period, the government of the United States was increasingly concerned about the political stability of the region. It felt that the rural areas, especially in the North and Northeast, were very isolated from the Center and Bangkok, and ill served by the government, which made them more prone to recruitment by the insurgents. One way to counteract this threat would be to improve educational services, and contribute to the development of the area by teaching a curriculum more relevant to the needs of rural dwellers.

The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) had also shown an interest in secondary education in Thailand. The Canadian studies accentuated the high drop-out rates and the over-academic nature of the curriculum. They concluded that changes were needed that would "help to channel students into programs suited to their aptitudes and interests, and in keeping with the economic needs of the nation."

The tendency to attribute the problems of unemployment and manpower shortages to the inappropriateness of the academic education, and the desire to make education more "relevant" to the needs of the local population—i.e. to "deacademize" it—were in keeping with the prevailing international mood. These policies were shared by leading educators and donor agencies, including the World Bank and UNESCO, and were later articulated in the World Bank Policy Paper in 1974:

> The upward push of demand reinforces the built-in tendency of education at any one level to be preparation for the next. As a corollary, the content becomes more theoretical and abstract and less practical; experience drawn on is more universal and less local; and cognitive, or purely mental, skills are emphasized over attitudes and manual, social and leadership skills. This education is dysfunctional for most types of employment—wage or non-wage—and for playing other roles needed in a developing society.

The Department of General Education (DGE) which was responsible for secondary education within the Ministry of Education was in close touch with the international community. The Department's own Secondary School Study addressed the concerns articulated by USAID, UNESCO and CIDA; and so did the Second National Economic and Social Development Plan (1967-71), which laid out the overall policy of educational development in the following way:

(1) To provide education which is consistent with the economic and social development objectives of the country.

(2) To make provisions for the expansion of education consistent with the Government's social obligations and responsibilities, including educational opportunities for all children of school-attending age.

(3) To achieve a more equitable balance in the country by accelerating the qualitative improvement of regional or rural education.

(4) To effect qualitative improvements in course preparation and curriculum development, textbooks, school buildings and the qualification of teachers.

(5) To promote the development of private education, particularly the improvement of its qualitative standards.

In formulating policy for secondary education, the government and its foreign advisers apparently did not consider possibilities of reforming employment policies to influence the demand and utilization of education. Instead, they reviewed three exclusively educational options to meet the objectives outlined above:

(A) To continue the present system and balance of college-preparatory and vocational streaming.

(B) To improve external efficiency by shifting the balance of enrollments toward vocational education and reducing college-preparatory education, without greatly changing the content of the system.

(C) To improve external efficiency by both increasing enrollments in vocational secondary schools *and* introducing comprehensive secondary schools which would allow students to pursue practical subjects as part of their general education program.

Evaluation of Policy Options

These policy options were evaluated in an *ad hoc* manner. Policy making and planning at this stage in the development of the Thai state were still relatively unsystematic. Therefore CIDA made its own evaluation while the Ministry of Education was carrying out its Secondary School Study.

Option (A) was evaluated on the basis of desirability and rejected because the existing system was not adequately meeting the present and projected manpower needs of the Thai economy. As can be seen by the projected supply and demand of graduates for 1966 (made in 1963), secondary education would have to be expanded in order to meet the manpower requirements for 12th grade graduates. On the other hand, the existing level of university graduates appeared adequate. Therefore, an educational program at the secondary level would need to be developed which trained people for technical, skilled and semi-skilled jobs, but which did not raise their expectations for college attendance. In addition, the large numbers of school leavers at the secondary level were not appropriately trained for existing jobs due to the highly academic nature of their educational preparation.

Option (B) was rejected for several reasons. First of all, it was not considered a desirable option. The government was aware that vocational education was not regarded highly among the population, that it was considered an education for second-class citizens. In fact, enrollment in vocational education had been dropping both in absolute terms (from 60,100 in 1960 to 43,500 in 1962) and as a percentage of total school enrollments from (1.44 percent in 1960 to one percent in 1962). Further, the study cited earlier demonstrated that vocational education was not effectively training students for employment. An examination of the differences between upper and lower secondary vocational education found that the quality of and demand for vocational education at the lower secondary level was especially low. Therefore, the government and the Joint Thai-USOM Task Force found, "little real evidence . . . available at the time of this assessment to support a program of across-the-board expansion of vocational education in Thailand. There is convincing evidence to support a sustained, orderly expansion of vocational education at the higher vocational and technical levels. In terms of educational investment and the returns therefrom, it would seem prudent to concentrate heavily on vocational and technical work beyond the tenth grade level and let the lower programs be absorbed into a general education stream." Secondly, this option was not affordable. The overall average baht-per-pupil cost in the vocational department was 2,355 (approximately US$113) as compared to 1,368 (approximately US$66) in general secondary. Considering the assessment of the impact of vocational education, the extra cost did not seem to be warranted.

Option (C) was considered desirable for several reasons. First of all, two pilot comprehensive schools had already been constructed in 1960 and 1963 under the guidance of the Minister of Education, Hon. M. L. Pin Malakul. These pilot schools had been well received by the local populations and certainly influenced the positive evaluation of the third option. In fact, the Ministry of Education, in assessing the impact of these schools through the Secondary School Study, had called for the main mode of education for grades 8-12 to be comprehensive schooling. The Department of Secondary Education (DSE) felt strongly the importance of adapting the curricula to the particular needs of the local areas and making use of local resources and people. A unit for Comprehensive High Schools was formed in the DSE in 1965. However, the decision to move forward on comprehensive schooling was not officially made for some time because of "... the difficulties of welding the multiplicity of agencies engaged in this field into a coherent organization capable of acting speedily and efficiently."

Feasibility studies were done individually by CIDA (who sent a team from the University of Alberta) and the Ministry of Education. Basically, policy option (C) was considered to be implementable because it could draw upon the experience of the earlier comprehensive schools, and would be more affordable than greatly increasing the places in vocational schools.

Making the Policy Decision

The Thai government chose policy option (C), namely, to introduce comprehensive schooling at the secondary level and to increase the role of secondary vocational education. However, it refrained from making it a national policy at once. It preferred simply to expand the earlier comprehensive schools into a larger pilot program, so that it would have a firmer base for later decisions. Equally important, a piloting approach would avoid provoking the kinds of opposition that a more sweeping reform might arouse. The government would also be testing the possibility of providing more practical and less academic courses, and, more ambitiously, of redirecting the *aspirations* of secondary students from preoccupations with the university and the public service to an interest in wider educational and professional opportunities.

The policy decision can be considered "issue-oriented" (see chapter one) since it was largely concerned with resolving the misdirection of the secondary curriculum and school output. It required a strong "practical" curriculum that would train large numbers of secondary graduates in mathematics, science and applied areas, who would be trainable on the job for many different kinds of positions in crafts, trades, sales, commerce and minor executive and supervisory positions. In keeping with the recommendations of the Joint Thai-USOM Task Force manpower study, vocational efforts would be concentrated in the final two years of secondary education, and gradually phased out at the lower levels. The program would be flexible, and selection of courses would be made by the students and not dictated by a curriculum committee.

The Second National and Economic Development Plan (1967-71) articulated the policy thus, ". . . at the secondary level, major efforts are to be made towards the expansion of comprehensive schools so that students will be guided towards studies of practical utility, especially to the vocational high schools which are oriented towards the vocational and technological disciplines."

Planning for Policy Implementation

Planning to implement the diversification policy began in 1966 with the assistance of CIDA and was quite extensive. The Department of Secondary Education, recognizing the need to establish a specialist entity to execute the changes, set up the Comprehensive School Project Office. By July of 1969 it employed seventy persons. CIDA offered a project loan of C$1 million and a grant of C$600,000 for technical assistance, including the provision of four Canadian advisors to work with their Thai counterparts in planning the policy. USAID also prepared a "companion" project in support of the diversification policy.

The project developed a time-table over six years for recruiting and training teachers, constructing facilities and acquiring furniture. The schedule allowed a gradual phasing in of the diversified curriculum at 20 existing secondary schools in several provincial capitals. Several criteria determined the choice of these 20 schools: (a) the manpower needs of the local area; (b) availability of space for expansion; (c) enrollments in the "feeder" schools; (d) location of existing vocational schools that might provide facilities for further education for graduates; (e) potential to act as a laboratory school; and (f) "upcountry" location far from Bangkok.

The schools were referred to as "brain-drain prevention" schools because, through improving the quality of education here, the government hoped to prevent "the brainy students" from migrating to Bangkok to attend the "good" schools. The Thai government would provide for the construction of school buildings and furniture through $14 million from the government budget and a loan of $7.5 million from the Bank of Thailand, and the CIDA loan would provide for the purchase of equipment.

Initially, only the lower secondary curriculum was to be diversified; the upper secondary curriculum would remain the same. The new 1967 curriculum would abolish "streams" and replace them with the offering of a variety of courses, including pre-vocational, open to grouping by abilities, interests and aptitudes. These 20 project schools would include "practical arts" courses and would be industry oriented, including such practical subjects as carpentry, automobile mechanics, metal working, home economics, typing and electronics. Each student upon entering lower secondary school would be required to devote a full eight hours (out of 35) per week to practical arts subjects. Thereafter, these courses would become electives and students could choose to spend up to half of class time on practical subjects. The unit system would be established, replacing the full year pass-fail policy in effect up to that time. Therefore, subjects would be assigned credits and promotion would be by subject rather than by year.

In planning, CIDA took into consideration the importance administrative staff and teachers involved in the comprehensive schools would have. CIDA felt strongly that since the staff and teachers had all been educated and trained in a "rigid atmosphere of a lock-step curriculum and learning by rote," a good retraining program would be necessary to help orient them to the problems, procedures and organizations peculiar to the comprehensive school program. CIDA went so far as to state that administrators and teachers must "study the philosophy behind the comprehensive school and accept it as their own." Therefore, CIDA made an administrative training program and an in-service teacher training program an integral part of its project (to be financed through the C$600,000 grant money mentioned above). The former would consist of a fellowship program whereby school administrators and supervisors were sent to the University of Alberta in Canada to study; the latter would provide for a series of seminars each year of the project for teachers and department heads, as well as close supervision on the part of the project staff. Separate from the CIDA program, but in support of its goals, USAID provided scholarships to a number of school administrators to tour comprehensive schools in the US, Canada, the United Kingdom, Nigeria and Malaysia.

The CIDA-assisted project also saw the need for good guidance and counseling and made plans to employ two counselors in each of the 20 schools to be diversified. A project center would be established which would allow supervisors the opportunity to pursue research and plan for the development of the schools, and to assist in the improvement of teaching in the project schools.

The USAID-assisted project was more modest and planned closely with the Thai education authorities in the Department of Secondary Education. Over a period of six years AID would disburse more than

US$1 million to assist the diversification of the curriculum in a further 42 rural lower secondary schools in security sensitive areas of the North and Northeast. In these schools, the practical arts portion of the curriculum would be more agriculturally oriented and would utilize school garden plots and home projects. The new curriculum here would also offer a variety of courses focusing on science, home economics, industrial arts, and commerce. These schools would come to be known as Type II schools, to differentiate them from the more industry-oriented Type I schools supported by CIDA. USAID would supply some equipment and teaching aids to the project schools and also technical assistance through Agriculture Education Advisors. In addition, USAID promised study grants for teachers to receive third country training to prepare them for their new role in applied subjects.

Policy Implementation

In general, the diversification of the curriculum of both the CIDA- and USAID-assisted government schools was completed within 7 years, just a year beyond their projected schedules. The only significant delay occurred in the construction of school buildings, because the Bank of Thailand was slow in releasing its promised loan.

Certain modifications were necessary as implementation proceeded. First of all, changes were made in the building plans for construction in later schools based on experience with the earlier schools. This rendered the later schools more efficient and less costly. In addition, some minor revisions were made in the equipment used. Furniture procurement was excessively delayed, as it was mainly purchased from one contractor who was found not to have a large enough plant to produce the goods on time. It was decided that future orders should be awarded to several companies to circumvent this problem.

Second, Training and Maintenance Centers were established to aid comprehensive schools in producing teaching aids, and to train people on the maintenance of equipment and buildings.

Third, in 1969, a major modification of the 1967 curriculum reduced the variety of course offerings, eliminated short courses over one school term in favor of one-year courses, changed the number of periods per week that each course was offered and revised some of the content of the courses. The revised pattern was found to be more easily implementable and less costly.

Finally, it was decided to add practical subjects to the curriculum at the upper secondary level. In particular, the CIDA-assisted schools had found that comprehensive schooling was so popular, that fewer students were dropping out after three years at the lower secondary level and were continuing their studies. These students requested the opportunity to continue to pursue a practical arts curriculum.

Policy Impact Assessment

In the early 1970s, the policy was evaluated in the light of four factors:

- the political situation,
- the state of the economy,
- the performance of other secondary education programs, and
- the performance of diversified education.

By late 1973, the political situation had changed dramatically when student demonstrations brought down the military government. The student movement had been building for some time, in reaction to the widespread corruption of the military government; its disregard for other social, economic, and cultural groups; lack of movement toward economic and social reform; and a perceived excessive dependence on and subservience to America and the West. The catalyst for the coup had come from the way in which Prime Minister Thanom had handled the desire of the population, especially the students, for a new constitution. In 1968 he issued a new constitution which provided for a bicameral legislature comprising an elected lower house and an appointed Senate. Though elections in 1969 produced a majority for the government party in the lower house, and allowed Thanom to continue as prime minister, in 1971 he dissolved Parliament, banned political parties, and again ruled under an interim constitution that restored military dominance over the government. The students began to formulate their own constitution, and it was the demonstrations for this new constitution which ousted Thanom.

The situation which ensued sparked the desire for democratic reform and created a political consciousness among students, the middle class and the peasantry that would significantly change Thai society. It also helped to increase the ranks of the insurgents. The government reacted with increased action to meet the needs of those living in the most impoverished regions of the country. More roads were built, health programs implemented, irrigation programs begun, etc. However, increased government presence in the villages also served to heighten dissatisfaction. Villagers became more subject to military and police harassment and more aware of bureaucratic corruption and bungling; their expectations, raised by overly optimistic government promises, frequently were not fulfilled; and they were becoming conscious of how far they lagged behind more prosperous regions and city dwellers.

The new government of 1973, then, came to power in the face of a major security crisis. The country was engaged in two exhausting conflicts, trying to stem a rising tide of internal insurgency while maintaining forces in Indochina. In addition, it became clear that the United States would soon be leaving the "Asians (to) fight their own battles."

Regarding developments in the economy, economic growth as measured by GDP had slowed somewhat, from the nine percent average annual growth rate enjoyed in 1966-69 to an average of about six percent between the years 1970-74. In addition, there was an overall increase in the consumer price index of 25 percent due in large part to the world oil crisis. Further, the country began to run a balance of payments deficit, due to a decline in U.S. military expenditures and transfers, and a reduction in prices of rice and rubber.

In the rural areas, the economic problems were exacerbated. In certain areas of the country land shortages began to be significant which consequently led to land reform pressures. Population was growing at such a rapid rate that it was difficult to ensure an improvement in the standard of living of the rural majority. Income disparities between the cities and rural areas continued to grow, especially as urban workers were able to extract an almost 50 percent increase in minimum wage rates in 1973. This contributed to increasing rural-urban conflicts. Development continued to be concentrated heavily around Bangkok where most of the manufacturing plants, public utilities and services were located. A large share of investments in agriculture, particularly irrigation works, were also made in the Central Plain. Large income disparities prevailed. In fact, the average income of rural families was about half that of urban families and per capita income in Bangkok was estimated to be three times that of the rest of the country. As mentioned above, in the Northeast the government had made attempts to promote community development, but there was only slight progress made in developing the region's productive capacity.

Finally, urban unemployment began for the first time to become a real issue. The rapid growth in 1966-69, particularly in construction and services, provided sufficient employment opportunities to absorb the additional urban labor force. However, by 1971 this had begun to change. The World Bank's Appraisal Report for the Third Education Project (1973) observed that unemployment was found mainly among unskilled young workers (15-24 years) in the urban centers and particularly in Bangkok. Underemployment was considered widespread in agriculture (due to the seasonal nature of the work) and in the service sectors.

In respect to general secondary education, concerns continued to be expressed regarding the large numbers of dropouts and graduates who did not continue on to university. Due to the excessively theoretical nature of the secondary curriculum, these were felt to be poorly prepared to enter the labor force. Enrollments had expanded rapidly since 1964 and by 1970, 445,500 students attended lower secondary schools and 59,700 upper secondary schools or about 13 percent of the 14-18 age group. Private education continued to provide for 50 percent of the secondary school population. Equity in educational availability was also a continuing problem—Bangkok maintained the lead with 40 secondary students per 1,000 inhabitants, whereas the Northeast had five and the other regions 10.

In addition, the internal efficiency of secondary education continued to be low. Only about 40 percent of those students entering eighth grade graduated from the twelfth grade which meant that 60 percent had either terminated their studies at the end of the lower secondary level or had simply dropped out. Although the predominant mode of instruction remained college-preparatory, only about 70 percent of those graduating from grade 12 actually went on to some form of higher education (35 percent to universities, 25 percent to teachers colleges and 10 percent to technical colleges). The remaining 30 percent entered the labor market.

External efficiency in terms of demand for labor could be said to have improved in that many of the manpower objectives of the Second Plan were met. However, in terms of supply of labor, the government continued to be concerned that there would be an oversupply of general education school dropouts and graduates entering the labor market without many skills and not easily trainable. This was a particular concern in the rural areas, where secondary school leavers would be seeking jobs locally.

The most encouraging feature of the evaluation was the performance of the diversified curriculum: it was considered a success. Enrollments in the 62 pilot schools were over the targets, whereas in other secondary schools there was a shortfall from expected enrollments (this also confirmed the positive impact of recruitment efforts by comprehensive school administrators). In some project schools, the enrollment was 150 percent of the projected maximum. A number of the schools tripled and quadrupled their enrollment in a five year period. Though high enrollment rates indicated an acceptance and demand for diversified education, they created some problems as well: in particular, they necessitated the use of temporary classrooms and increased the teacher-pupil ratio above the optimal level. Further, a joint Thai-CIDA assessment (funded by the World Bank) which focused on the principals' evaluations of the diversified school experiment also found the experiment to be a success. In general, it found considerable community support for this type of schooling. Though it was clear that academic (college-preparatory) type schooling continued to hold the same prestige and status with parents, there was, "considerable evidence . . . that students generally like and appreciate the comprehensive curriculum."

Not only were the schools successful in introducing the students to various areas of employment and giving them hands-on experience, but the level of academic work was very high. The results of the twelfth grade exam for 1971-72 showed that students from the comprehensive schools did exceptionally well in comparison to students from other schools. In fact, the highest standing in the science stream for all of Thailand was obtained by a student from one of the project schools.

Though at this point it was too early to evaluate the impact of the schools on the manpower situation in Thailand, the Thai-CIDA evaluation noted with considerable excitement that 30 percent of students finishing the lower secondary level went on to senior secondary vocational courses. This accounted in part for the increase in enrollments in vocational schools by almost 10 percent per year from 37,000 in 1965 to 50,000 in 1970. In addition, 30 percent of students from project schools continued in comprehensive schools and only nine percent switched to college preparatory schools.

Though the early findings were largely encouraging, some problems did come to the fore. In addition to those mentioned in relation to high enrollment rates, the diversified schools lacked qualified teachers, department heads, and supervisors for practical subjects. This problem could be related back to the fragmentary nature of educational administration in Thailand, under which the various departments of the Ministry of Education acted autonomously in planning, development, and administration of the respective types and levels of education. The fact that the Secondary Education Department planned the construction of the schools and curriculum development, implementing the diversified curriculum largely independently of the Teacher Training Department and the

Vocational Education Department meant that the latter were not able to help in providing training for specialized teachers and instructors. On top of the lack of complementarities at the personnel level, there was also a lack of curriculum guides and textbooks in practical arts courses. Finally, the schools were found to be more expensive than planned to construct and operate, which raised questions about their replicability in their existing form nationwide. These problems would need to be addressed, if the comprehensive schooling experiment were to continue.

Second Policy Cycle: Policy Response—Generating Policy Options

The political and economic developments recounted in the last section created the desire for democratic reform in Thailand, particularly in education. Due to the populist movement which had brought it to power, the new government felt compelled by events to mold policy in a more egalitarian way. It felt that if national conflict and disintegration (in the style of neighboring Southeast Asian countries) were to be avoided, absolute priority in economic development must go to the small farm sector of the economy, and part of that effort must include expanded educational opportunity and quality.

Though a loosely formulated group of experts and educators had been meeting since 1971 to discuss possible changes in the education system, the coup accelerated the impetus for reform, and in 1974 the Council of Ministers established a special committee of prominent and highly respected Thai intellectuals and bureaucrats to lay the groundwork for systematic educational reform. The committee comprised members of the Ministry of Education, Department of General Education, and the National Education Commission as well as representatives from the National Economic and Social Development Board, the Budget Bureau, teachers unions, and private schools, universities, and educational experts. Regarding secondary education, the reform committee confronted three familiar tasks: (1) to address the demand for secondary education in the rural areas, (2) to improve the quality of instruction, and (3) to provide the type of education that would prepare students for entry into the labor market.

The committee had at its disposal the results of two studies, one by UNESCO in 1970, the other by the World Bank in 1972. The UNESCO study cited the wide disparities of economic growth rates between the rural and central urban areas. The implication of such a disparity, the report concluded, was a relatively slow development and low productivity of the agricultural sector due mainly to the low educational level of farmers and other rural workers. The World Bank study again noted the distortions in the education system in favor of the well-to-do urban youth, and the overemphasis on academic subjects and favored a more practically oriented curriculum.

Reflecting the Third National Economic and Social Development Plan (1972-76) which stressed the development of human resources, the Thai government set out in 1972 its Third-Five Year Education Plan (1972-1976). The plan's major objective was to build a modern and more relevant education system and it called for: (a) strengthening education planning and administration; (b) improving the internal efficiency of the system, including upgrading the quality of teaching; (c) making curricula more relevant to Thai needs; and (d) decreasing regional disparities in educational opportunity. The reform committee considered three options for secondary education which could help meet these objectives:

(A) Focusing on traditional secondary education with an eye to addressing the issues of equity and external efficiency as well as quality,

(B) Continuing along the same path, that is implementing diversified education in a limited way, but maintaining traditional education as the main mode of secondary education, and

(C) Expanding diversified schooling, to meet the strategic objectives identified in the sector studies, and become the standard mode of secondary education.

Evaluation of Policy Options

Though the reform committee had commissioned many studies to assist it in analyzing the situation and to help it determine which mode of secondary education to pursue, it also worked largely on intuition and the feeling that change was necessary and inevitable. There was a philosophy infusing the reform committee which extended beyond the economic considerations of education. The philosophy evolved from liberal thought which had a broader meaning for education. This philosophy stated that society would be better if students were taught about the real work world, and not caught up in ivory tower academics. The committee felt, in addition, that young people should be exposed to social trends in society, that school afforded a place to discuss issues such as war, family relationships, etc.

At the same time, the reform committee was impassioned with a desire to spread secondary education to the rural areas and just as importantly to provide a secondary curriculum that would help prepare students to work in and contribute to their communities. Therefore, the committee examined the three options with a view to meeting several objectives, which greatly influenced their evaluation. These multiple objectives, namely to address the problems of equity and external efficiency, as well as to impart a certain philosophy for living and working required a "strategic" policy as compared to one that was "issue-specific". In 1966 the government had been mainly concerned with how to correct the secondary curriculum and school output and the question was whether vocational schools, general schools or diversified schools could best do this. In this case, an "issue-specific" policy was adequate to deal with the objectives. Now in 1974 the concern was broader, encompassing not only the secondary curriculum, but the need to ensure national unity and bring about equity. The fact that the policy was intended to meet several objectives at once narrowed the possible options and meant that evaluation would not proceed in a linear fashion, but along three dimensions. In sum, it was felt that a change was needed to address the problems of national unity, equity, and manpower development; therefore option (A) was rejected and option (B) was deemed to be too narrow in scope.

The reform committee found option (C) to be desirable for all of the reasons outlined above. It would be the best kind of secondary education to provide young people in the rural areas, as the diversified curriculum would reinforce a positive attitude towards work and manual dexterity and therefore would better prepare students for entry to the labor force. In addition, the new curriculum would be oriented to each region, which would increase its relevance and thereby help increase agricultural productivity. Regarding affordability, preliminary studies of existing diversified schools found the costs of diversified schools to be reasonable. Capital costs per pupil place were about US$600, about 20 percent higher than in schools which were not diversified. Recurrent costs per student were about US$75-80, about equal to those in schools which were not diversified. Though the diversified schools were clearly more expensive, the desirability of this option outweighed the problem of affordability. In addition, Thai authorities were convinced that their ongoing studies to decrease costs would eventually make constructing and operating these schools even more affordable. Further, provisions to increase school fees would also help finance the policy. Finally, the reform committee felt equally optimistic about implementability.

Though the lack of qualified teachers and teaching materials had impeded the progress of earlier comprehensive schools, lessons learned from implementation of the schools assisted by AID and CIDA would be applied to further implementation.

In its deliberations, the education reform committee, like all previous commissions and missions, did not consider whether changes in employment policy or labor market practices might influence educational demand and behavior.

Policy Decision

The reform committee's report, which came out in January of 1975, made four major recommendations which focused on promoting social justice through: (1) more equitable allocation of education resources; (2) changing the grade structure of the system (to 6-3-3); (3) making the curricula more practical and relevant to the real life needs of learners; and (4) unifying and decentralizing the administrative structure. The major objectives of the reform included improving equity, flexibility and diversity in the system, and better preparing students for the labor market.

In regard to secondary education, the reform called for the consolidation of all separate specialized secondary schools (both college-preparatory and vocational) into comprehensive schools; the abolition of entrance examinations in favor of a geographical quota system for access to secondary schools; an increase of fees for secondary and higher education coupled with liberal scholarship programs for needy students; and the consolidation of fragmented curricular subjects around flexible national core curricula with regional variations.

The National Education Council (NEC), which was responsible for formulating public education policies and plans, endorsed the recommendations of the committee. The Cabinet of the government which assumed responsibility after the elections of January 1975 also approved the recommendations and instructed the Minister of Education to prepare a program for implementing the reform. It was decided that the reform would provide the basis for the education sector plans in the Fourth National Five Year Plan (1977-81). This would give the Ministry of Education (MOE) and NEC time to conduct further studies to help implement the reform.

The objective of implementing diversified education on a nationwide basis, according to the Fourth Plan, was ". . . to meet the real needs of each locality in terms of social, cultural, political and economic situations; and to provide training in both theory and practice . . . ."

Structurally, the diversified schools would be created in the following way: existing vocational schools would become diversified secondary schools and the teacher training cycle at upper secondary level would be phased out. Remaining college-preparatory secondary schools would be converted to diversified schools by adding the prevocational curriculum. Secondary education would become a six-year program by the inclusion of grade seven, previously included in primary school. The upper cycle would be extended from two to three years in order to address the incidence of high repetition rates among students in the existing two year cycle. Entrance examinations to secondary schools would be replaced by a system of quotas by primary schools, so that primary graduates from low income families could have greater access to secondary education. School fees would be increased sharply to cover about one third of actual costs and scholarships would be provided for needy students. A credit system would be introduced to allow students to progress at varying rates, or re-enroll after dropping out.

The revised secondary curricula would aim at reducing disparities in quality among regions, introducing more flexible programs and better preparing students for employment or self-employment. The curricula would combine basic academic training with practical (prevocational) skills training and knowledge and civic education. The new lower secondary curriculum would have the dual characteristics of being a general education for all and for those who want to continue education at a high level, and would also have a terminal and functional character in imparting occupational skills necessary for living. In particular, the lower secondary curriculum would allow for individual development and self-exploration; it would be more flexible and responsive to local needs by exposing students to different occupational and professional training. The upper secondary curriculum would focus on skill acquisition and would also provide students the opportunity to gain practical experience from economic enterprises outside the school premises.

The policy decision to expand diversified education had several characteristics. First of all, though the scope of the policy had been expanded, the policy itself had not been changed, but proceeded along a continuum. Second, there was a demonstrated demand for the policy. Third, the decision was based on agreement among selected Ministry of Education personnel, members of the National Education Commission and educational experts. These were men of strong personalities who were well placed in the education structure and therefore in a position to see such a reform through. Fourth, the policy, originally inspired by foreign advisers and derived partly from school systems in England, Nigeria and Malaysia, had been repeatedly adapted by this time and was now a thoroughly "Thai animal". Finally, the policy was articulated in the form of operational steps—though the policy was intended to be implemented nation-wide, implementation would proceed incrementally, with an eye to learning while doing.

Planning for Policy Implementation

Once the skeleton of the reform had been formulated, UNESCO undertook a study, published as *Education: Towards Equalization and Reform*, which made recommendations for implementation. The reform was articulated in the 1977-81 and 1982-86 national plans and broad planning was done by the National Education Commission and the reform committee, but the real details such as costing, etc. were specified by the Department of General Education (in the Ministry of Education). Further elements of detailed planning, derived from the UNESCO study, were provided within the context of three World Bank-financed projects, in 1976, 1979 and 1982, using institutions such as the Office of Special Projects, the Project Implementation Unit and the National Curriculum Development Center, which had been established under earlier initiatives.

The government calculated that the cost of the entire reform would necessitate substantial capital expenditure as well as a higher recurrent budget. Projecting a per annum GDP growth rate between 1975 and 1985 of 5-6.5 percent, it determined that the added costs would be within the country's financial capacity. UNESCO also conducted feasibility studies which concluded that the reform would be affordable, but at lower enrollment rates than those projected by the Thais.

Due to the change in the structure of education, which added another year at the secondary level, and the projected large increase in enrollments in the upper grades of primary education—which would then produce more demand for admission to secondary school—the government expected enrollments in secondary education to increase by about 20 percent a year until 1981 when it would reach three million. Both UNESCO and the World Bank found this rate of expansion financially unrealistic, and believed that a more realistic range of expansion would be between 8.3 percent (reaching 1,852,000) and 18.7 percent (reaching 2,670,000) per annum during the years 1977-1981. In the years 1981-1985, enrollment increases were projected to range between 10.4 and 15 percent per annum.

The Fourth Plan envisaged a national rate of construction for new secondary schools of 100 schools a year. Most new schools were to be constructed in rural areas and would offer the new diversified curriculum. To implement diversification on a nation-wide basis would require providing simple workshop facilities at the lower secondary level and more specialized workshops and equipment for upper secondary schools. Some 85 percent of the existing 1,200 public secondary schools would need to be provided with such facilities on a gradual basis, and so would the majority of the 1,000 private secondary schools. At this rate, diversification of all secondary schools would be achieved by 1990. The government planned to continue simultaneously its policy of experimenting with less costly means to implement diversified education.

The National Curriculum Development Center (NCDC) would develop new learning materials (course syllabuses, textbooks, workbooks and teacher guides) to support the new curricula and upgrade the quality of education, with assistance from the Institute for the Promotion of Teaching Science and Technology (IPTST), which was responsible for the science curriculum. Regarding personnel, the government would initiate regular upgrading for education administrators, which would focus on providing the requisite pedagogic and managerial skills for implementing the new curricula and improving the efficiency of resource utilization, under the guidance of the NCDC. In addition, systematic in-service training would prepare teachers to use the new curriculum. This would be achieved in part through intensive evening courses at teacher training institutions and through radio training. No new teachers would be needed under the Fourth Plan, since existing levels of teacher training enrollment would be sufficient to supply the teachers required on the basis of student enrollments projected by the UNESCO mission.

Basically, planning was to be a continuous process, leaving room for modification to take place as feedback from the field came in. As a result of this process, the Fourth Education Project with the World Bank (1976) provided for diversifying 50 existing schools through the provision of equipment and the construction of laboratories and workshops. The Fifth Education Project (1979) provided for diversifying an additional 42 schools which had upper secondary levels, as well as establishing 12 Area Vocational Centers, where practical instruction could be given to complement the academic training provided at nearby feeder schools. The Sixth Education Project (1982) greatly expanded the implementation of diversified education by providing assistance to 480 additional lower secondary schools.

Policy Implementation

Implementation of the policy went according to plan although it generally lagged about 18 months behind schedule. There were three aspects of implementation which contributed to the success of the policy: (1) it proceeded slowly enough that lessons learned could be incorporated along the way; (2) teachers and community leaders were involved; (3) it was marketed.

As example of the first aspect, in the early stages of implementation of the Third and Fourth (World Bank) Education Projects, construction and the procurement of equipment were delayed somewhat by procurement inefficiencies within the MOE and by cumbersome budget and approval procedures. However, these issues were later addressed by the government which facilitated implementation of the later stages. In addition, the rural secondary schools diversified under the Third Project drew heavily upon the experience of the CIDA-assisted schools. For example, they based the difficult scheduling of courses on the guidelines worked out by the CIDA-assisted schools and sent their teachers and administrators to these schools, to help improve their performance. Further, there was a great deal of resource pooling among the 32 rural project schools, which could be imitated more widely.

In addition, curriculum weaknesses were addressed. In 1978 the government introduced what came to be known as the 1978 curriculum, intended to reduce disparities in quality among regions, to introduce more flexible programs and to better prepare students for employment and self-employment. The new diversified curriculum required all students to take at least four periods a week of work education subjects which now emphasized practice rather than theory. In particular, work education provided students an opportunity to learn basic "living skills" and exposed them to a broader range of subjects and skills on which to base their future choice of a career. Increased emphasis was also placed on practical and manual activities in other subjects. At the lower cycle (Grades 7-9) there were six, six, and 12 weekly periods of electives (out of 35), respectively, while at the upper cycle (Grades 10-12) elective subjects accounted for about 16 periods (out of 40). Each student could choose electives from among a variety of subjects in any of the five semi-integrated areas offered: languages, science/mathematics, social studies, personality development and work experience. (The last area centered on workshop practice in the manual arts, business, home arts and agriculture.) Moreover, the new curriculum attached priority to providing student guidance: schools now provided counseling services to assist students in selecting elective subjects that were most consistent with their aptitudes, available facilities and staff, and local employment opportunities. Because the new curriculum was designed with small, rural schools in mind, the Department of General Education (DGE) made allowances for larger and better equipped schools to implement the new curriculum in ways which would fully utilize facilities and equipment. Staff development was considered very important and the DGE organized series of workshops and seminars between 1980 and 1984.

The costs of school construction had long been a concern for the Thais. This was addressed under the Fifth Education Project under which a prototype design was developed, based on studies of earlier diversified and general schools, which minimized costs, and was compatible with the skill levels of middle level technicians and available local materials. Forty-two community secondary schools, which had been established through mobilization and use of community resources in the rural areas, immediately benefited from this design effort.

To further cut the costs of bringing diversified education to the rural areas where smaller schools would enroll between 100-300 students, the government determined that it would need to experiment with alternative means of providing the practical instruction required in the upper secondary curriculum, since it would not be cost-effective to provide all small rural secondary schools with workshops. Area Vocational Centers (AVCs) thus became part of the Fifth Education Project. These AVCs were located in each of the country's 12 educational regions in predominantly agricultural areas where diversified secondary schools were not yet in existence and were designed to serve feeder schools, both public and private, within a 30 km radius. Each Center consisted of a single workshop complex where practical instruction was given to complement the academic training provided at nearby general secondary schools. In AVCs, the normal upper secondary curriculum was dropped in favor of the one used in vocational schools. The Centers were utilized differently by each school, some allowing students to take all coursework there, others only sending their students for particular classes. The Department of Vocational Education (DOVE) contributed to the creation of the AVCs, since the Centers were also to be used for short-term training courses given evenings by the DOVE. Technical assistance was also provided by the United Nations Development

Program. AVC directors, assistant directors, guidance counselors and academic staff were trained in specially designed programs in countries overseas, and teachers were subsequently trained between 1982-1985.

The Sixth Education Project further addressed issues of equity and economy. Four hundred and eighty relatively disadvantaged lower secondary schools in rural areas were selected for diversification. In addition, ways to attract qualified teachers to rural schools were to be implemented. Since studies had indicated that teacher utilization was below what it could be, the average teaching load was increased at great savings. In addition, the DGE developed a method known as "echo training". Courses were organized for secondary school supervisors and other staff from the regional education offices and for teacher training college tutors. These people were made responsible for training leader teachers from the school clusters, who in turn trained other teachers in their subject areas within the school cluster. In addition, community resources were exploited in that business people such as tailors, hairdressers, repairmen, etc., were employed part time to train teachers at project schools. In later stages, business people began to provide limited apprenticeships for upper level students. Finally, improving regional management of secondary schools was a government priority during this time, and the Sixth Education Project assisted by providing office equipment and furniture and reference materials for curriculum development and production of teaching-learning materials in the regional education offices of the four major geographical regions.

As implementation proceeded, those directly involved in the reform were included in the process. For example, local teachers were consulted when the 1978 curriculum was designed and they were also asked to assess the success of the curriculum once it was being used. In the same way, many community leaders provided technical support and administrative guidance as well as information on job availability in the local labor market. In areas where AVCs were established, community leaders helped to disseminate information to the local public on the centers and their functions.

Finally, throughout implementation, a concerted effort was made to make the objectives of the reform clear to students and parents. In particular, schools would offer "training and awareness" programs, presenting workshop simulations and the like, which would give people in the towns and villages the opportunity to observe the schools in action. In the same vein, an important aspect of the reform was the introduction of a strong guidance component. After students were tested and streamed in the vocational or academic track, guidance counselors were there to explain the results to the students and their parents, and to help the students choose the best course of study.

Policy Impact Assessment

The impact of the educational policy of secondary school diversification was evaluated quite routinely, through government assessments, World Bank project reviews, and University of Alberta (Canada) studies. In particular, the policy was re-examined in the light of three factors: (a) whether there existed a demand for diversified education, (b) whether the performance of comprehensive schooling was satisfactory, and (c) whether the policy had met national objectives.

Regarding the issue of demand, it was clear from the start that diversified schooling was accepted by the consumers and producers of education—students, parents and teachers. There were shortages of places in both CIDA-assisted schools and rural secondary schools of the Third Education Project, since enrollments were well over targets. In fact, alternative means to entrance examinations were investigated to determine which students should be chosen to attend due to the success and popularity of these schools. Enrollments in rural schools surpassed by 23 percent those projected at appraisal, with a total over 58,821 by 1978. In contrast, nationwide there was a shortfall of 26,233 secondary students in 1978, in terms of actual enrollments compared with targets.

Further, from 1967 to 1980, government schools emerged as the preferred secondary institution. In 1967 the secondary student population was almost evenly divided between government and private secondary schools; in 1980 enrollment in government schools far exceeded the private schools (1.07 million in comparison to 268,000). Enrollments in diversified schools of the Fourth Education Project surpassed the appraisal target by some 18 percent, approaching 116,000 in 1983. Community Secondary Schools included in the Fifth Education Project came very close to meeting target enrollments in 1984. Though in 1980, enrollments in the community schools were only 82 percent of the appraisal target, by 1984 enrollments had risen to 93 percent of the projected target. In 1984, some school authorities opened their schools to upper secondary students in order to more fully utilize capacity, which pushed the enrollment rate above the target.

Although such figures do not tell the entire story regarding the demand for diversified education, evaluation surveys conducted by both the University of Alberta (annex 4.13) and the government of Thailand (annex 4.14) also attest to the demand for diversified schooling. A 1984 Thai National Education Commission assessment of the 32 rural secondary schools found that 63 percent of parents of students in these schools considered diversified schools to be better than other secondary schools and 29 percent considered them to be the same. The University of Alberta assessment surveyed 16 of the 32 rural schools in 1978-80, through detailed questionnaires which were sent to administrators, teachers, principals, parents, alumni, and students. In general, all interviewed found the rural secondary schools to be much better than others in their provinces, although they were considered below average in comparison to secondary schools in Bangkok. Finally, a survey of diversified secondary schools conducted in 1984 by the Thais had quite the same finding: "In general, the DSS schools are equal or better in quality than the average Bangkok schools but still inferior to Bangkok Government schools." The diversified schools were considered to offer the opportunity to students to discover their particular interests, aptitudes and abilities in the first secondary grade and to choose the program of their interest thereafter, which nonproject schools did not.

Regarding the performance of diversified schooling, there are three aspects which need to be examined: (1) how successfully the curriculum helped students develop the necessary skills for employment, (2) how successfully it effected an attitude change regarding education and employment, and (3) how successful it was in assisting students in finding work upon completion of their studies.

Again referring to the 1984 Thai survey of diversified schools, it was reported that these schools were more successful than nonproject schools in training students in vocational skills (annex 4.15). Further, the survey stated that DSS students felt they had a better chance of receiving practical training in the practical subject of their choice than nonproject school students.

One of the objectives of diversified education was to change the attitudes of students and parents regarding the type of secondary education most suitable for students and regarding the type of employment they should aspire to. Results of various assessments point to a change in attitude regarding, at least, education. In answer to the question "In your opinion, is the Rural Secondary School Project successful?" a majority of Ministry of Education personnel claimed it was totally or partially successful. They found that the diversified curriculum helped graduates to "gain more in reality" and that the schools had "changed parents' attitudes" towards accepting and encouraging students to follow vocational and technical routes. CIDA-assisted schools had "sensitize(d) teachers to (the) world beyond the academic." Further, Ministry of Education personnel felt that, "attitudes (would) change and favor training-on-the-job instead of going to university." Attesting to the fact that diversified education has had some effect on changing attitudes regarding education, the trend has been, since the late 1970s, towards a rapid increase in the demand for vocational training. For example, in 1981 demand for vocational schools in the Bangkok area was so great that only one in seven applicants was admitted.

However, this change in attitude regarding education has not transferred to a change in attitude regarding employment. The 1983 Thai CSS study reported that most students and parents still preferred the same traditional careers (e.g. soldier, policeman, teacher, nurse and doctor) over independent careers in agriculture and trading.

Those supporting the implementation of diversified education cannot claim success for the policy insofar as supplying the Thai economy with appropriately trained graduates. As mentioned above, the policy did not affect the aspirations of parents and students for civil service jobs. Therefore, though these students were given the benefit of a diversified curriculum which was designed to be terminal and to provide a semi-skilled labor force, the majority have chosen to continue their studies. For example, a tracer study of lower secondary graduates in the school years 1980-1983 found that about 78 percent continued their studies, of whom 57 percent continued in the academic stream and 43 percent chose the vocational stream. Only five percent embarked on a career, while about seven percent were unemployed and the remaining 10 percent were untraceable. The results of a survey of DSS schools follows the same pattern. A DGE study made in 1982 showed that, of the 1978/1982 cohort, less than 10 percent of lower secondary cycle graduates took up jobs, and close to 90 percent of the rest continued their study at the upper secondary level. Of the upper cycle graduates, about eight percent took jobs, while the rest entered universities or other post-secondary institutions. One explanation for graduates continuing to higher education is that all project schools (CIDA-assisted, DSSs, RSSs) were located quite close to urban areas, where there was easy access to higher education.

Finally, was the policy able to meet the national objectives of maintaining unity and contributing to community development? The regional disparity in secondary enrollments, as measured by the Gini coefficient, was reduced by 60 percent from 1973 to 1980. However, considerable imbalances remained in participation rates between and within regions. Thailand's north and northeast regions generally, and Yala province in the south particularly, have lagged behind the rest of the country. In addition, access disparity is evident within different administrative levels. Nonetheless, insofar as greater equality contributes to firmer unity, the project has made a positive contribution (annex 4.16).

Community development efforts have also been a very successful part of diversification. For example, AVCs have been used to teach basic skills to adults in short courses after school hours. Follow-up findings have shown that graduates were highly satisfied and were able to apply their knowledge and skills to their work, both in terms of upgrading their occupation and improving their everyday life. The diversified schools themselves have become a valuable community resource. They have contributed to their communities by providing: general knowledge and occupation services (for example, organizing farmer bazaars, searching for location of markets for farmers, lending tools or equipment, giving demonstrations of certain skills, and so forth); health services (for example, distributing information and materials for family planning and immunization, supplying clean water and sanitation services, and so forth); cultural activities (for example, collecting histories and biographies of important persons, folklore and folksongs, setting up museums or exhibitions, and so forth); recreation services (for example, lending school building and equipment for games, arranging training for music, singing, dancing and games, and so forth); and information services (for example, setting up community bulletin boards, broadcasting both in-school and out-of-school, and so forth). The degree to which these school activities have been successful rests on the level of communication between community leaders and the school directors and principals, as well as on the skill levels of the teachers in the schools.

In summary, how valid is the claim that the policy of diversified education has been successful in Thailand? Simply because it has now become the predominant mode of education in the country is one answer to the question. Diversified education is no longer considered an innovation in Thailand, but has been *accepted* as the only mode of secondary education. That is not to say that the Thais do not recognize the problems associated with the policy, such as the insufficient provision of materials, equipment and physical facilities and the inadequate preparation of teachers to teach the new curriculum, particularly in the smaller lower secondary schools in the rural areas. However, these problems are considered to be ones of implementation, and capable of being resolved incrementally. The policy itself has not been questioned, but rather reaffirmed every time a policy decision was made during the last decade.

Conclusions

Figure 4.1 summarizes the process of the Thai experience. The introduction of diversified education into Thailand employed an evolving approach to policymaking. In the mid 1960s the national objectives were rather narrow (concerning manpower needs), so the government adopted an "issue-specific" policy. The approach at this point was incremental and conservative—the government wished to see how diversified education would be accepted, and viewed this as a pilot program. The policy then evolved over time and took on more of a Thai character, with wider "strategic" objectives. During the second policy cycle, when the government was reviewing whether to carry on with diversified education or to abandon the effort, it had several objectives to meet: manpower needs, national unity and educational equity. Therefore, the policy had to be "strategic" in order to meet this diversity of objectives. A subdecision was whether to expand the scope of diversified education or to maintain it on a limited basis. This necessitated a comprehensive, synoptic approach to decision making. However, implementation throughout the two policy cycles was incremental.

There were several advantages to the mixed approach employed by Thailand. First of all, the incremental nature of the first cycle gave the Thais an opportunity to test the acceptance of the policy. The promise of financial support from the international community which was promoting diversified education at this time certainly tipped the balance in favor of this policy, and limited the way in which other options were evaluated. However, the Thai education authorities did not just accept project loan money but experimented with pilot programs, to see if they could build a demand for this type of education. When they achieved acceptance and demand, they built a consensus within the government and within the donor community, and eventually came up with a policy that had a definitive Thai character.

It is important to note the role acceptance and demand play in the success of any policy. If they do not exist, or are not created, a policy will fail. Why did the authorities succeed better with diversified education in Thailand than in other countries where it was tried? To begin with, the Thais did not make it a second class education, open chiefly for academic failures. They did not trade *access* to education for *quality*. The Thai authorities did not just try to provide more


1963
FORMULATION
EVALUATION
1966
ADOPTION
IMPLEMEN-
TATION
CONCEPTUAL WORLD
PROCESS
EMPIRICAL WORLD
A
Status quo
C
Increase role of vocational schools *and* introduce comprehensive schools
B
Increase vocational schools, decrease academic schools
Generation of options
• Government studies with U S Operations Missions
• Ministry of Education study
• CIDA sector study
• Education system needs to
- meet manpower projections
- prepare dropouts
- improve equity in outer areas
Analysis
• Monarchy with stable military government
• Mainly rural, multi-ethnic
• High economic growth, unevenly distributed
• Potential security problem in outer areas
• Education system: Elitist and academic
• Secondary education issues: limited access, equity, quality, efficiency
SITUATION A
A
Status quo
B
Increase vocational schools, decrease academic schools
C
Increase role of vocational schools *and* introduce comprehensive schools
Consequences
• Education better suited to local conditions
• Impact rural development
• Proved successful in pilot schools
• Consistent with international ideology
• Can draw external support
Desirable
No
Desirable
No
Desirable
Affordable
Feasible
Yes
Policy Decision
Issue-oriented
Urged by CIDA and USAID
Pilot program with limited implementation
Planning
Extensive planning aided by CIDA and USAID
Implementation
Closely managed by government and donors. Several modifications made
• Diversified schools a success, high demand, good quality, expensive
• Civilian government
• Growing insurgency
• Potential security problem in outer areas
• Slowdown in economy - unemployment
• General secondary education (same as in Situation A)
SITUATION B

Figure 4.1 Policymaking in Thailand

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Figure 4.1 Policymaking in Thailand (continued)


1970
IMPACT ASSESSMENT
1974
FORMULATION
SECOND POLICY CYCLE
ADOPTION
IMPLEMEN-TATION
1978
IMPACT ASSESSMENT
Desirability: Yes
Feasibility: Problems
Affordability: Expensive
Scope not satis-factory
A
Improving general secondary education
B
Status quo
C
Diversified schools main mode of secondary education
Not seriously considered
Generation of options
• Reform Committee
• UNESCO studies
• World Bank support of diversification
Analysis
Desirability: Yes; relevant and region specific. Affordability: Expensive but outweighed by desirability. Feasibility: Problems in pilot could be avoided
Policy Decision
Strategic policy decision nationwide. Endorsed by Cabinet. Incorporated into National Development Plan
Planning
Satisfactory
Most Expectations of interest groups met
Incremental approach and within context of Education projects
Implementation
Mainly according to plan and with high degree of success
• High demand for diversified schools by students and parents
• Schools imparted vocational skills but not change in career aspirations
• Succeeded in community development
• Security maintained
SITUATION C

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student places, but addressed the issue of educational quality as well. The diploma of the diversified schools was fully equal to that of the college preparatory schools. In addition, diversified education was not a terminal program, liable to be seen as a dead-end. There was a great deal of flexibility in the new curriculum which required students to take practical courses, but still enabled them to go on to university, if they chose.

Second, because the policy was initially narrow in scope, or incremental, it did not provoke the type of controversy or violent reaction that a more comprehensive, synoptic approach might have. It should also be noted that the authoritarian government in power at the time did not permit outright rejection of the reform.

Third, the policy was considered at a national level, that is to say from a synoptic approach, only after limited pilot projects had proved it to be successful. Originally, as laid out above, the policy was mainly intended to meet the objective of making education more relevant to the manpower needs of Thailand. When the decision was made to expand diversified education, it was intended to address new objectives, including national unity and equity issues. Though the policy had not yet proven itself on these grounds, a momentum had been established, and people already associated the diversified schools with success.

Fourth, the incremental nature of implementation allowed a "learning by doing," and the Thais benefited from the opportunity of making changes based on feedback as the policy progressed. Though not necessarily inherent to the incremental implementation approach, the implementation process in Thailand contributed greatly to the success of the policy. The decision to make diversified education the predominant mode of secondary schooling was made at the central level, by the reform committee; however, during implementation local providers and consumers of education were included in the process. Teachers and school administrators were brought in to help design a diversified curriculum and teachers, administrators, parents and students were called on to assess its success. Of primary importance to the success of the reform was the introduction of a strong guidance component. Students were tested and streamed in the academic or vocational track according to their abilities; school guidance counselors then helped the students and their parents to understand the testing and how to choose the most appropriate courses. Further, community leaders helped disseminate information concerning the schools, and made suggestions regarding how the schools might contribute to the community. Local people were recruited to train teachers in their special skills, and later, businesses were asked to provide a work environment for upper level students through a limited apprenticeship program.

It is surprising to see how much weight was placed on the criterion of desirability over the criteria of implementability and affordability in evaluating policy options, especially in the second cycle. Though a few schools had successfully adapted the diversified curriculum in the early 1970s, it had been quite expensive to do so and it was not clear that the policy would be capable of being implemented universally *and* at a lesser cost. The government was certainly taking a risk with this decision, but behind it lay the belief that it was the right one for secondary education in Thailand. The decision was basically made by a select group of MOE and NEC personnel, and educational experts, who were well-placed in the educational structure and therefore in a position to make it work. This is a strong testament to commitment and the "political will" to make things happen.

The success of diversified education in Thailand is unexpected, since it has failed in most other countries where it has been tried. This says much about the successful nature of the policy decision making and implementation process in Thailand, but does not necessarily attest to the merit of the educational model itself.


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MYANMAR
LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
VIET NAM
Gulf of Tonkin
CAMBODIA
Andaman Sea
Gulf of Thailand
MALAYSIA
Chiang Rai
Mae Hong Son
Phayao
Nan
Chiang Mai
Lampang
Phrae
Mae Sariang
Uttaradit
Loei
Nong Khai
Udon Thani
Sakon Nakon
Nakhon Phanom
Sukhothai
Tak
Phitsanulok
Phichit
Phetchabun
Khon Kaen
Kalasin
Roi Et
Khemmarat
Chaiyphum
Nakhon Sawan
Chai Nat
Ubon Ratchathani
Sisaket
Warin Chamrap
Surin
Nakhon Ratchasima
Nam Tok
Suphan Buri
BANGKOK
Aranyprathet
Ratchaburi
Phetchaburi
Chon Buri
Sattahip
Trat
Prachuap Khiri Khan
Chumphon
Ranong
Takua Pa
Surat Thani
Nakhon Si Thammarat
Phuket
Kantang
Phatthalung
Songkhla
Hat Yai
Satun
Pattani
Narathiwat
Betong
Salween
Mekong
Mae Nam Ping
Mae Nam Nan
Yom
Mae Nam Mae Klong
Suphan Buri
Mae Nam Pa Sak
Lam
Nam Chi
Mae Nam Mun
20°
16°
12°
8°
100°
104°
THAILAND
Roads
Railroads
Rivers
Selected Towns
National Capital
International Boundaries
0 75 150 Miles
0 125 250 Kilometers
MAY 1994

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Thailand: Annex 4.2

Thailand: Basic Data, 1966

Population	
Total	32.9 million
Rate of Growth	3.3%
Population Density	165 per sq. mile
Gross Domestic Product	
Per capita	US$133
Rate of growth	7.3%
Industrial Origin of GPD	
Agriculture	33%
Manufacturing, mining, construction	20%
All others	47%

Source: World Bank.

Thailand: Per Capita GNP, Selected Years



Source: World Bank.

Thailand: Composition of Labor, 1960 and 1980



Source: World Bank.

Thailand: Total Work Force and Agriculture Sector Work Force, 1960–80



Source: World Bank.

Thailand: Educational Disparity in Capital Expenditure per Pupil in Lower Primary Schools by Region, 1970 and 1972



Source: MOE and NEC.

Thailand:
Educational Disparity in Percentage of Students Progressing from Primary Grade Four to Grade 5 by Region, 1971/72



Source: MOE and NEC.

Thailand: Educational Disparity in the Percentage of Seventeen- and Eighteen- Year-Olds in Upper Academic Secondary Schools by Region, 1973



Source: MOE and NEC.

Thailand:
Educational Disparity in Percentage of Primary Schools Possessing the Required Textbooks in Thai and Mathematics by Region, 1974



Source: MOE and NEC.

Thailand:
Educational Disparity in Percentage of Primary Schools Reported as Always Having Sufficient Exercise Books by Region, 1974



Source: MOE and NEC.

Thailand: Educational Supply and Manpower Demand, 1963 and 1970

Category	Demand	Predicted Graduates	Difference Between Supply and Demand
1963			
University	2,683	2,550	–133
Secondary	43,057	21,214	–21,843
Seventh Grade	176,995	85,800	–91,195
Fourth Grade	822,502	655,100	–157,402
1970			
University	3,784	2,950	–834
Secondary	60,379	39,114	–21,265
Seventh Grade	207,920	337,040	+129,200
Fourth Grade	800,000	816,570	+16,570

Source: World Bank.

Thailand: Repeater, Drop-Out, Retention, and Progression Rates in Primary and Secondary Education, Selected Years

	Primary Education		Secondary Education	
	(G1-4)	(G5-7)	(G8-10)	(G11-12)
Repeater Rate[1]				
1965	11.7	4.0	5.1	33.0
1969	18.1	3.3	10.1	16.0
1971 (estimate)	14.8	3.3	9.0	16.0
1976 (forecast)	8.3	3.0	5.0	9.5
Drop-out Rate[2]				
1965	75.7	30.5	35.9	42.6
1970	63.5	31.7	36.3	23.9
Retention Rate[3]				
1965	24.3	16.9	36.3	15.1
1970	36.5	24.9	23.9	12.1
Progression Rate[4]				
1965	27.8	89.7	67.4	66.0
1969	33.5	84.9	69.3	65.0
1971 (estimate)	38.0	83.8	67.0	75.0
1976 (forecast)	51.3	85.6	79.0	80.0

[1] Percentage of total enrollment in each cycle repeating at least one grade.

[2] Percentage of enrollment in first grade of each cycle not continuing in first grade of subsequent cycle.

[3] Percentage of entrants in first grade continuing at successive levels.

[4] Percentage of leavers of highest grade of cycle continuing in lowest grade of following cycle.

Source: National Education Council.

Thailand: Annex 4.13

Thailand: Rural Secondary Schools, Thai-Alberta Cooperative Assessment Project, Summary of Objectives and Conclusions

OBJECTIVES	CONCLUSIONS
A. Specific Objectives	
1. Appraise the provision of a more flexible and diversified curriculum.	1. Very satisfactory progress has been made towards providing a flexible and diversified curriculum.
2. Appraise the provision of needed facilities for each school.	2. The facilities constructed for the RSS Project are generally satisfactory, but considerable inadequacies exist in some identified areas.
3. Appraise the assignment of qualified teachers to carry out the learning and teaching situation.	3. The RSS Project schools are generally staffed with young, well-qualified teachers in the first decade of their career.
4. Appraise furnishing of equipment, supplies and teaching aids in order to facilitate learning.	4. Generally, the RSS schools had provided equipment, supplies and teaching aids to facilitate learning, but in some specific areas progress was modest and below the expectations of the various groups involved in this educational enterprise.
5. Appraise the provision of a supervision and training programme for teachers.	5. The Department of General Education had made serious and generally effective efforts to provide a training programme for teachers and administrators at the RSS schools, and that the efforts should continue.
6. Appraise the quality of the administration of the schools.	6. On the whole, the RSS schools are administered effectively, but room for improvement exists in several areas, such as scheduling, accounting, and teacher morale.
7. Appraise the satisfaction of administrators, teachers, pupils, parents and alumni and Ministry officials with the schools in helping to meet the social and economic needs of Thailand.	7. The RSS schools have made a significant positive change in the educational services available at the secondary level in the provinces, through making available a much wider curriculum and generally effective teaching and administration.
B. General Objectives	
1. Appraise the movement towards satisfying the economic and social demands of the country in consonance with the Third National Economic and Social Development Plan.	1. The demonstrated holding power of the RSS schools in providing students with more years of more diversified education will probably help to satisfy the economic and social demands of Thailand in the years ahead.

Source: University of Alberta report.

Thailand: Annex 4.14

Thailand: Rural Secondary Schools, Preliminary Results of NEC Assessment in Selected Areas

A. Questionnaire to School Administrators, Principals and Teachers

QUESTIONS	REPLIES
1. Do you teach according to your major and minor subjects?	80% Yes
2. How much did the project help your school in the following points:	
• provide possibility to the student to choose the course of his/her interest, skill and ability	3.57 points (on a 5-point scale)
• provide adequate buildings, furniture and equipment	3.47 points (on a 5-point scale)
• suitably qualified teachers	3.41 points (on a 5-point scale)
3. Do you think you can get something new out of the project with regard to:	
• better understanding of the new curricula	82% Yes
• new teaching tools	75% Yes
• new buildings	88% Yes
• measurement and evaluation	90% Yes
• method of remedial curriculum	71% Yes
• teaching style	52% Yes
4. Do you think that the RSS curriculum is sufficiently flexible to respond to the skill and ability of individual students?	
• sufficiently flexible	52%
• insufficiently flexible	17%
• not sure	24%
5. Do students choose a subject useful for their career?	71% Yes

QUESTIONS	REPLIES
6. Which elective subject presents more problems academic or practical?	
• academic	13%
• practical	58%
(a) Which is the problem with academic subjects?	
— too many students choose the same subject	70%
— too few students choose the same subject	48%
(b) Which is the problem with practical subjects?	
— insufficient facilities	64%
— too many students choose the same subject	59%
— too few students choose the same subject	45%
7. Do RSSs respond to local needs or not?	86% Yes
8. Are student results better? e.g. do more students pass examinations?	88% Yes

B. Questionnaire to Students

QUESTIONS	REPLIES
Does the curriculum of RSS meet the local needs?	97% Yes
How?	
• allow students to pursue their interests	28%
• offer more vocational courses	39%
• students can work after studies	44%

C. Questionnaire to Parents and Guardians

QUESTIONS	REPLIES
1. How are the RSSs compared with other secondary schools?	
• Better	63%
• Same	29%
2. What is your opinion about school fees?	
• Reasonable	90%
• Too high	2%
• Too low	8%
3. What is your opinion about other expenses (e.g. textbooks, materials, etc.)	
• Reasonable	57%
• Too high	24%
4. Would you like your child to continue studies after M.S.3?	
• To continue	90%
• Not to continue (take up job)	10%
5. Do you think that your child can live his/her life after finishing RSS school?	59% Yes
6. Does the RSS program meet local needs?	82% Yes 6% No 12% Don't know

Source: NEC.

Thailand: DSS Evaluation Survey, Conclusions of the Draft Report

OBJECTIVE 1	EVALUATION RESULTS
"To improve the quality of provincial secondary schools, so that they can be equal to that of Bangkok schools in their capacity to organize education. The development of these schools will improve general educational standards and increase skilled manpower for the provinces".	In general, the DSS schools are equal or better in quality than the average Bangkok schools but still inferior to Bangkok Government schools. The DSS schools are more successful than non-project schools in training students in vocational skills.
OBJECTIVE 2	
"To provide an education adapted to the aptitudes, interests, abilities and future plans of the individual students".	DSS schools offer the opportunity to students to discover their particular interests, aptitudes and abilities in the first secondary grade (M.1) and to choose the program of their interest thereafter. Non-project schools do not offer this opportunity.
OBJECTIVE 3	
"To organize appropriate activities in basic vocational training as part of general education for every student".	DSS students, according to their own responses, claim that they have an average opportunity to have practical training in the practical subject of their choice. Non-project school students responded that they had little or no opportunity. High-ranking administrators were of the opinion that the DSS curricula played, to a large extent, the role of a catalyst in the implementation of the 1978 lower secondary curriculum.

Source: NEC.

Thailand: Representational Index of Lower Secondary School Enrollments

		Representation Index[1] *Lower Secondary Enrollments[2]*	
Region	*Principal City*	*1973*	*1980*
Central	Bangkok	2.72	1.70
South	Yala	0.82	0.70
South	Songkhla	1.14	1.40
South	Phuket	1.10	1.20
Central	Ratchburi	0.95	0.90
Central	Lopburi	1.18	1.20
North	Phitsanulok	0.65	0.70
North	Chiangmai	0.71	0.80
Northeast	Udron	0.56	0.80
Northeast	Ubon	0.52	0.80
Northeast	Korat	0.49	0.60
Central	Chonburi	0.91	1.00
Gini Coefficient[3]		0.326	0.137

[1] The representational index indicates the degree to which a region, district or city is over or under-represented in its share of school places compared to its proportion of the relevant school-going age group. A representational index higher than 1 shows over-representation, and lower than 1 shows under-representation.

[2] These enrollments cover the first 3 grades of the secondary cycle and students aged 13-15. However, in 1973 when primary education covered the first 7 grades, lower secondary students were in the age group 14-16.

[3] The coefficient ranges from 0 to 1, with 0 representing an entirely equitable distribution and 1 representing a very inequitable distribution.

Source: World Bank calculations.

5

Policymaking in Burkina Faso: Synoptic with External Influence

Introduction

At independence in 1960 the government of Upper Volta was faced with the need to expand primary education within the constraints of a severely limited national budget. The government accepted advice to institute a system of rural nonformal education to provide primary education to its rural people, while the small urban populations continue the customary primary schools (first policy cycle). In the early 1970s, the government chose to continue these parallel systems with some qualitative reform of rural education (second policy cycle). In 1986, the government shifted away from rural education and made formal schooling the dominant mode of primary education (third policy cycle). The following study attempts to elucidate, within the context of the conceptual framework developed in chapter one, what led to the adoption and abandonment of rural nonformal education.

First Policy Cycle: The Situation Leading to 1960

Country Background

Burkina Faso, known until 1983 as Upper Volta, became an independent republic in 1960. The former French colony was, and remains, one of the poorest of the poor nations of the world. The fact is reflected in the GNP per capita in 1960 was only about US$40. It also reflects the serious constraints the country faced in regard to development: poor soils, a hard climate, water shortages, an absence of known mineral resources and a scarcity of people educated and trained to undertake conventional development.

Although Upper Volta covers 274,000 square kilometers, its people in 1960 numbered only around 3.5 million, yielding a thin overall population density of some 13 persons per square kilometer. However, the distribution of cultivable soils and rainfall caused a corresponding distribution in the population: the more hospitable Central and Center-West Regions had somewhat heavier densities of 35 and 46 persons per square kilometer (p.s.k.) respectively, while the desert Sahelian region had only six persons p.s.k. An oddity is the South-West region: with its ample water and good soil, it leads the country in producing the commercial crops of sugar and cotton; but it is only lightly populated, because of the prevalence of onchocerciasis, malaria, bilharzia, tuberculosis, Guinea worm and sleeping sickness. A relatively scattered population poses difficulties for development generally and in particular for planning school systems. Those difficulties can be compounded, when an area of economic potential lacks the people to work it. Upper Volta's urban population was small, amounting to some 175,000 persons or five percent of the population in 1960.

Clearly, the overwhelming majority of the country was rural and agrarian. In 1960, just under one-fifth of it, about 700,000 young people, was of primary school age, reflecting the high birth rate of 50 births per 1,000 population. Despite a grievous infant mortality rate of 174 infants per 1,000 dying before their first birthday, the country still needed to accommodate increasingly large age cohorts. In 1958, for example, some 171,000 babies were estimated to have been born and some 141,000 would have survived through 1959. In 1959, some 174,000 were estimated to have been born and perhaps 144,000 survived through 1960, yielding a cohort larger by 3,000 young people. As social development occurred, the survival rate could be expected to improve and enlarge the new age-cohorts further. Thus, it was projected that the primary school age population would double to some 1.3 million within 35 years.

More than 90 percent of these young people would be born to rural, agrarian families and their most probable prospect would be lives and livelihoods on the land. Indeed, the high birth rate could be explained by the labor-intensive nature of agriculture and the use of children as assistants in the field and with the livestock, coupled with the need for families to ensure the survival of enough children to take over the land and support those adults who reached old age. (The life expectancy of 30 years meant, however, that the number of really elderly people was relatively small.) The importance of children for agriculture had an impact both on the demand for schools and on the way children maintained attendance at them. These issues will be discussed in due course.

The population was not only rural and scattered, it was also fragmented ethnically and linguistically. There were no fewer than 60 different groups, each with its own laws and customs regarding the family, land tenure and so on. The Mossi people made up about 45 percent of the population, which meant that the 59 other groups were correspondingly smaller. Although they got along quite well for the most part and Upper Volta was [illegible] more united society than many others, the tribes' many languages posed a problem for a national school system. Religion was also a factor which affected schooling. About three-quarters of the people practiced indigenous tribal religions, a fifth were Muslims and the remaining five percent were Catholic Christians. Only the latter two operated any schools, which had the consequence that their members were disproportionately represented among those who qualified for employment by the state and hence among those who exercised power. Although these observations obviously indicate a political role for a national school system, the issue lies outside the focus of this case and will not be discussed here.

Economic Context

In 1960 Upper Volta was a very poor, largely subsistence-agricultural country with almost no industry and a relatively small service sector. The limited resources of Upper Volta at the time of independence are clear from the following figures: GDP was estimated at about 34 billion francs CFA. On this basis, the GDP per capita was about 10,000 francs CFA, or US$40, probably the lowest in French-speaking Africa. The agricultural sector (including subsistence farming) accounted for about 66 percent of GDP, and the industrial sector contributed only about two percent to GDP.

About 95 percent of the population derived its livelihood from mainly subsistence agriculture and livestock raising. Outside a few very limited areas of modern agriculture the practices applied by the farmers were mainly traditional. Most agricultural work was done with simple hand implements and the average yields were among the lowest in Africa. A major part of the harvest was consumed by the individual farm families, and only a small proportion of the products were sold. The cash income of a typical farm *family*—NOT individual farmer—even in good years, amounted to about US$8-$10 in 1959 dollars—little more than the absolute minimum for paying the poll taxes and for buying salt and cloth.

The modern sector at the time of independence was almost nonexistent. Salary and wage earners numbered only about 25,000 or roughly three to four percent of the male labor force and most were in government services. They represented also almost the entire stock of educated manpower in the country. There were few manufacturing industries, about 40, of which only three had more than 100 workers. Most were foreign owned, and they accounted for about 12 percent of domestic output. Known mineral resources were also few.

The long dry season, the shortage of good arable land and the absence of development in irrigation meant that most rural males had a good deal of unproductive time on their hands or, in other words, were underemployed. This led to great annual migrations in search of wage employment both within and outside the country. External migration was substantial. In the late 50s and early 60s, there was a yearly exodus of about 400,000 men to the plantations in Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire. Consequently, almost half of the adult male population was away from the country much of the year, and a third or more was away all year. They were drawn both by the work, which was not on offer in Upper Volta, and by the salaries, which were two to five times higher than those available in their own country. The migration was obviously both a boon and a threat to the development of Upper Volta. On the one hand, it reduced underemployment, drew income into the country and helped maintain living standards. On the other hand, it could drain labor away permanently from improving agriculture and from other forms of rural development and might erode the social fabric by leaving impossible burdens of work and responsibility on the rural women and old people. An added consideration was that the migration internal to Upper Volta concentrated in Ouagadougou and the few other towns of the country. It exacerbated their already troubling rate of 18 percent in open unemployment. The dilemma affected education, too. Schooling was a necessary base for raising the quality of the rural labor force, but it also gave access to the modern sector and so helped accelerate the permanent depopulation of the agricultural sector. It had already been observed that young men who had been to school seemed to be disproportionately represented among the entrants to the towns. But the relatively poor quality of their scholastic attainments coupled with the small size and slow growth of the modern sector meant that they, too, tended to remain unemployed. Concern over the drainage of manpower from the rural areas was reinforced by concern over mounting juvenile delinquency and urban crime.

The options for economic development seemed few in the extreme. The absence of minerals or other indigenous raw materials ruled out possibilities of income from exports of commodities. The option of industrializing through advanced technologies was ruled out by the almost total absence of a labor force equipped by education and training to utilize them. Besides, the land-locked position of the country and the rudimentary state of its roads and communications isolated it from potential markets. Agriculture and livestock appeared to offer the only rational avenues for economic development. Yet the land, despite its vast area, already could not provide sufficient employment, let alone an adequate standard of living, for the population. Using it as the foundation of development would have to be approached through huge parallel investments in physical, technological and human resources.

Yet an extreme lack of resources of all kinds characterized Upper Volta at the moment of independence. The country was in fact highly dependent on foreign aid, especially from France, not simply to finance public investment and development, but also just to balance its ordinary recurrent budget. In addition, France was responsible for financing one-fifth of recurrent expenditure by paying the salaries of French technical assistance personnel, as well as a part of the expenditure relating to services such as air navigation facilities, meteorology and radio communications. Any room for maneuver seemed utterly controlled by the many bilateral and multilateral donors.

Most of this foreign aid came in the form of grants. While such gifts certainly had their advantages, they also carried drawbacks. They added to the resources of the country, they expanded the possibilities of development, they limited the burden of debt and they kept the trade deficit small and manageable. On the other hand, they were necessarily relatively small—for Upper Volta was but one of many countries seeking help with their development, it was one of the smaller and it had some of the most intractable problems—and they reduced the government's moral strength to negotiate and control the direction and forms that development should take. They weakened the government vis a vis the perceptions, proposals and fashions of the donors. The donors themselves were not a stable factor: precisely because Upper Volta was considered a "hardship station," their personnel were incessantly changing, along with their ideas of what might be good for the country. In this way, the dependence on aid and grants helped set the scene for the history traced by this case, for education was no more exempt than other sectors from the exigencies and consequences of scarce resources. (See annexes 5.1-5.5 for more basic data on Upper Volta at the time of independence.)

Political, Administrative and Social Context

Upper Volta entered independence with a newly introduced form of pluralist democracy but also with ethnic diversity and tribal patterns of loyalty, and without a well developed sense of nationhood. Despite the absence of significant intertribal conflicts, the ruling party felt it prudent to replace the constitution with a one-party system. Correspondingly, it retained the highly centralized administrative structure of the French colonial regime, along with a good many of the French colonial officials. However, a new structure was created to maintain communication between the government and the people: committees were formed all the way up from villages and neighborhoods to a committee director and political bureau at the national level. They were to allow citizens to make known their needs and desires to those in power. In actual operation, the committees are thought by many to have enabled the government to exercise greater control over the population and to get decisions made in Ouagadougou implemented throughout the country.

The centralizing and authoritarian tendency was reflected in the countryside, where the traditional tribal chiefs exercised a great deal of power. The patriarchal values of the many tribes and their emphasis on age and its wisdom persisted. Although such a situation could be of substantial help to the government, when the chiefs and elders approved and supported government's intentions, it could of course become a difficult obstacle, were the chiefs to withhold their cooperation from or even oppose particular policies. Education would naturally be a central concern to the chiefs and their people. It would follow that advocates of any significant change in educational policy should be fairly certain of at least no opposition from these traditional authorities.

Although virtually in its infancy, education through schooling was beginning to affect the older customary ways of preparing children for adult life. The huge majority of boys still married at around 20 years of age and were allocated land to settle and raise families. An even larger majority of girls continued to be similarly trained in early adolescence for traditional roles in marriage and household production. Nevertheless, as reported above, the hard conditions and meager returns to what was virtually subsistence agriculture and pastoralism made gradually increasing proportions of the young males respond to the opportunities for more rewarding wage employment elsewhere. Further, the rural communities generally were gradually growing aware of the brighter opportunities made accessible through schooling. The importance of a school education for these opportunities was of course underlined by the government itself: it was the major employer in the country, the salaries it offered were well above the incomes scraped from cultivating the soil or herding cattle and it made its employment conditional upon educational qualifications. Rural parents were beginning to seek such opportunities for their children, particularly their boys, even though it might mean sending them away to boarding schools at an early age. In effect, they were beginning to use the school as a surer and faster way to help their children abandon rural life. They did not appear to view it as an instrument for raising the productivity and quality of the occupations and environments with which they had long been familiar and in which they were expert.

Education Sector

Like other former French colonies at the time of independence, Upper Volta had an education system modeled after that of France. The primary level consisted of six years of academic instruction for 6-12 year olds, followed by a seven year secondary school cycle. Admission to the latter was restricted to those who passed a standard entrance exam. Rationing by numbers was not necessary, as very few completed the primary course, let alone succeeded in the entrance exam. The narrowness of the filter can be gauged from the fact that, while six percent of the relevant age group were enrolled in primary schools, only 0.5 percent of the next age group had managed to enter secondary school. Thereafter, the French model ceased: university education had simply not been introduced to Upper Volta at the time and the few potential graduates had to go to France for their studies. From the very start of the first grade of primary school, the language of instruction was French, even though its daily use was restricted to the towns and tiny modern sector. The curriculum emphasized literacy and numeracy through content derived from France and through reliance on drills and rote learning.

One of the main concerns of educators at the time of independence was the apparent failure of enrollment rates to respond to increased expenditures on the education system. Between 1948 and 1959, the colonial regime had raised the share of allocations for education from 13 to 23 percent of the national budget. In the same period, however, the primary enrollment rate was estimated to have risen from two percent to only six percent. On the one hand, those figures demonstrated that a 76 percent increase in resources had yielded a tripling of the enrollment ratio in the face of a fast increasing population—a creditable achievement in productivity. On the other hand, they also demonstrated the plight of a poor country: what magnitude of national budget would be needed to cope with an enrollment ratio of 100 percent, 16 times that of the current reach? And what was it going to take to bring on stream adequate supplies of skilled manpower to replace the French personnel in the first instance and then to keep abreast of new development? The issue was acute not only at the professional levels, but also at those for intermediate technical and semi-skilled positions, particularly in agriculture and public administration.

Quantitatively, there were in 1960 only about 450 primary schools in operation in the country, offering education to only six percent of the primary age group. (This compared unfavorably with the primary enrollment ratio in neighboring Côte d'Ivoire which was 27 percent for the same time period.) Further, only 62.4 percent of the enrollment were in government schools; the remaining 37.6 percent got their education privately. The existence of such a relatively large proportion of private schools attested to a demand for schooling which the government was unable to meet. On the other hand, the fact that private demand amounted to just over two percent of the age group indicated that effective demand was not widespread and probably reflected its mainly urban origin and the urban location of the private schools. The public schools, too, were mainly urban. Enrollment ratios in towns of more than 5,000 inhabitants were than ten times those of the rural areas. In 1957, for instance, Ouagadougou and Bobodioulasso had attained ratios of 71.2 and 62 percent respectively. The inference was of course that, if enrollments were to increase significantly among the rural population, the government would have to undertake almost all the provision and make schooling very cheap for parents and families to use (see annex 5.6 for enrollment projections).

Enrollments and their ratios were not the only problem. The internal efficiency of the schools was disappointing, also (see annex 5.7). Slightly fewer than half the final year primary pupils passed their certificate of elementary primary studies (CEPE), which indicated that more than half had not learned or been taught what they were supposed to have learned. At the next step, only 15 percent of sixth year completers won a place in secondary education, signaled one of two things: either the expectations of the secondary schools were unrealistic or the primary schools could not do their job. In addition, repeater rates were quite high at all levels, especially at the sixth grade, where it was over 40 percent by 1965. What the drop-out rate was between entry into the first grade and arrival in the sixth grade had not even been measured in 1960, but it was thought that fewer than half the first grade entry reached grade three. The primary schools seemed unable to retain their pupils, let alone instruct them satisfactorily.

Third, compounding the narrow coverage and inefficiency in both retention and quality was the relatively high unit cost. In 1960, it required about 12,000 CFA francs (US$48) per year to educate a child in primary school. That sum was equivalent to the annual per capita income of the country. (For comparison, by 1984 it had been reduced to approximately one quarter of the annual per capita income.) The government projected for 1967 that, on the assumptions of a 1.87 percent population growth rate and of all capital construction costs being met by foreign aid, a primary education at that price for the estimated 844,000 children of school age, would cost some 10 billion CFA francs each year just to assure the functioning of the schools. Even given a growth of five percent per year in the national income, that sum would represent some 20 percent of it—instead of the approximately 3.0 percent in 1960—would be the equivalent of the entire governmental budget and simply insupportable.

To summarize, the government was faced with the following educational situation:

- access to primary education was limited to a small minority;

- the country's severely constrained resources made it unlikely that primary education could be made available to a majority, let alone all, of the eligible children within the foreseeable future;
- access to what little schooling was provided was unequally distributed, being much more readily available to those living in urban locations; it was also unequally distributed between boys and girls;
- the schools were internally inefficient both quantitatively with high rates of repetition and dropout and qualitatively with disappointing levels of academic achievement;
- they were also externally inefficient, first, since the nature of general education appeared more relevant to the small minority, who would eventually enter the modern sector, than to the very large majority, who would have to make their livelihoods in migrant, family or self employment, most likely in rural areas; and, second, since what was learned did not seem to equip even the few students who entered the modern sector to cope with its requirements;
- the unit costs were such that expansion on the existing basis could not be supported by the resources either at hand or likely to become available.

Potential for Change

Obviously, the task confronting the newly independent country of Upper Volta was to reform the education system to make it more accessible, equitable, internally and externally efficient and economical. How difficult was this task going to be within the social, political, economic and institutional dynamics? In other words, what were the potential forces of support, resistance and accommodation and what did their balance promise for possibilities for initiating and sustaining a set of educational changes?

The government was naturally preoccupied by the economic constraint. GNP was estimated to be growing by 1.8 percent per annum, while the population was growing by about two percent. Therefore, just to maintain the enrollment ratios at the levels of 1959/60, poor as the quality of education was, would take a greater percentage of the national budget. However great the government's desire to increase access to primary education, the financial constraint was even greater.

But more than finance influences possibilites for change. Upper Volta's situation must be viewed against the background of a colony in transition to statehood, with all of the concomitant advantages and problems. On the one hand, the transfer of political and economic power out of French hands into those of the Voltaics themselves brought with it great expectations for improvements in all spheres of life, including the educational. The government could look for strong, even noisy, support from parents and students in urban areas for its efforts to make education more widely available. The rural populations could also be expected to be supportive, but perhaps with less vigor. Possibly, however, such support could be assumed, only if any educational changes continued and promised more of what people had come to expect and did not call for reductions or redirections of hopes. Similarly, support could be looked for from the body of teachers and educational administrators, provided of course that expansion and change tended to improve rather than worsen their own positions and conditions. A factor which would have to be borne in mind was the collective strength of the teachers. As they were perhaps the best educated body of personnel, a number of political leaders had come from their ranks and they had advanced furthest in organizing themselves into unions. While they could prove valuable allies in promoting educational development, they could equally prove tough opponents to reforms which did not fit their concepts of what was good for education or themselves. Overall, however, the prospects of support for development and educational advance were good.

On the other hand, implementing intentions was likely to prove difficult. There was obviously the lack of money. Equally important was the lack of skilled personnel. The functioning institutions of the country were small enough: their very size could well inhibit their capacities to plan and mount substantial expansions with any speed, let alone undertake simultaneously any significant changes of direction. Their inadequacy was aggravated by their being staffed at the professional and more senior administrative levels mainly by French expatriates rather than by Voltaics. Because the educational system was so little developed and open to so few, the number of qualified Voltaics becoming available would be correspondingly small and the rate of africanization in the government services slow. Further, the possibility that at least some of the more experienced French would leave at independence threatened the efficacy of those institutions even more.

As important as the qualifications and competence of the staff was their orientation. The main interests of French personnel could by and large be expected to lie outside Upper Volta and they could be expected to share French perceptions of what was good and desirable in education, as in everything else. They might be skeptical of and resistant to ideas and plans promoted by Voltaics, however much they were employed to serve the government of Upper Volta. To be sure, Voltaics educated and trained by the French might be equally reluctant to deviate from the norms and standards to which they had become accustomed. On the other hand, they might be less prone to block or subvert the government's wishes.

The country had inherited a highly centralized system of government. This meant that no local institutions had been fostered, which might take on some of the functions of the central government. For a considerable time, then, the country would have to depend on Ouagadougou, with all its own inadequacies, for both the impulse and implementation of development and modernization.

Overall, then, the potential for change in education looked extremely restricted. While public support would be forthcoming for what was known, its availability for change could not be taken for granted. On the economic and institutional fronts, the capacity to implement new programs was minimal.

Generating Policy Options

With independence on the horizon in 1959, the Voltaic authorities decided to have their educational system reviewed. As it had been introduced by the French colonial regime, the reviewers might have been expected to be either Voltaic or at least of other than French provenance, so as to achieve an impartial perspective. In the event, however, the government commissioned a French agency, SEDES (Societe d'Etudes pour le Developpement Economique et Social) to undertake the task, perhaps because the French government was meeting the costs. The terms of reference were to study the system and to make recommendation for policies which would contribute to the development of the new country. The team selected for the task was led by Messrs. Christol and Medard from SEDES.

At this point, the background of these team leaders should be noted. They were educators with previous experience of French West Africa. They had long ago been brought to the view, shared by many others, that, while literacy and numeracy were indeed essential to all forms of development, the French colonial pattern of schooling was inappropriate to the kind of development necessary in most of Africa. In a word, it did not prepare young people to work in and develop the agricultural sector; but rather oriented them to opportunities of clerical work in towns. Schooling of a quite different nature was required for the realities of a Sahelian economy. This view shaped their interpretation of what they found in Upper Volta.

The SEDES team spent 45 days seeking demographic data so that they could make projections for the number of children to be schooled in the future; data on employment to determine manpower needs; cost data within the existing education system; and data regarding the economy, to see what the country could afford to spend on education. Most of these data were simply not available. Consequently, the team was forced to make "best guesses" and, as they reported, many of their figures were gross estimations.

Christol and Medard saw the high illiteracy rates in the rural areas and the lack of educational services as the major problems of education. They identified three options for addressing them. One was to expand access to the existing system of primary education. A second was to modify the existing somewhat. The third was to devise an alternative pattern of educating the young for development.

The first they dismissed out of hand. Their reasons were what might be expected:

- The cost would be too great. Even if taxes were increased, teachers' salaries were cut by as much as half and expenditures on materials reduced, it would not be possible to double the number of children in primary schools by 1967.
- The curriculum was not relevant to the lives of children in the rural areas. It not only unfitted them for life there and promoted migration to the towns, it probably also contributed to the high rates of repetition and drop out.
- Since the modern sector was growing so slowly, a school system oriented to it would not need to educate many people to satisfy its demands.

The second option looked at was to curtail the six-year primary cycle to three years, make that available to all and at the end of the third year select the academically most able to proceed further, while the remainder returned to ordinary family life. The advantage would be universal access and universal literacy and numeracy at a substantially lowered cost. Christol and Medard dismissed this option out of hand, too, but not on educational grounds. Rather, they feared that such severe selection at so early a stage would encourage elitism, on the one hand, and divisiveness and social conflict on the other.

In fact, the only option which they seriously considered was an even less costly pattern—a shorter program of study which would be more relevant to the lives of those in the rural areas and therefore more efficient both internally and externally. Their rationale ran roughly as follows:

- The agricultural sector would be a major springboard to development. Since improvements in agricultural skills would lead to higher productivity, higher incomes and development generally, the country should place greater emphasis on agricultural training for the masses than on general education for the few.

- However, basic literacy and numeracy for all youth were also necessary to carry forward the modernization of a traditional society, and to promote building a united nation out of the many tribal groups. Hence, a form of rural education through nonformal approaches, which combined literacy and agricultural training, would create the stream of modernizing attitudes, knowledge and skills for the villages.
- The fact that rural youth would be learning about farming would make it easier for them to return to this vocation, without "false hopes" of a civil service or private sector job.
- As productivity and conditions improved for those in the rural areas, the young people would be less likely to emigrate.

As suggested earlier, this strategy was shaped mainly by Christol and Medard's pre-existing view on the sort of education required for French West Africa in general. Its credibility and appeal were reinforced by the statistical data available on the population of Upper Volta in the age groups concerned, by the political considerations of meeting projected educational demands, by the personal knowledge of the planners and by the only too evident financial constraints. The commonsense benefits of the rural nonformal education model proposed were thought to be so self-evident, that they would easily outweigh any shock produced by the novelty of the concept. Indeed, so self evident were its virtues assumed, that no consultation was attempted with either the operators of the current system, the teachers and administrators, or the users, namely the parents, guardians and community leaders of the pupils. The down-to-earth pragmatism of agrarian, pastoral folk could be relied on to appreciate the soundness of the proposals. Possibly, a further consideration was the force that a decision of the central government would carry: no opposition, even of a passive kind, was envisaged. Consequently, there were no proposals to test any of the basic assumptions on a small pilot scale before launching a national scheme.

The scheme was framed as follows:

- schools or rural education centers would be provided only to communities which requested them;
- the centers' buildings and teachers' houses, along with the land for productive activities, would be donated by the requesting communities;
- only young adolescents aged 12 to 14 years would enter the program;

- they would be given a 3-year course of literacy and numeracy, combined with training and actual production in agriculture;
- the instructors would be recruited from the localities of the centers and specially prepared for their tasks. However, they would require less qualifications and pre-service training than the ordinary primary school teacher.

What proved to be a crucial aspect of the scheme is to be noted: the rural education centers would not replace the ordinary primary schools. The latter would continue and even be expanded, but they would not operate in rural areas. In effect, there would be a 2-track system of basic or primary education.

Evaluation of Policy Options

In assessing the desirability, affordability and implementability of the proposal, the report by Christol and Medard offered the following reasoning:

DESIRABILITY. The several grounds of desirability have been outlined above. In brief, the scheme would widen access to literacy and numeracy and contribute to the modernization of attitudes and values, but would achieve that without simultaneously alienating the young from rural life and agriculture. On the contrary, by teaching modern agriculture, it would raise rural incomes and living standards and stanch the rate of emigration.

AFFORDABILITY. The major advantage of this approach was that more students could be educated at a lesser unit cost to the government. Christol and Medard determined that it would be less costly to educate 155,720 adolescents from ages 12-14 in a three-year program, than attempt to educate the 650,580 aged 6-14 in a six to eight year program (taking account of repeaters). The reduction in pupils would mean corresponding reductions in the numbers of teachers and buildings needed.

The costs of wastage would also be reduced, because, so the designers felt, young adolescents could be expected to be better motivated, more disciplined and to have a better capacity to learn than children at age six. Attendance should improve, learning efficiency increase, repetition and dropout decline.

The reform would also provide education to a greater proportion of the population over a shorter time. Christol and Medard projected that by 1967, 80 percent of all boys and 20 percent of all girls from 12-14 years old would have an opportunity to go through a course of rural education.

In fact, the *main selling point* of the program was that it was financially affordable. It would be less costly than primary education because:

- it was shorter—three years as compared to six
- would be more efficient in retaining and instructing its students
- the capital costs would be minimal, since the local communities would provide the land and buildings
- recurrent costs would be partially offset by the productive activities of the new schools or centers
- recurrent costs would be even more significantly reduced by recruiting teachers at a lower level (moniteur as distinct from instituteur-adjoint)—not only would they be paid one-third the salary of primary school teachers, but they would require less training.

Taking into account mainly recurrent expenditure, unit costs per student per year under the proposed rural education centers would be 6,530 CFA francs vs. about 13,320 CFA francs for primary education (keeping in mind that GNP per capita was 10,000 CFA francs or US$40). Given that the mean repeater rate for primary school was from 23-25 percent, the mean time to finish primary school would be 7.4 years. The potential cost savings to the government can be seen by comparing the cost of completion of primary school (7.4 x 13,320 F = 98,575 F CFA) versus the estimated cost of completing a three-year rural education program with no repeats allowed (6,530 F x 3 = 19,590 F CFA). This would render rural nonformal education one fifth as expensive as conventional primary education.

IMPLEMENTABILITY. The plan would be implementable because it would be drawing upon human and natural resources which already existed in the rural areas. The local community requesting a school or center would construct the buildings and teachers' houses, just as it built its own local houses and with the same materials. It would also use its existing resources to provide grazing land and at least one hectare of land suitable for the center to grow the crops, vegetables and fruit trees commonly found in the area.

It is plain that this supply side of implementability depended on some assumptions about the demand side. The first was that the rural populations would welcome a three-year program of education for their children, rather than have no education at all. Education—literacy, numeracy, practical skills for everyday life—was thought to be valued as goods in themselves. The second was that the rural populations would appreciate the necessity of two forms of basic education, one for their children, the other for children in the towns. The third was that the value put on even a three-year course of rural education would be strong enough to move communities to donate land, labor and perhaps other resources to it. The final assumption was that rural parents would prefer to have their children taught by teachers recruited locally, even though they were not as qualified as the teachers in the ordinary town primary schools. Local teachers would after all understand local customs as well as have an intimate understanding of the land, resources available, and so forth. As indicated earlier, these assumptions were not tested.

Making the Policy Decision

Given the French experts' philosophy, the decision to institute a system of rural nonformal education was made *a priori*. The Christol and Medard Report was approved by the Voltaic Legislative Assembly in late 1959. It was intended to become the dominant model of education until the country was economically advanced enough to expand the formal primary system. (See annex 5.8 for the new nonformal curriculum).

This policy decision was obviously heavily influenced by external forces. Some insight is provided by Aime Damiba, a member of the ministry of education from that time, who observed: "Was the mission suggested to the Upper Volta or was it effected at the UV's spontaneous request? Experience indicates that most missions are suggested and all the more easily accepted when the carrot of foreign funding is dangled. What is more, in 1959, the whole of the Upper Volta administration at the senior level was in the hands of French officials from the colonial era. Could this be the explanation for the success of the Christol-Medard report?"

Damiba also levels charges of paternalism against the French. The carefully articulated policy was infused with a distinct philosophy. There was a spiritual connotation to it, that the education which children received in formal primary schools alienated them from their villages and families and the only answer was a rural education which would teach them to value these things. Certainly they held this idea to be more important than access to equal education since it was clear that a three-year rural education would not measure up to a formal primary school certificate.

BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE NEW POLICY. The reform was intended to teach basic literacy and numeracy skills and give agricultural training to those living in the rural areas. The structure of the system would be as follows: The reform program would be administered under the Ministry of Education (MNE). Rural education centers would be established in villages where primary schools did not exist for a 10 km radius. The centers would be established in areas with the lowest education rates first. The catholic and protestant missions would be invited to participate and set up their own rural education centers. The government also anticipated that once in place, the centers could be used to teach adult literacy. The centers themselves would be small, admitting 45-50 students to a class. Minimum age of entry would be twelve, and school leavers would be 14-17 years old. Rural education for both boys and girls would consist of a three-year course and recruitment would take place once every three years in May. The content of the curriculum would be basic instruction in reading, writing and math, and the objective would be for all youth to receive a general education corresponding to the Grade 4 level in the primary schools. Instruction would be given in French, and a primary target would be for all youth to acquire a basic understanding of French. Agricultural training would take up one-third to one-half of instruction time. No certificates would be given to the students so as not to encourage them in further educational pursuit. Finally, the designers imagined that a Committee of Job Offers (*Comite des offres d'emploi*) could be established to examine the needs of the economy and advise the educational system on how its programs might meet these needs.

The decision to implement a reform of the educational system by implementing rural nonformal education had three major characteristics which could make it difficult to implement, particularly for a country at Upper Volta's stage of development. First, it was reached through a "synoptic" approach to policy making as opposed to a more conservative, incremental "strategic" approach. Christol and Medard had examined the problems in the existing system and developed a consistent, comprehensive and "correct" solution. The new policy was so broad and sweeping that it was bound to be difficult to implement. It was not a program which could proceed easily step by step but only when all components were in place—teachers needed to be trained, classrooms needed to be built, a new teaching curriculum needed to be developed, teaching materials then would have to be distributed, support staff would have to be oriented and installed in offices, etc. Just communicating the policy to the hinterlands would be a major challenge considering the diversity of the population (7,063 villages with a mean population of 600) and the many ethnic and language groups.

Second, the policy was a radical departure from the existing situation. It would create a dual system of education which the public did not understand and would therefore require some "marketing" on the government's part.

Third, the policy decision was isolated from policy decisions made in other sectors, without regard for the need for the proper infrastructure to support the reform. As the World Bank economic report of 1964 pointed out:

> After independence, the government of Upper Volta carried out investment projects with foreign financial aid, but these projects were not in any sense part of a more general plan or program, and were generally carried out on an *ad hoc* basis.

Planning for Policy Implementation

Not only was the reform conceived of by French experts, it was also developed mainly by expatriates—of a team of eight, only two were Voltaic. The plan was based on the Christol and Medard Report and called the "Plan Christol".

Planning for implementation of the scheme was to begin with the establishment of a Directorate in Ouagadougou consisting of a director, his assistant and a technical bureau for planning and programming of rural education. The Director of Rural Education enjoyed the same status as the directors of primary and secondary education in the Ministry of Education, which reflected the importance of this position. The plan designed by the Directorate covered institutional development, scheduling, financing and staffing.

Institutional planning was quite comprehensive. A schedule for constructing rural education centers through 1969 was designed, which included plans for furniture, farm instruments, maintenance, etc. In 1961, 225 centers would be established for an estimated 11,250 students. 375 new centers would be added each year for an annual increase in the number of students of 18,750. At this rate of expansion the system would include 2,700 classes with more than 130,000 boys and girls in the school year 1969/70. By 1970 the basic institution-building phase of rural education for boys would have been completed and a second phase of expanding the system to include all the girls would begin.

Financing of the reform was carefully planned. The "Plan Christol" estimated the costs for implementation, and how the government might meet these costs. The plan envisaged that the expansion of primary education would be slowed down. Most of the funds anticipated for further development of the total education school system could, therefore, be used to expand the rural education system. In addition, the government anticipated substantial aid from the French and the European Economic Community.

Plans for staffing were explicit. Though local participation was expected, the program would be developed and run primarily from the Directorate in Ouagadougou. A network of regional "rural education counsellors" would be set up in nine districts to recruit teachers, and to advise the Directorate concerning the placement of schools and the needs of the local communities. A schedule for the number of teachers needed through 1969 was established and plans were made to set up a teacher training center. In the meantime, Rural Education counselors would travel to the regions and train people recruited to be rural education teachers, in the same normal schools where primary school teachers were being educated. It was anticipated that the teachers of the rural centers would work together with the agricultural extension workers in their particular regions, to develop methods of teaching agricultural skills.

The designers of the plan felt confident that rural education would be welcomed by the peasants in Upper Volta. It did not occur to them that the new reform would need to be "marketed" to the population, since this was the "only reasonable solution" to the education problem in Upper Volta.

Policy Implementation

The radical nature of the educational reform program made it exceedingly difficult to implement and the institutions created to administer the program proved ineffective in dealing with problems as they arose. Overall, few components of the reform were instituted according to the original implementation schedule.

Implementation of the scheme began in 1960 with the establishment of a directorate of rural education in Ouagadougou and a teacher training institute in Kamboince. The European Economic Community's European Development Fund (FED) financed 225 centers for 11,250 boys and also financed equipment for the central administrative services and five regional inspectorates. Additional assistance was supplied by UNICEF, the FAO, France and the U.S. During implementation, the policy underwent three significant modifications: (1) the scope was narrowed down, (2) there was a *de facto* shift in support assistance from the Ministry of Education to the Ministry of Agriculture; and (3) the age of entrance to rural education was changed from 12 to 15.

Though the establishment of rural education centers began on schedule, their rate of expansion began to fall towards the end of the first ten years of implementation. In 1966, rural education centers (CERs) were still expanding at the expected rate of about 10 percent a year. By 1968, the rate started to decline. (Throughout this period, formal primary schools remained the dominant type of rural learning institution. Even though their numbers were to have been frozen, they actually expanded by four percent a year from 1966 to 1968.) Between 1965 and 1970, CER enrollments rose from 21,000 to 26,000 (or 20 percent). In 1971, enrollments had dropped to the 1965 level. At the same time, primary school enrollments rose from 93,000 to 102,000. By 1973, there was actually a drop in the number of CERs to 737, although enrollment increased to 24,000 youths. This was only one-sixth of what had been projected for this time period. Meanwhile, regular primary schools continued to expand steadily, and to get the largest share of the education budget. (The total education recurrent expenditure budget was CFAF 1,509 million in 1972. Of this 70 percent went to primary education, 15 percent to secondary, and 11 percent to rural education.)

As far as support services for the project were concerned, a large burden fell on the local representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture. This was not surprising since it was easier to rely on the established institutions of the Ministry of Agriculture (MAE) rather than create new ones under the MNE. For example, it was originally intended that regional committees under the MNE would establish plans and programs for the centers. However, major responsibility for the development of rural education in the districts fell on the prefects in the regions, which were under the MAE. In addition, MAE extension agents and other officials of the rural development services worked closely with rural education teachers on the agricultural aspects of their work, and inspected the school fields in their regions.

In 1968, the policy was modified to change the entry age to 15 years. This was due to the fact that 12, 13, and 14 year-olds lacked the physical strength of the older students, which meant that their practical progress and contribution to the work of the school farm was less effective. In addition, integration of these young people into farm life after completion of the CER courses was more difficult because they were too young to take over their own plot of land. Even with this new regulation, there was a great spread in ages attending, with 11 years as the youngest and 21 as the oldest age group.

Why was implementation of the plan altered so significantly?

- The goals were unrealistic given the limited capacity of the government for new investments in education. When the detailed plans were first prepared, the educational system was already absorbing 23 percent of government expenditure. Contrary to what the planners had hoped, it was impossible to increase education's share of the budget or to transfer additional finances from primary education. Moreover, the country went through a serious financial crisis in the mid-1960s which affected all educational and most other governmental program.
- The planners had overestimated the willingness and the ability of the people in the villages to provide the necessary buildings and land for establishing this new type of educational facility. Some

villages preferred to wait in the hope that they might instead get assistance for building a conventional primary school. This hope was encouraged by the fact that the government continued to expand primary education contradicting the plan to freeze it. Others, in the poorer and educationally least developed parts of the country, made little effort toward schooling their children and youth.

- The practical difficulties of establishing a completely new system of education had been underestimated. In particular, the centers suffered from a lack of textbooks and instructional materials. Teacher quality was also a problem.

Policy Impact Assessment

In the early 1970s, the government paused to evaluate the impact of the introduction of rural nonformal education. The international donor community, especially the World Bank and UNESCO, had become interested in the reform and assisted in the evaluation. Specifically, the policy was re-examined in the light of four factors: (a) the performance of rural education centers, (b) the performance of the economy (c) the performance of the formal primary education sector, and (d) the influence of the international educational "ideology".

Performance of Rural Education

In terms of the performance of rural education centers, the government had expected that rural education would address the issues of access, equity and cost as well as making a positive impact on the economy. In fact, after ten years of implementation, the results were mixed concerning the benefits of rural nonformal education according to an independent consulting firm hired by the World Bank. Illiteracy rates remained as high as ever—about 100 percent for females and 95 percent for males in rural areas. The number of children of school age (6-15) receiving education had only reached ten percent (and most of these were still being trained in the formal primary education system as opposed to the rural education centers, by a ratio of four to one—see annex 5.9). Although academic achievement was acceptable and the cost of education in the CERs had been kept down, there continued to be problems with low enrollments and also with the fact that most centers had become "poor" primary schools as they moved closer to focusing on academic subjects and further away from agricultural instruction. A general feeling about the system can be gained from this report of the Institut Etude Developpement Economique Social (IEDES):

> . . . three to six years later (after implementation began), there were frustration and low morale all around. All the authority of the commander of the cercle (CER) was now needed to recruit and to ensure attendance of students who, much younger in age, were more like the primary school children and less in conformity with the "profile" foreseen by the experts. If the roof of the center gave way or blew away, nobody wanted to repair it; if the pedagogical and agricultural equipment needed to be replaced or repaired, as they were worn out by usage or for lack of maintenance, the needed resources were not available from anywhere. The parents began to doubt the literacy ability of former students and would not mind revoking their children's right of access to what was billed as an adequate educational equivalent to the primary school cycle. The teacher lost faith and asked to be relieved, or he tried to quit rural education once his contract for six years was over.

In particular, the government had expected that rural education centers would provide education to a greater population at a lesser cost, that students would gain a basic literacy and numeracy equivalent to that of a fourth year primary school student, that the rural centers would teach new agricultural methods which the students would then pass on to the community and which would lead to greater agricultural productivity and finally, that providing education to those in the rural areas would discourage migration to the cities and emigration to surrounding African countries. We will examine these each in turn.

First, the centers did not reach the goal of providing education to 130,000 boys and girls in 2,700 classes by 1970, but only to about 30,000 (see Annex VII). The reasons for such low attendance were numerous: parents were not interested in building centers in their villages because they viewed it as a "second best" alternative—many held out in the hopes of getting a traditional primary school; boys in the age group 13-18 were not interested in attending a full-time three-year course because it prevented them from earning the income to enable them to marry and they were needed on the family farms; and girls in this age group were required to stay at home to be trained for marriage.

However, according to a study sponsored by the World Bank, the centers were able to keep the costs down to about 40 percent of that in primary schools. In recurrent costs, rural education cost about CFAF 5,000 per student per year as compared to CFAF 13,000 for primary education. In terms of investment costs, on average it was comparable to that of primary education. Though investment costs were higher in rural education than in primary education due to the fact that they required land, agricultural and artisan tools, and draft animals, these were largely balanced by the income from farming in the centers.

Second, for those students who did attend the rural education centers, their achievement level was generally acceptable but not good. According to Mostafaoui and Ader who examined the achievement level of a fairly large group of third-year students in 1967 on behalf of UNESCO, it compared favorably to the results achieved by students in the fourth year in other French-speaking African primary schools: Reading ability in French was comparatively good; conversational ability was poor but sufficient for a simple exchange of information—about the same level as observed in fourth-year primary school students; about half of the students were able to solve simple arithmetic problems and calculate surfaces and yields; the others could solve only the textbook problems that they knew by heart. Still, it was taking a long time for French to become an effective medium of instruction, since it was not the language children used at home. Because of this, the teaching of agricultural science, civics and related instruction was often postponed until the third year, which greatly diminished the effectiveness of the educational program. In addition, the quality of instruction was adversely affected by inadequate teaching material and insufficiently trained teachers. A small follow-up study showed that retention of literacy skills was not as good as for primary school students.

Third, the centers were not focusing enough on teaching agricultural skills. This is evidenced by the decreasing incomes earned by the centers over time. In 1966/67, 101 centers reported an average income from agricultural production of 43,254 CFAF (US $180). In the following year, the average income from 184 centers was 25,216 CFAF (about US$100). In 1969-70, 337 centers reported a slightly increased income of 26,492 CFAF (US$105), but the hectarage had also increased by 19 percent.

The UNESCO study of 1967 concluded that many centers did not give their pupils adequate training in the application of modern agricultural methods. They pointed to the fact that less than 50 percent of the total number reporting yields were able to show higher production figures per hectare for various crops than the average farmer could obtain in his own field. Part of the problem for this lay in the fact that centers were often given the worst land to work. In addition, physical facilities were inadequate--there were not enough land, draft animals, equipment, or an adequate water supply for productive farming. Also, most teachers in the centers were of urban origin, had no knowledge of farming and had little communication with extension workers who were supposed to supervise the teaching of farming methods. Moreover, the content of the program was the same for the whole country and did not take into account the particular needs of the different communities.

Finally, emigration continued to increase, as outlined below.

Performance of the Economy

As far as the economy was concerned, rural education had not had much of an influence (see annex 5.11 for comparative data). In fact, it had stagnated since independence. GDP increased by 16 percent from 1961 to 1964 and by another two percent up to 1967. Price increases and population growth (a little under two percent per annum) reduced the real growth per head to practically nothing. Agricultural production, which accounted for 44 percent of GDP (less than in 1960), fluctuated according to weather conditions rather than progressed. Industrial units continued to work under capacity. Public works and construction activity had declined since 1964. Services and trade activity changed little, mainly as a result of an almost stagnating volume of external trade. There was a marked deterioration of the infrastructure, notably roads and telecommunications.

Economic inequities increased between rural and urban areas since independence. Ninety percent of the population were at this time living in the rural areas, and development expenditures were only ten percent higher than those in the urban areas.

The government also continued to be highly dependent on external assistance to finance development investment. As indicated in the 1967-70 *plan-cadre* (frame-plan), 27.4 billion CFAFs would be needed for development projects of which it was anticipated 23 million CFAFs would come from external sources—almost all grants. The *plan-cadre* portioned 20 percent of investment expenditure for education. They attempted to keep the investment rather low in order to contain the increase in recurrent expenditure inherent in any investment expenditure. Most of the financing would come from the French Ministry of Cooperation (FAC) and the FED (16 million) and smaller amounts from the US, Germany, Taiwan, and the World Bank.

Persistently low agricultural productivity, especially in the overpopulated central plateau region, contributed to a rural exodus. However, the most important flow of migration was external, toward Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana. Most of those emigrating were males of productive work age, 215,000 in 1973 alone. By the early 70s, emigration had grown to the point that at least 737,000 (or 28 percent of the labor force of 2.65 million) Voltaics resided and worked in these two countries at any one time. The lack of opportunities in Upper Volta both in the rural sector, due to the lack of arable land and in the modern sector, where available jobs had decreased from 32,788 in 1964 to 22,576 in 1966 (although this reached 33,500 again in 1972) fueled the emigration (see annex 5.13 for data). In fact, in 1972 the demand for jobs in the modern sector by those who had finished secondary school was five times as high as the number of job offers. The large rate of out-migration "aged" and "feminized" the population, which also brought about a more regressive social atmosphere. Those left behind in the villages tended to be less open to innovation.

Performance of the Primary Education Sector

As for primary education, many of the same problems as had faced policymakers in 1960 continued to exist, in spite of the fact that most of government expenditure on education was devoted to this division of education (65 percent versus rural education's small nine percent share). Enrollment ratios had only reached 14 percent. In addition, children in urban areas continued to be educated on a much larger scale than those in the rural areas, despite the introduction of rural nonformal education.

Internal inefficiencies continued to pose a problem. Repetition rates were quite high, as evidenced by 1973 statistics: first year, 13 percent; second year, 13 percent; third year, 14 percent; fourth year, 16 percent; fifth year, 18 percent; and sixth year 40 percent. A study of achievement done in 1968 revealed that dropout rates were also very high: of each 1,000 students entering primary school, nearly 760 had dropped out by the sixth year and of the 240 remaining, only 199 passed the CEP (Certificat d'Etudes Primaires). Only 95 were admitted to secondary level schooling. UNESCO estimated that as a result of the high dropout rates, 30 pupil-years of teaching were needed to produce one primary school graduate, at a cost of 20 times the per capita national budget.

International Educational Ideology

Finally, the international community had of late picked up the banner of rural education. The World Bank and UNESCO in particular were interested in supporting the reform. The World Bank policy paper in 1974 on "Rural Development and Bank Policies: A Progress Report" discussed the need for alternative education programs as follows:

> In many countries basic education can be partly contained within the primary school system, but major constraints on its provision to the rural poor have been time and cost. There is, therefore, considerable interest in schemes for providing non-formal and more cost-effective education and training to adults and adolescents . . . including adjustments with regard to age of entering school, length of cycle, size of class, simplification of curricula, use of mass media and adaptation of indigenous learning systems. A number of other actions might also be taken to spread basic education more effectively to the rural poor: (a) schooling should be integrated with employment and development; this may be through skill training of those who have left the schools, or by means of a program where practical skill training directly related to the creation of new self-employment

> opportunities is given in the schools; (b) rural education should be functional in serving specific target groups and in meeting identified needs; (c) rural education programs should be designed as part of a total education delivery system; they can themselves become the focus of coordinated action through the use of multipurpose centers to serve other activities such as cooperatives and health services; (d) rural education projects should be integrated with other development activities and linked wherever possible to the provision of other appropriate inputs and services; and (e) the provision of basic education and training should be designed flexibly to make use of existing facilities and resources, and to use mobile units in order to remain replicable in terms of costs and management requirements.

The Bank's interest in rural education and its willingness to fund such programs greatly affected the decision-making process in Upper Volta.

Second Policy Cycle: New Policy Cycle—Generating Policy Options

In the early 1970s, the government of Upper Volta was faced with the same dilemma as it had been ten years previously—how to make education more accessible, equitable and efficient, given the poor resources of the country. Rural education had been given a try, and it had not significantly increased the literacy level in the country. Meanwhile, traditional primary education continued to be inefficient and costly. What alternatives were open to the government under these circumstances?

(A) The government could eliminate the scheme entirely by a general phasing out of the rural education system, and expand resources to the traditional education system. This could be done simply by abandoning the centers altogether or by gradually lowering the age of intake into rural education and creating a bridge between the system and formal primary education.

(B) The government could "stay the course" and continue with the system of rural education, instituting some qualitative reforms.

The question of whether to continue with rural nonformal education and to institute some qualitative reforms or to expand primary education was viewed differently according to who made the assessment. Certainly, no one felt that a dual system of education was desirable. Even the advocates of rural education supported it as a temporary measure until the economy had grown to a point where universal primary education could be achieved.

By this time it was clear to everyone involved that parents and children were passionately interested in educational opportunities. Many rural parents had come to believe that rural education centers were providing a second-rate education. Parents had been demonstrating their lack of faith in the CERs, with low enrollment rates in the centers. (Enrollment rates had dropped 20 percent between 1969/70 and 1970/71 despite the increase in the number of centers, as shown in annex 5.9.) Conventional primary schooling was regarded by the population in general as a means of escaping traditional society and economy and gaining access to the modern and privileged sector. To close off this only option for a better life was unacceptable to those living in the rural areas, so they just refused to send their children or they sent the younger children, since they did not believe it was worth the opportunity costs of sending adolescents who could help on the farm.

Partly because of this lack of public interest, the Ministry of Education (MNE) had quite given up on the rural education centers as a means of educating rural children. *A priori*, the Ministry preferred the option to gradually lower the age of intake into rural education, deemphasize the practical training in agriculture and the trades during the first years, and create a bridge between rural education and general (upper) primary education. The Minister of Education himself deemed that the policy had failed and gave rural education the lowest possible priority rating (Class IV) in the 1972-76 five-year plan. Primary education was placed at Class II. The minister also commissioned a massive nationwide survey, which included conferences and seminars, to determine what kind of education was needed and desired by the country.

On the other hand, the FAC, the FED, and UNICEF continued to encourage rural education, and soon the World Bank would join their ranks. It should be remembered that Upper Volta's heavy reliance on foreign aid gave international actors a critical role in determining policy. In many ways, the international donor community analyzed the situation just as the French had ten years earlier. Using population projections, education budget projections, and unit cost projections, these external agencies attempted to determine for Upper Volta what system of education would be most cost effective in providing universal literacy. Again, they took no account of popular views of the purposes of education.

Evaluation of Policy Options

Once again the options were not properly evaluated. The assumptions and implications of each option were not fully drawn out. Rather, the evaluation was based on conventional knowledge. The World Bank assisted in the evaluation process.

Option A was thought to be financially unaffordable. World Bank staff looked at data on population increases and possible budget growth and determined that even under the most optimal of conditions, that is if there was a high growth of the education budget and if the entire increase were allocated to primary education, the enrollment rate of 6-11 year-olds in 1980 would only reach 16 percent. In a low growth scenario with increases equally divided across the sector, the enrollment rate would decline to 9.6 percent. The Bank estimated that 13 percent was the highest ratio that could be realistically hoped for, given the normal cost-of-living increases in teachers' salaries and the inevitable reductions in French bilateral aid, not to mention the political unfeasibility of freezing the appropriations for secondary and technical education. Unit costs would be about 12,200 CFAF per student year, or 85,000 CFAF for a full six-year program (annex 5.12).

Neither was Option A desirable because, not only would universal primary education be expensive, it was not necessary for a country with a small, slow-growing modern sector. A tentative survey of the manpower needs of Upper Volta through 1980 showed that, even if the percentage of students attending school in the formal system remained the same both at the primary and secondary levels, there would be more than enough educated people to fill the positions that would be available in the modern sector.

Option B was thought to be much more affordable. The Bank estimated that if the present unit costs per student year were increased from CFAF 4,840 to CFAF 5,500 (to take into account improvements in the system) and there was a high growth of the national education budget, rural enrollment ratios could reach 34 percent by 1980. (This compared quite favorably to the 16 percent enrollment ratio under a best case scenario for primary education.) Taking into account the number of children who would also be educated in the primary schools during the same period, this scenario would see fully 45 percent of the school-age population between six and 16 educated by the year 1980. In sum, it would be five times less costly to send a student through three years of rural education than through six years of primary schooling (with no repetitions).

Option B was also desirable for all of the same reasons that had been given in adopting this policy initially. Throughout the process of evaluating policy options, international donors were predisposed to pursue rural nonformal education. Simply put, they persisted in the philosophy and reasoning of the Christol-Medard plan, and the belief that modernization of the agricultural sector could be effected through the rural education centers. (See annex 5.13 for long-term manpower projections.)

Option B would be implementable, because it was supported by the international donor community. With all the resources of the three major contributing aid organizations—the World Bank, the French FAC and the FED—brought to bear, it appeared that implementation would not be a problem. The objective was to make qualitative improvements in the curriculum, teaching, support services and construction of the rural education centers. Though the reform would be implemented in five of the 11 Regional Development Organizations (ORDs), much of the system was already in place. However, the reform would be extensive.

There was a great deal of controversy regarding the two options. The international community, especially the World Bank, had determined that rural education should be given a longer try. It should be pointed out that those consultants who were responsible for evaluating the rural education system on behalf of the Bank were agricultural educators, and therefore it is not surprising that they recommended continuing with rural education. In addition, primary education continued to be inefficient and costly. Further, though the results for rural education thus far had been discouraging, international donors felt that it was due to poor policy implementation, and not the policy itself. They continued to believe in the worth of rural education. Finally, it offered the World Bank an opportunity to continue research efforts regarding non-formal education. This could serve as a pilot project from which the Bank could determine whether to institute similar programs elsewhere.

However, the MNE remained adamant in its opposition. In undertaking a study to determine what kind of reform to implement in primary schooling, the Ministry eschewed any foreign assistance. It insisted that only nationals could define authentic new educational objectives. This opposition led the international donors to identify the MNE as one of the weak links in the implementation of the original program and to decide to seek another agent to implement the reform successfully.

The donors reasoned that since the reform was meant to refocus attention on the teaching of agricultural techniques, the MAE was in the best position to supply support services. In addition, they suggested that rural education would be better placed to compete for national funding than it was under the MNE. The MAE was certainly in favor of the plan, and the executive branch of the Voltaic government was interested in any new development projects with aid money attached.

The donors therefore made the transfer of administration of the rural education centers a condition for external financing of the reform. Not surprisingly the MNE resisted this change, as did teachers of rural education centers who considered themselves more traditional teachers than rural trainers. But they were overruled. This was to cause some problems in implementing the Bank-financed project.

Again, as during the French evaluation of the original policy option, there was no attempt to accommodate the desires of the rural parents and children. However, the MNE was broadly aware of the parents' and students' misgivings about rural education, although the study it planned on public attitudes regarding rural education would not yield findings for another five years. There was certainly reason to believe, from low enrollments in the centers and the general lack of regard for them, that this was not the form of education which people desired. Still, international donors felt that the government could convince the people of the relevance and cost effectiveness of rural nonformal education.

Making the Policy Decision

In sum, the decision in 1973 to reform the rural education system was not based on a rigid evaluation made by the Voltaics. They did not draw out implications and assess the options. Instead, they relied heavily on the international aid community. In particular, the World Bank had determined that rural education was worthy of support. Though the MNE and MAE were divided over the decision, the government decided to accept the recommendations of the external agencies. This is clearly reported by Aime Damiba, onetime director of Educational Planning, who wrote in 1980:

> I shall say nothing about the committee meetings that Upper Voltan technicians were forced to attend to "consider the reform of rural education"; the only purpose of these meetings was to approve the proposals of the providers of money. With regard to bringing the scheme under the Ministry for Rural Development, it is certain that the Minister of National Education never proposed a draft decision along these lines to the Council of Ministers . . . the decision was taken at the highest level, the Minister of National Education being told that the government could not leave a present of over one billion CFA francs on the doorstep without taking it in.

It is clear that the government of Upper Volta had continued to base its development policy decisions on available aid money, rather than formulate a coherent, consistent development plan.

Basic elements of the policy reform. The main objective of the Government's rural education reform program was to focus on qualitative reform of the existing system, not to expand it. The main features of the program were:

- For the Rural Education Centers (which came to be known as Rural Youth Training Centers): the provision of better-trained staff, complete sets of farm equipment, and improved buildings and water supplies; reorientation of the content of programs to make them more practical and suitable for rural life, which was the responsibility of the Rural Pedagogical Bureau, and the use of local languages for initial instruction; increased time allocation for students on their own family farms; integration of the centers with village life by setting up for each center an elected village council responsible for management and supervision of the rural education teacher; the raising of the entry age to 15 so that at the end of their training the participants would be old enough to establish themselves on the land.
- For graduates upon completion of training: the provision of technical advice through more and better-trained staff to help groups (called Rural Youth Groups) to establish themselves on the land and/or in other revenue-earning enterprises; integration of group activities with those of the Regional Development Organizations and provision of credit for the acquisition of draught animals, farm implements and supplies. In addition, the reform would create three rural development training centers, which would provide an opportunity for further schooling for outstanding students in the Youth Training Centers. These training centers would prepare students for careers as extension workers and agricultural instructors.
- For overall management and support: the strengthening of the Rural Youth Training Directorate, which would be placed under the Ministry of Agriculture; the recruitment and training of additional staff for the regions; the design of new buildings, making use of local construction materials.

The reform program was to be implemented in five of the eleven Regional Development Organizations. The Directorate of Rural Education, and the Regional Development Organizations would implement the reform under the direction of the Ministry of Agriculture. Funding would come from the FAC, the FED, the Swiss Development Corporation and the World Bank as well as West Germany, USAID, UNICEF and the government.

The reform would address the many problems which Upper Volta encountered in the 11 years that the rural education centers had been in operation. Specifically, the reform would address:

- the problem of young school leavers who were not able to immediately apply their newly-acquired knowledge. It would do this by first, requiring that new male students be older (at least 15) and also physically capable of doing heavy agricultural work. Second, Young Farmer Cooperative Groups would help the students to bridge the gap from school to active work in the community. The groups would be managed by the members and assisted by village elders as well as an instructor/extension worker. Cooperative groups would help the young people to obtain land of their own as well as serve as a locale for agricultural instruction for the community. In addition, those trained in the cooperative groups would be more productive, earn more, and thus be less likely to emigrate to the Ivory Coast in search of higher wages;

- the language problems by introducing an experimental program in national languages in a few of the centers, which would be spread to other centers, if successful;
- the curricular problems by introducing a new curriculum, which would allow more time for practical farming and placing more emphasis on the teaching of health and hygiene, rural handicrafts, practical arithmetic and bookkeeping;
- the poor quality of teaching by providing in-service training for teachers already in place—new candidates for the rural education teachers training program would be recruited on the basis of maturity and rural experience; and
- the perception on the part of parents and children that rural education centers blocked access to further education by creating Rural Development Training Centers. One such center would be constructed in each of the three targeted Regional Development Organizations. The Rural Development Training Centers would provide two more years of schooling in general education and agricultural training, and lead to a Certificate of Elementary Rural Studies. Graduates would find easier access to the rural education teacher training institutes and the agricultural schools. It was thought that this would have a double positive effect, because rural teachers with this background would be more effective than recruits from the general education system and this further schooling would open up more options to those attending rural education centers and therefore be more appealing to parents and children in the rural areas. However, this education would not qualify graduates for the highly desirable civil service or other formal sector employment.

Overall, it was believed that management of the rural education system would be improved through a closer coordination with the rural development and extension services of the MAE at the national, regional and local levels.

The decision to reform rural education had three major characteristics. First, it was comprehensive. Though it was not a radical departure from the idea behind rural education, it would require building a large and diversified infrastructure. These changes could be potentially difficult to implement. Specifically, it was clear there might be problems on three fronts: (a) Basically the Rural Youth Training Centers were conceived by the Bank, the FAC and the FED. These three agencies had their own projects, staffing arrangements and operating procedures. Obviously, this could lead to problems in coordinating their efforts, which could affect the outcome of the reform; (b) In addition, the institutional change which placed administration of the reform under the Ministry of Agriculture would certainly create some resistance on the part of the Ministry of Education; and (c) Training people to fill newly created positions at the regional and national levels would take much time.

Second, the implementation of such an extensive reform was beyond the analytic and managerial capability of Upper Volta. As indicated above, it was conceived by sources outside the country, who had not seriously considered the manpower needs of such a reform. Finally, the reform was alien to Upper Volta, since it was conceived and promoted by foreigners. It was clear that the Rural Youth Training Centers would need more than a name change to gain acceptance in the rural communities. The reform and its centers would need to be "marketed" in order to change people's already negative perceptions of them.

Planning for Policy Implementation

As the preceding paragraphs would suggest, it was not the government which planned implementation, but the three aid organizations. Indeed, they began planning and implementing the aspects of reform which they had come to regard as necessary, even before the government officially articulated the policy reform in 1975. Further, each of the agencies drew up its own plans, without much regard for what the other agencies were doing. Each project had its own objectives and was internally consistent, but was not coordinated with projects financed by the other aid organizations. Schedules were developed to fit each project, not an overall plan. Each agency committed financial resources to its own project, which involved financing a certain amount of recurrent costs, but did not examine how they fitted into the overall government budget.

The different elements of the reform were divided in the following way: The World Bank was responsible for reconstructing and equipping

Rural Youth Training Centers in three target Regional Development Organizations, equipping some 150 new Young Farmer Cooperative Groups and constructing housing for 25 of their supervisory staff, constructing support facilities for the groups and Rural Youth Training centers in the targeted regions, providing technical and pedagogical support for regional and central management and evaluation and constructing and equipping three Rural Development Training Centers, which would provide further schooling for graduates of the youth training centers.

French aid (FAC) would finance the reinforcement of staff and operating costs of the Rural Pedagogical Bureau and support for the Ouagadougou region. The European Development Fund (FED) was to provide support for the Banfora and Ouahigouya regions and the Swiss Development Cooperation would finance the construction of a training center for women instructors for the youth training centers.

Since the objective of the reform was to improve the quality of rural education, the targets for planning were the development of institutions in five of the eleven regions. In particular, planning involved.

RURAL YOUTH TRAINING CENTERS (previously Rural Education Centers). Centers to be chosen for reconstruction and equipment would be selected through a survey of rural education in the three targeted regions. This would be carried out by Voltaic nationals, and with the assistance of foreign specialists .

Each center selected would develop at least four hectares of land, using the equipment provided under the project. Part of the farm income would be accumulated to help establish cooperative activities for graduates. Supervisory services would be provided by a rural education supervisor working in close cooperation with the agricultural instructor, both of whom would be under the Regional Development Office.

RURAL PEDAGOGICAL BUREAU. The bureau would develop a new curriculum which would be more practical and suitable for rural life. Teaching would be in national languages on an experimental basis in 15 of the project youth training centers. The proposed curriculum, entrance requirements and teacher qualifications would be revised by May 1, 1975.

YOUNG FARMER COOPERATIVE GROUPS (formerly Post-School Cooperative Groups). Cooperative groups were intended to provide support and guidance to center graduates to establish themselves on the land. Each group would consist of about 15 young people who had completed their training in the same regions. It was hoped that most of the boys would be 18 years old and the girls, 16 years old. The Bank wished to institute a pilot program consisting of 150 groups made up of center graduates. These would be equipped and provided with continuous advice and services. If successful, 360 new groups would be created from more graduates over the years 1974 through 1977.

The Regional Development Organizations would administer the credit to the cooperative groups for capital requirements, seeds, fertilizers, etc. and would also provide extension facilities and marketing possibilities.

RURAL DEVELOPMENT TRAINING CENTERS. Three rural development training centers, intended to provide two years of further agricultural training to graduates of youth training centers, would be constructed in three different regions.

In addition to revamping the institutions above, the reform would also focus on staff support and training. This would include the retraining of instructors at the Rural Youth Training Centers, increasing the number of regional supervisors providing technical assistance in three regions, increasing support for regional agricultural staff and hiring extension agents who would work exclusively with the cooperative groups.

Improving the management of rural education would be completed by May 1, 1974, the principal element of which was the transfer of administration of the Rural Youth Training Centers from the Ministry of Education to the Ministry of Agriculture.

Amidst all this flurry of planning and timetabling, not only was the rural population forgotten, but even the Voltaic civil servants were excluded, as foreign consultants hurried to perfect their separate components. To be sure, all the donor agencies had made clear that the government should "market" the idea of rural nonformal education to the public, but the government never did. (See annex 5.14 for policy targets.)

Policy Implementation

Though the policy reform was not a radical deviation from the original idea of rural education, it was extensive, and required elaborate implementation mechanisms and networks. Implementation was slow-going for several major reasons: The donor community had "jumped the gun" on the reform, and begun implementation, before the government itself had adopted a unified approach. In addition, the division of labor coupled with imperfect coordination between the donors created overlaps and territorial jealousies. Finally, the plan was so comprehensive, that it was beyond the administrative capabilities of the Voltaic civil service.

The various international organizations began implementing their projects in 1973, while the government was still formulating its policy on the reform. The government revealed its plan in 1975. Hence, some aspects of the reform which had been started in 1973 had to be revised, which led to some delays.

Not surprisingly, there were difficulties in determining the respective responsibilities of the French financed Rural Pedagogical Bureau and the World Bank Project Unit within the central directorate. In addition, Voltaic civil servants working under the Bank Project received higher remuneration than equivalent civil service personnel working for the directorate or regions, but funded by other external aid sources. This differential naturally created tensions among the different groups of workers.

The synoptic approach to policy making discussed earlier required that the reform be comprehensive and not incremental in nature. It was during implementation that this approach began to show its weaknesses. To attack all institutions involved in rural education at one time required a complicated and delicate time schedule, as one institution was dependent on another. For example, a major problem was the transfer of administration of the reform from the Ministry of Education to the Ministry of Agriculture (or Rural Development, as it came to be known). This took longer than expected and interfered with the implementation of other aspects of the reform, including a three-year delay in starting the renovation of the centers. In addition, it created hostile feelings between the ministries and a breakdown of communication and cooperation between them. This lack of communication and good-will created inefficiencies and was felt particularly in at least one aspect of the reform.

The reform called for a pilot program in the use of local languages. Though a division of the Ministry of Education had long been developing literacy programs in local languages, the Ministry of Agriculture set about developing its own methodology for the pilot program.

Due to delays in the construction of the rural Youth Training Centers there were fewer graduates than expected to establish the Young Farmer Cooperative Groups. Therefore the number of cooperative groups created was only a third of that expected. Since there were few young farmers who had completed training in the cooperative groups, it was decided to suspend construction of the three Rural Development Training Centers and to take a wait and see attitude regarding the success of implementation of the rest of the reform. This suspension was one of the major modifications of the reform.

In particular, the weaknesses of the comprehensive "synoptic" approach to policymaking were felt in the three main domains of the reform as follows:

RURAL YOUTH TRAINING CENTERS. The number of centers actually reconstructed was limited due to weaknesses in management discussed above, the inexperience of the labor force, intermittent shortages of construction materials, and the difficulty the rural artisans encountered in constructing the innovative and economical design.

The curriculum was refocused on the teaching of practical agricultural activities. In some cases, teaching materials were reported to be inadequate or late in arriving. Most of the curriculum development was done by foreign experts, as turnover was high among the Voltaic counterpart staff. In addition, the introduction of teaching in national languages posed several problems. First of all, there was a question as to how many local languages should be used, since teaching materials would have to be produced for each one. Second, many of the children and their parents preferred instruction in French, since this was the language of instruction at primary schools, and was necessary for a child to "move up" in education or jobs. Third, some instructors were not able to speak the languages of the areas where they were assigned.

Village Center Councils became more active in the management of Rural Youth Training Centers. They participated in major decisions, assisted in the acquisition of farm land, construction and the recruitment of pupils, and sometimes in setting up cooperative groups. While this involvement of village councils was a good way to promote the villagers' interest in and support for the reform and mobilize local resources for developing the youth training centers, there was not enough time to properly train the Councils in their functions, which partly accounted for the lack of acceptance of rural education.

FURTHER TRAINING OF CENTER GRADUATES. Since the reform focused on improving the rural education centers, the cooperative groups received short shrift. As stated above, the number of Young Farmer Cooperative Groups did not grow as quickly as had been hoped. The new groups were to be made up of graduates of the reformed training centers. Recruitment for the cooperative groups proved difficult, because the centers were slower to get off the ground than expected. It was also discovered that the cooperative advisors were poorly trained. In addition, the Rural Pedagogical Bureau had little time to develop teaching materials for the cooperative groups. As mentioned above, the creation of three rural development training centers, which were to provide an opportunity for further schooling of outstanding center graduates, was impeded due to the slow process of reforming the centers.

Overall management and support. As mentioned above, the transfer of administration of the reform from the MNE to the MAE created considerable problems for implementating the reform on a national level. In addition, regional staff support presented difficulties. Regional logistical and technical support to training was limited due to operational deficiencies in the management of the Regional Development Organizations, and in some cases to a lack of interest on the part of regional directors and agricultural extension staff. There were also important inadequacies in training for the first generation of center supervisors.

In addition to the suspension of the development of rural development training centers, another major modification of the policy took place, when the powerful teachers' unions managed to bring about an upgrading of youth training center instructors to civil servant status with salaries comparable to those of primary school teachers. This created a considerable increase in the average unit cost of rural education. Average unit costs (per student, per year) of the centers was now US$85 as compared to US$62 in primary education. However, in reformed centers, the costs per student were reported to be similar to those in primary schools.

A Mini-Assessment

In 1979, as the World Bank staff reviewed the progress of the reform, they decided to proceed with support for the centers. Despite the mediocre results of the reform in the five years since it had been initiated, they felt a need to test the effectiveness of rural education on a larger scale. They held fast to the belief that problems encountered thus far were a result of poor and inadequate implementation, and not due to problems inherent to the policy. Consequently a Second Bank Education Project for US$14 million was cofinanced with the African Development Fund (ADF) to expand the reform into three new Regional Development Organizations, and strengthen the management support services, staff training and evaluation components of the rural education system. In particular, it would provide for (1) constructing, furnishing and equipping rural youth training centers; (2) support for post-center training to rural youth groups and rural promotion centers; (3) support to central and regional services of the rural youth training Directorate; (4) the training of agricultural project managers, building construction artisans and foremen. The purpose of this component was to assist in road construction as well as to assist rural residents in the construction of education centers.

Once again, the implementation of this phase of the reform suffered because of the comprehensive and ambitious design that was not consistent with the national managerial capabilities. The project required that seven different government agencies with widely scattered institutions work together to bring about implementation which created problems in coordination and supervision. This resulted in a lack of coordination between the government agencies involved in the reform and also within the different departments of the Directorate itself. Moreover, financial management was very weak which led to delays in the payments to contractors and suppliers.

Implementation was also impeded because of various political changes within the government, which eventually led to a bloodless military coup ousting the government of Colonel Lamizana. This followed a general strike which was organized by the main teachers' union. As a result, there was a certain backing away from the reform's initial objectives and a slowing down of its implementation, because the new government did not support it, even to the limited degree of its predecessor. Even on the technical level, some of the personnel responsible for designing the project were dismissed from their positions. In keeping with the new government's focus on rural development and priority to increase agricultural production and bring about food self-sufficiency, certain modifications in the rural education system were introduced. The major modification was widening the functions of the Rural Education Directorate to cover the training of the whole rural sector, including adults, under the newly instituted Directorate for the Training and Organizing of the Rural Sector.

Policy Impact Assessment

Over the course of this policy cycle, the rural education system continued to grow, but with little improvement in rural education. Personnel were increasing in the centers and were receiving healthy allowances, lodging, and moving expenses at too great a cost; training centers were still being built, while many which were already built were not operating; supervisory personnel were receiving large indemnities; the central Directorate had a fleet of high-cost vehicles for supervision missions, many of which rested in the parking lot in Ouagadougou, since supervisors were not keen on going out into the field.

In the early 1980s, the donor community began to reevaluate the merits of rural nonformal education. Their reports and exploratory studies consistently revealed that rural nonformal education was not successful in fulfilling its objectives. More specifically, the reports concluded the following about the performance of rural education:

- Rural education had failed to significantly increase literacy. After 20 years of implementation and reform, the rural education system had made little impact on illiteracy in the rural areas. The illiteracy rate of 92.3 percent recorded in 1980 was the highest in Africa and the rate of primary-age enrollment at 19 percent was the lowest.
- The rural population continued to reject this system of education. Participation in the centers was lower than expected. The number of centers in operation had actually decreased from 737 in 1972 to 639 in 1984. These 639 centers had enrolled only about 15,000 students or a class average of 25, which was also much smaller than in 1972. The dropout rate was between 13 and 16 percent per year.
- The cost of a rural education was much higher than for primary education (see annex 5.16). Various studies done by UNESCO, the French and the Bank revealed that unit costs for rural education were between three to six times as great as those of primary education. This was due to several factors: (a) the raise in rural education teacher salaries; (b) the low enrollments in the centers (25 vs. 52-55 in primary education); (c) the number of support staff needed for overseeing agricultural activities, as well as teaching literacy; (d) and high investment costs for classroom buildings, teacher housing, educational materials, and land, water, tools, seeds, and so forth needed for agricultural activities.
- Access to education was still much lower in the rural areas, and still highly skewed in favor of the urban populations. Overall, only two percent of the school-age population were being educated in the Rural Youth Training Centers.
- The quality of education in the training centers was inferior to primary education. Bank supervision reports noted poor achievement in literacy and arithmetic and poor retention of literacy skills. In addition the centers continued to suffer from a lack of pedagogical materials and from poorly trained teachers.
- The cooperative groups were not successful in integrating graduates of the training centers into the agricultural sector. The age of the center graduates who went on to join the cooperative groups was part of the problem. In 1983, 40 percent were less than 15 years old because parents had continued to send the younger children, though an effort had been made to raise the leaving age to 18. Even those who were older could not hope to have land of their own for many years following completion of their training with the cooperative groups. Further, rural education was not the force for modernization of agriculture which had been predicted. Part of the problem could be attributed to the patriarchal nature of

Voltaic society, which placed great value on age and wisdom. The farmers were suspicious of new methods imported from outside the community and introduced by young people. Rural education was not their idea, and they were resistant to the ideas it introduced.

- Rural education had not stemmed the tide of emigration. On the contrary, the rate of emigration was growing over time and by 1981 about one million Voltaics were employed abroad. Indeed, the pattern had changed from the temporary emigration of single men to a more permanent emigration of couples and families.

These poor results were weighed in conjunction with the impact of the rural education system on the agricultural sector. A 1983 Bank economic memorandum found little evidence that agricultural training in the centers was affecting methods used by the rural population at large: "Although the agricultural sector has shown a positive response to the development efforts of the past decade . . . it is important to note that the sector is still fundamentally subsistence-oriented and that crop diversification and structural change remain to be introduced in most parts of the country."

Third Policy Cycle: The New Policy Cycle

In the early 1980s, a number of socio-political factors caused the government of what was now Burkina Faso to enter a new policy phase. First of all, in response to the unpopularity of rural education and parents' and students' demands for access to ordinary primary and secondary schools, the Ministry of Education had begun to explore ways to reform the school system. In addition, the international community had begun to question the basic precepts of rural education and to reemphasize the value of schooling. Finally, Captain Thomas Sankara came to power in a populist revolt that eschewed elitist education.

Results from extensive surveys of the population, seminars and conferences had led the Ministry of Education to believe that the best route for educational reform would be one which emphasized the importance of community, culture and national languages and also which taught practical work skills. The new government developed an ambitious reform which involved a pre-school program, a basic cycle of eight years, a substantial work-oriented training cycle of four years, and a research program for specialists. In 1979 the government instituted a pilot program to test the reform, and by 1984 had 8,000 pupils in 38 pilot schools.

At the same time, the international donor community began to reevaluate nonformal approaches to education. The World Bank Sector Policy Paper of 1980 emphasized the need for both training in specific skills (including nonformal education) and general education. In fact, the Policy Paper noted:

> Some general formal schooling seems to be necessary for further training; it provides skills in communication, mathematics, and science, necessary in a modern economy. Educated workers are more achievement-oriented, more self-reliant, more adaptive to new situations, and above all, more trainable. To improve the external efficiency of education, therefore, it is necessary to expand and improve efficiency of at least first-level education.

On a policy note, the Sector Paper stated:

> The Bank considers first-level education the minimum foundation on which countries should gradually and systematically build higher levels of a comprehensive network of formal and nonformal education and training equally accessible to all segments of the population...Most of the assistance of the Bank in providing opportunities in basic education for the school-age population will be concentrated on increasing or upgrading student places, teachers, and physical resources *in the formal system*.

Finally, the government of Captain Thomas Sankara was fueled by a populist revolution, and committed to a more egalitarian form of education than the dual system provided by the existing policy.

During this time, manpower needs for the country had not changed much. With 3.3 million persons in the active work force in 1982, modern sector employment was estimated at about 100,000, or 3 percent. Expectations were that the growth of modern sector employment would be modest in the near future and that most of the expansion of productive activity would occur in the agricultural sector. An optimistic assumption was that employment requirements arising from net increase and attrition would be about five percent or 5,000 workers per year.

As a result of these developments, the major players in education policy making (the Burkinabe government, the World Bank, UNESCO, the French government) were in a better position to assess the performance of rural education with objectivity and detachment. Whereas in 1973 and 1979 they were philosophically committed to a policy of nonformal rural education and attributed unsatisfactory performance to poor implementation, in 1983 they viewed the unsatisfactory performance as a product of the policy itself. Consequently, the government and the international community set about another search for a viable institution to provide basic education to the rural population.

The alternatives open to the government of either continuing along the path of rural education or abandoning rural education to expand the school system were both undesirable for cost and efficiency reasons. The high cost of continuing to pursue rural education as a means to provide education to all was vividly illustrated in an IREDU-CNRS study. The study showed that total investment costs to educate all children of school age would be 1.25 times the GNP, and the recurrent costs would be 1.6 times the total government budget. Other indicators of the poor performance of rural education were detailed in the section on Policy Impact Assessment.

At the same time, the performance of primary education had not improved much over the years. First, primary enrollment rates had gained only five percent in ten years, increasing from 14 percent in 1973 to 19 percent in 1983. Second, urban areas continued to be favored over rural areas in regard to distribution of educational services. The ten largest townships, which comprised seven percent of the total population, had an enrollment rate of 60 percent in primary school, compared with only nine percent in the rural areas where over 90 percent of the population lived. Third, internal efficiency continued to be low with repetition averaging more than 18 percent over the six-year cycle and 45 percent in Grade 6. Dropout rates were at least ten percent per year and three out of four pupils entering primary school failed to complete the program. In addition, only a quarter of all students completing the sixth year passed the final examination, which reflected achievement and not a scarcity of secondary school places. The equivalent of 21 pupil-years was required to produce a graduate with a school-leaving certificate. Finally, high cost continued to characterize primary education, mainly due to the relatively high cost of the main input (teachers) into primary schooling and anomalies of resource allocation in the rest of the education sector. Education continued to account for 22 percent of the national budget.

While both options had significant drawbacks, the government believed that the population preferred formal education and that, instead of looking for a less costly alternative, ways should be explored by which primary education itself could be made less costly. Specifically, the government and donors identified two ways to accelerate the expansion of primary education most cost-effectively: (1) by lowering unit costs and (2) by increasing resources to primary education through reallocating resources from other areas of education.

In particular, World Bank staff theorized that lower unit costs could be achieved by recruiting primary teachers at a lower civil service level with a lower salary and training them for only one year instead of two. They also proposed that more resources could be made available to primary education through a variety of measures, including reducing stipends to secondary and university students and reducing the growth rate of scholarships for university students, then reallocating the savings to the primary level. By the mid-1980s, stipends constituted 35 percent of the education budget, greater even than the entire primary schools' share of

22 percent. In regard to scholarships, a study conducted by IREDU-CNRS showed the cost of schooling one university student was 54 times that of schooling one primary student. The study determined that, if all university scholarships were abolished, it would open primary education to 130,000 more children.

The measures above were politically sensitive and involved different sectors of the government (the Ministries of Agriculture, Education, Higher Education and Scientific Research, and Finance) and major interest groups. In order to facilitate the process of generating and evaluating different options, it was necessary to find a mechanism by which the implications of different policy options could be easily drawn and whereby the different players in the decision making process could evaluate these implications, interact among themselves and work out compromises and tradeoffs.

In attempting to help the government in this process, the Bank developed a Computer Simulation Model. The Model was able to provide cost implications of various scenarios taking into account population growth, existing teacher salaries and promotion rates, government budget growth, and budget allocations to the different branches (see annex 5.17 for cost projections). In October of 1983, the Bank brought together representatives from the Ministries of Agriculture, Education, Higher Education and Scientific Research, and Finance as well as from the teachers' unions and private school owners to discuss different policies for expanding basic education with the aid of the Simulation Model. A series of projections were first worked out which showed that even with a moderate population increase, if the current situation were to continue, the enrollment rate of the 7-12 year age group would rise from 19 percent in 1981 to only 37 percent in the year 2000. Moreover, any major expansion of the system without altering its basic characteristics was easily seen as financially prohibitive.

The next step, then, was to explore suggestions regarding (1) changes in primary education's share of the total government budget and (2) measures to reduce unit costs. These suggestions were immediately plugged into the Model, and the participants were able to see the implications of the various scenarios. The group then went through a painful iterative process of evaluation, negotiation, modification, tradeoff, implications, more evaluation, and so on. In the end, the government decided that a target enrollment rate of 60 percent by the year 2000 was feasible, provided the budget share for primary education was increased and unit costs within primary education were decreased.

The decisions made during this process, according to the World Bank Staff Appraisal Report for the Burkina Primary Education Development Project (1985) were formalized in a government agreement to:

- lower unit costs by: (a) recruiting teachers at a new, lower level; (b) promoting existing teachers at a slower rate; (c) attempting to identify low-cost construction methods; and (d) improving internal efficiency through better focused training of teachers in combination with development of a textbook production, procurement and distribution capability;
- develop the central institutions' capabilities for planning, managing and controlling education costs over the long-term and to carry out the necessary resource allocations within the sector; to this end the government was to prepare an annual budget review including increases in allocations to primary education and decreases in the budget for fellowships for secondary and higher education.

In spite of the process by which this policy was generated, the new plan met with some resistance, both from the Ministry of Agriculture, which was unprepared to give up on the rural education centers, and from university students and the Ministry of Higher Education and Research, which did not look favorably on the prospect of any cutbacks. In addition, teachers' unions were not happy with the new salary schedule they were accorded.

By the end of the decade, 1990, the future of rural education continued to be uncertain. Not surprisingly, the Ministry of Agriculture continued to believe in rural education and wished to maintain and in fact expand the system. The World Bank believed that rural education centers should be converted into primary schools, or agricultural training centers and was studying the possibilities of "harmonizing" the two systems. Whatever the decision regarding rural education, it will take a great deal of time to reverse a policy which already had institutions in place and a bureaucracy which had a vested interest in seeing it continue.

Conclusions

The schematic diagram developed (figure 5.1) summarizes the main events of the policymaking process in Burkina, within the context of the conceptual framework developed in chapter 1. Some general conclusions follow below.

Figure 5.1 Policymaking in Burkina


First Policy Cycle
Late 1950s
FORMULATION
EVALUATION
ADOPTION
IMPLEMENTATION
Early 1970s
IMPACT ASSESSMENT
CONCEPTUAL WORLD
PROCESS
EMPIRICAL WORLD
A
Expansion of existing system
C
Introducing non-formal education alternative
B
Streaming existing system
A
Expansion of existing system
B
Streaming existing system
C
Introducing non-formal education alternative
Desirability: Not relevant in rural areas
No
Desirability: leads to elitism, divisiveness, social conflict
No
Desirability: Yes, relevant
Implementability: Yes
Affordability: Less costly than A or B
Yes
Policy Decision
• Synoptic
• Imported policy: SEDES driven
• Strategic
Planning
Planning by expatriates. Emphasis on Finance. No attempts to market.
Implementation
Difficult to implement. Modifications to make scope more realistic.
Is Policy satisfactory? Parents and MNE losing faith.
Generation of options
• Analysis by a SEDES team of 2 French educators
• Poor data
• Distinct philosophy in favor of non-formal education
Analysis
• Country newly independent. Very poor
• Weak economy with few options for development
• Education
- Very limited
- Unequal distribution
- Primary schools "irrelevant" to rural societies
- Low quality
SITUATION A
• Rural education did not improve economy
• Performance of non-formal education mixed: low enrollment and poor quality
• Primary education same as in Situation A
SITUATION B

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Figure 5.1 Policymaking in Burkina (continued)


Second Cycle
FORMULATION
EVALUATION
1973
ADOPTION
1975
IMPLEMEN-
TATION
MIN.
ASSESSMENT
A
Expand
Primary
schools
B
Modify
non-formal
system
A
Expand
Primary
schools
B
Modify
non-formal
system
Policy Decision
Reexamin-
ation
Desirability
Affordability
No
Desirability:
Yes by Donors and
Ministry of
Agriculture.
No by parents and
Ministry of
Education
Affordability: Yes
Yes
Reform bill
influenced by
donors.
–
Comprehensive
Is
Policy
at fault?
Planning
Generation of options
Analysis
• Continuing support of
international community
• No research or analysis
By donors
for
their projects
Implementation
Implementation
was beyond
national
capabilities,
lack of donor
coordination
Mediocre
results
of reform
SITUATION C

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Figure 5.1 Policymaking in Burkina (continued)


IMPLEMENTATION ADJUSTMENT
Early 1980s
IMPACT ASSESSMENT
Third Cycle
FORMULATION
EVALUATION
ADOPTION
A
Use rural education to expand access
B
Abandon rural education and expand primary schooling
A
Use rural education to expand access
B
Abandon rural education and expand primary schooling
Policy Decision
No
Planning
Results unsatisfactory
Did not meet expectations
Unsatisfactory
Desirability: Non-egalitarian, unpopular. Affordability: costly.
No
Evaluated by all interest groups by reiterative process
Yes
Expand primary education by:
• lowering unit costs
• reallocating resources to primary education
Improve implementation and broaden scope
Generation of options
Analysis
• Research by government
• Studies by donors
• Seminars
• Conferences
• Revised policy of donors
Implementation
Many administrative and coordination problems
• Literacy low
• No demand for non-formal education
• Low access
• High migration from rural to urban areas
• Graduates did not integrate into agriculture sector
• Cost of non-formal schools higher than primary schools
• New government
• International community less enthusiastic about non-formal education alternative
SITUATION C'

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The introduction of rural nonformal education into Upper Volta (first and second policy cycles) clearly demonstrates a case of a synoptic approach to policymaking with a twist: one driven by external forces. A synoptic approach is highly calculated, internally consistent, and comprehensive, which systematically diagnoses and generates "correct" solutions to problems. The synoptic approach assumes: (a) that the problem at hand does not go beyond man's cognitive capacities, (b) that there exist "correct" solutions to problems rather than "political" accommodations of warring interests, and that these solutions can be discovered by the right technical experts, and (c) that there exist agreed criteria (rather than social conflict) by which solutions can be judged, and that once people "see the light" they will have adequate incentives to support and implement these solutions.

The decision to restructure education by instituting a system of rural nonformal education was a comprehensive solution to the problem of providing access to education within the constraint of limited resources and was conceived by players external to Upper Volta. These international actors were working within a mindset which assumed that (1) there are universal concepts, or an internationally collected wisdom, which applies to any given situation, and (2) that this wisdom can be transferred into any country. In essence, they felt that, once one had a clear idea of the problem, the appropriate solution could simply be taken off the shelf, so to speak. Afterwards, all that was necessary would be to provide technical assistance and funding—with little attention paid to the country's demands and constraints.

On the surface, it appeared that such a system of education would provide a more relevant form of basic education at a cost that the new government could afford. This policy had all the elements of success: international respectability, financial backing and a good chance for implementation because of the support of several large international organizations. In addition, the synoptic approach employed in the policy making process provided some advantages. First, the comprehensive nature of the reform helped create a critical mass which is necessary to any successful policy implementation. Second, the reform placed special emphasis on institutional development. With all these advantages, why did the policy fail?

There were several fatal weaknesses in the policymaking process. The major flaw was that demand factors were totally ignored. The decision revolved around the experts' detailed examination of the situation. Though they briefly entertained ideas concerning alternative policy options, their biases predisposed them to favoring rural nonformal education as the "correct and only" solution to the problem. Therefore, they assumed that consumers of education would embrace it. In the decision making process, the government did not draw the proper implications from this option, overlooking that fact that it might be rejected by parents and students, because denying them access to the formal educational system would close off the only door to escape from their difficult subsistence existence.

There is an important lesson here. Interest groups must be dealt with in the policy process, otherwise they will use everything within their power to manipulate the policy to meet their own objectives. In the case of Burkina, parents used the only means at their disposal to interfere with the reform—passive resistance. They either did not send their children at all to the nonformal centers, or in many cases, they sent the younger children of primary school age, which undermined the intent of the policy which was to provide a basic literacy training to rural adolescents. Rural teachers made up another interest group that was ignored in the decision making process. These teachers subsequently demanded that they be treated like primary teachers, accorded the same status and salary, which made the reform financially unviable. Neither donors nor decision makers in Burkina saw the importance of bringing interest groups into the original decision making process. Particularly after the first policy cycle, when they could see that rural education was not widely accepted, they identified the "salesman" as the problem instead of the "product": instead of recognizing that rural education was not being accepted in the countryside, because people did not want it, the decision makers identified the Ministry of Education as the problem. To their way of thinking, the Ministry of Education was not successful in "selling" the reform, so they simply switched salesmen (to the Ministry of Agriculture) and continued to attempt to get the consumers of education to "buy" the reform.

Second, the introduction and reform of rural nonformal education were led by the international donor community; in this respect, the government was a "follower" in the policymaking process. Once the donors entered the policy making process, the scales were tilted. In effect, the international community's intervention in the policy process stifled it. The Voltaic government did not bother to analyze the implications of the reform; since the French and the European Economic Community, and later the World Bank, UNESCO and other aid organizations were going to fund it, the government just was not compelled to conduct a full analysis. Basically, the government made policy in an *ad hoc* manner, embracing almost all projects which had aid money attached. The fact that the policy was a creation of external players meant that the country itself was not necessarily committed to it—Upper Volta had no feeling of "owning" this policy.

Third, the introduction of rural nonformal education was so far reaching that it was beyond the analytical and managerial capabilities of the Voltaic authorities to design and to implement. To begin with, following independence the French continued in their roles as advisors and planners, taking most of the responsibility for designing and implementing as well as financing the introduction of rural education. In the early 1970s, when rural education was reformed, the government was the last to formulate any kind of plan for the reform. The many international organizations already involved in nonformal education began to implement their "pet projects" before the government could give any overall guidance. In fact, each of the organizations involved in the implementation of the policy had its own objectives, and without a definite government strategy there was no coordination of the numerous and complex array of projects, which was inefficient and wasteful.

The third cycle demonstrates a departure from the earlier model of policy making. It appears that after the first two policy cycles the government of Burkina came to recognize the "pulling and hauling that is politics", endemic to any type of policy decisionmaking. The third cycle emphasizes the interaction among different interest groups, the many dimensions of policy making (the social, political, and financial aspects), and the importance of both providers and consumers of education. The process of the analytical evaluation of the different policy scenarios was greatly aided by a Computer Simulation Model. It is too early, however, to assess the degree of success of this approach in generating a policy that is socially and politically desirable, financially affordable, and nationally implementable and sustainable.

Burkina Faso: Annexes


BURKINA FASO
Roads
Railroads
Rivers
○ Selected Towns
⊛ National Capital
International Boundaries
MALI
NIGER
BENIN
TOGO
GHANA
COTE D'IVOIRE
Gorom-Gorom
Djibo
Dori
Ouahigouya
Kongoussi
Kaya
Bogandé
Tougan
Yako
Nouna
Boulsa
Ziniaré
Dédougou
Réo
Koudougou
OUAGADOUGOU
Zorgho
Koupéla
Fada N'Gourma
Diapaga
Kombissiri
Tenkodogo
Manga
Boba-Dioulasso
Orodara
Banfora
Diébougou
Léo
Pô
Gaoua
Volta Noire
Volta Blanche
Volta Rouge
Komoe
Niger
Béli
Gouaya
Sirba
Bopendi
Bonsoaga
0 20 40 60 Miles
0 20 40 60 Kilometers
4°
2°
0°
2°
14°
12°
10°
MAY 1994
IBRD 25181R

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Burkina Faso: Socioeconomic Data

Population, 1961	4,400,000
Political Status	Independent since August 5, 1960
Total GDP, 1959	43.0 billion (CFA) 170 million (in US$)
%GDP from agriculture	58
%GDP from mining and manufacturing	2
GDP growth rate, 1954-1960	3.7%
Per Capita GDP (1959)	US$40

Source: World Bank.

Burkina Faso: Per Capita GNP, Selected Years



Source: World Bank.

Burkina Faso: Composition of Labor, 1960 and 1980



Source: World Bank.

Burkina Faso:
Total Work Force and Agriculture Sector Work Force, Selected Years



Source: World Bank.

Burkina Faso: Enrollment Projections, Selected Years



Source: Société d'Etudes pour le Développement Economique et Social (SEDES).

Burkina Faso: Flow of Hypothetical Sixty-Student Cohort, 1960



Source: SEDES.

Burkina Faso: Nonformal Education Curriculum, 1961

	Credit Hours		
Subject	*First Year*	*Second Year*	*Third Year*
French Language	1:00	1:25	1:15
Reading	1:00	0:50	0:50
Writing	0:30	0:20	0:20
Math	1:00	0:55	0:45
Humanities			0:20
Work Practice	3:00	3:15	3:15
Physical Fitness	0:30	0:15	0:15

Source: Ader and Mostefaoui, *Haute-Volta: Evaluation du système d'éducation rurale.*

Burkina Faso: Primary and Rural Enrollment, 1962–72



Source: Ministry of Education.

Burkina Faso: Student Enrollment by School Type, 1971/72



Source: Ministry of Education.

Burkina Faso: GDP by Sector, 1964 and 1970



Source: World Bank.

Burkina Faso: Projected Cost per Pupil by Branch of Education, 1980

Branch of Education	Cost per Pupil (CFAF)	**Number of Years of Schooling**	Repeater Rate	**Total Cost (CFAF)**	Number of Pupils Trained, per CFAF 1 million
Rural	5,500	**3**	—	**16,500**	61.0
Primary	12,200	**6**	15%	**85,000**	12.0
Secondary	51,000	**5**	15%	**295,000**	3.4

Source: World Bank.

Burkina Faso: Manpower Projections, Selected Years

A. Estimated Requirements for Personnel with Specialized Training

Type of Training	*1971-75*	*1976-80*	*1981-85*
Rural	1,570	1,030	620
Scientific and Technical	860	1,320	1,970
Commercial and Economic	790	920	1,210
Medical and Social	190	250	330
Pedagogical	760	990	1,240
Administrative and Judiciary	500	670	890
Military	160	180	200
Total	4,830	5,360	6,460

B. Output of General Education

Level of Education	*1971*	*1975*	*1980*	*1985*
CEPE (primary certificate)	4,060			4,285
Complete Lower Secondary	865	1,160	1,345	1,435
Some Lower Secondary	1,300	1,745	2,225	2,360
Complete Higher Secondary	265	400	610	645
Some Higher Secondary	600	840	1,310	1,430
Total	7,090	4,145	5,490	10,155

Source: SEDES, *Emploi et Formation en Haute Volta, December 1970.*

Burkina Faso: Summary Enrollment Targets as of November 1972



Source: World Bank.

Burkina Faso:
Enrollment Targets by Gender, Selected Academic Years



Source: World Bank.

Burkina Faso: Recurrent Unit Costs of Primary (1981) versus Rural (1982) Education

	Rural Education (1982)	*Primary Education (1981)*
Total Recurrent Expenditures (CFAF million)	958.3	2,958
Net Recurrent Expenditures (CFAF million)	—	2,924
Enrollments	15,558	18,754
Cost per Student (CFAF)	61,595	16,010
Student: Teacher Ratio	21	55

Source: Government Budget, CFJA Annual Report, 1981-82.

Burkina Faso: Annex 5.17

Burkina Faso: Recurring Expenditures in the Education Sector, 1980

	1981 Budget (CFAF million)	*Share of Education Budget (%)*	*Share of Total Recurrent Budget (%)*
Primary Level	**2,958**	**34.5**	**7.3**
Secondary Level	**1,762**	**20.5**	**4.4**
Operating Expenditures	880	10.3	2.2
Stipends	*629*	*7.3*	*1.6*
Subsidies	253	2.9	0.6
Administration (Primary and Secondary)	**433**	**5.0**	**1.1**
Higher Education	2,704	31.5	6.7
Operating Expenditures	236	2.7	0.6
Stipends	*2,388*	*27.8*	*5.9*
Subsidies	80	1.0	0.2
CFJA (Young Farmers Training Program)	**726**	**8.5**	**1.8**
TOTAL	**8,583**	**100.0**	**21.3**

Source: Budget de l'Etat, 1981.

PART III

SYNTHESIS

6

Conclusions

Chapter 1 argues that educational development is not a well structured field of unambiguous issues, clearly defined objectives, mutually exclusive choices, undisputed causal relationships, predictable rationalities, and rational decisionmakers. It holds that just the opposite is true—educational development is made up of a series of untidy and overlapping episodes in which a variety of people and organizations with diversified perspectives are actively involved in the *processes* through which issues are analyzed and *policies* are generated, implemented, assessed and redesigned. In order to capture the intricacies of policies and processes, this book offers a consolidated model of policymaking that places analytical rationality (the process), within the political and administrative aspects of policymaking (the actors). The processes fall between two extremes, the incremental and the synoptic. The incremental process is interactive, and approaches problemsolving in a step-by-step manner; synoptic policymaking confronts problems as a whole, combining economic, political, and social analysis into one integrated planning process that makes interaction unnecessary. The actors are positioned between two modes of policymaking: the organizational/bureaucratic, wherein decisions emanate from an organizational entity (such as the government, the military, and so forth), and the societal/personalistic mode, wherein decisions are the result of negotiation among interest groups, which often have conflicting agendas (such as government ministries, teachers' unions, parents' pressure groups, and so forth). This static model captures very well the instance of decision-making, but does not explicitly consider the activities preceding (analysis, generation of options, bargaining, and so forth) and following it (implementation, assessment, and possible redesign). A dynamic framework was thus introduced in chapter 1 to cover the pre-policy decision activities, the decision process itself, and the post-decision activities. The framework served as a guide for the analysis of policymaking in Peru, Jordan, Thailand, and Burkina Faso.

The case studies vividly illustrate the usefulness of the two analytical instruments—the model and the framework—in unraveling the policymaking process. For example, the introduction of rural nonformal education in Burkina is only thoroughly understood when the role of the international community, its analysis of the problems in education, and its part in promoting an alternative, is revealed. Different models can be employed even within the same country if there is a change in the social, political or economic context, or in the actors involved. An incremental approach was pursued in introducing diversified education in Jordan in the early 1970s, which was considerably influenced by the international community; a more comprehensive synoptic approach was used when systemwide reform was introduced by the government in the mid-1980s.

If we map the various policymaking cycles of each country on a graph (figure 6.1), we find that most of them fall in quadrant I. This indicates that much of the decisionmaking was approached synoptically, and emanated from an organizational/bureaucratic source. Indeed, the organizational/ bureaucratic mode (quadrants I and IV) was the prominent source of decisionmaking (six of the nine cycles fall here).

Figure 6.1 Quadrants of Decisionmaking



( ) Refers to number of policy cycle

Looking more closely, we see that this mode predominated in the early cycles of policymaking in all four countries. This in part reflects their stage of development: in all cases except Peru, it was the international community, in concert with "client" government officials, which initiated, even dominated the process. International actors were able to exert such influence, because governments were at a relatively early stage of developing their national capacity. In Peru, the authoritarian military government was able to impose policies of its own.

It was only further along in the process that the societal/ personalistic mode held sway (quadrant II). To examine the idea of systemwide reform in Thailand and Jordan, committees were constituted which represented a variety of interest groups, including teachers' unions, various members of education ministries, and school and university administrators. In both case, parents and students were also consulted, either at the policy formulation or policy implementation stage. In Burkina, the international community brought together the various interest groups to generate and evaluate policy options. It seems unlikely that much policymaking takes place in quadrant III. This is because incremental policymaking is generally limited in its effects, and therefore does not incite the same level of political interest; for this reason it does not require the type of interaction and negotiation characterized by the societal/personalistic mode.

The organizational/bureaucratic mode intersected with the incremental approach in policymaking in the first policy cycles of Jordan and Thailand. In both cases, pilot programs were instituted by government officials together with international actors, in order to test the waters for system-wide reform. However, before broad-based reform could be introduced, negotiations among numerous interest groups had to take place (see above).

In this next section we will look closely at what can be concluded from applying the conceptual framework described in Chapter I to the different components of policymaking in the cases of Peru, Thailand, Jordan, and Burkina Faso. Throughout, each policy cycle is treated separately.

Analysis of the Existing Situation

How are educational problems identified and analyzed, and how does a policy cycle begin or recommence? In the cases analyzed here, educational change was largely instigated from outside the education sector and its objectives often lay outside its domain. For example, the independence of Burkina in 1960 prompted an analysis of the educational system and how it might contribute to overall economic development. The military government in Peru, threatened by political, social and economic chaos, viewed the education system as a vehicle for social change. Jordan and Thailand tried diversified secondary schools to remedy a situation, where a shortage of skilled workers coexisted with high unemployment among secondary school graduates.

In most cases, analysis included an examination of the education sector, as well as socio-political-economic factors. However, in spite of its importance, there was very little appraisal of the forces for (or against) change, to assess the feasibility of success of policy reform. In examining the dynamics of change, this study found that none of the four countries took full account of interest groups in the first policy cycle. At independence in Burkina, French experts arrived in the country and conducted their analysis independently of any local interests, most importantly students and their parents. Similarly in Peru, the military government conducted its own analysis of the education system purposefully omitting teachers and administrators, as they were viewed to be obstacles to change. In both instances the reforms ran into implementation problems and in the end were unsuccessful, due in no small measure to the failure to create demand among those neglected in the process.

Of importance to this discussion is the nature of the state as an institution—it can be either conducive to, or resistant to, change. For example, in Peru the fact that the military government was highly centralized meant that it could, at least in theory, more easily introduce systemwide reform. In contrast, in more socially and politically conservative societies, such as existed in Thailand and Jordan, the state was compelled to tread more cautiously, when it came to educational reform.

The Process of Generating Policy Options

This stage involves two issues: first, how thorough was the analysis that prompted a policy change and second, how were policy options formulated? In the case of the first policy cycle in Jordan, actual data collection and analysis were skimpy due to the unstable political situation at the time. Policymakers here depended more on international opinion. Similarly in Thailand, though data were more readily available, they were viewed through the prism of international experts. In Peru a number of reports were commissioned over a period of three years that were all conceived of and executed within a revolutionary framework. This certainly biased the analysis and the eventual process of generating and evaluating possible policies to address the country's problems. Finally, in Burkina Faso, data were collected over a short 45 days by French experts, who admitted that many of their figures were "best guesses." The government's later move to refocus on primary education was partly a result of a Ministry of Education nationwide survey, conducted through conferences and seminars, to determine what kind of education was needed and desired by the country.

As far as formulation of policy options, the case studies clearly show that, in practice, there is no *systemic mode* whereby data are generated, and then a full range of options is formulated, prioritized, and refined. A limited number of policy options were usually contrived, determined by the ideologies of the actors. In Peru, the military government had devised an overall approach to social reform within whose framework educational reform had to be fitted, thus significantly narrowing the range of options. In the first policy cycles in both Burkina and Peru, policy options other than those promoted by the French in the case of the former, and the military government in the case of the latter, were dismissed out of hand. There was a wider range of policy options generated in Jordan and Thailand, and in both countries the reform introduced survived the initial cycle and was expanded in the second cycle.

In the policy cycles analyzed, the predominant mode was *importation*, whereby the policy option or options were introduced by the international community, i.e., the first policy cycles in Burkina, Jordan, and Thailand. The stage of development a country has reached is crucial in this regard—the influence that the international community wields depends to a large extent on a country's national capacity. For example, in Jordan and Thailand the leverage of the international actors diminished as national capacities grew stronger. By the second policy cycle in each country it was government officials who took the lead in policymaking. However, in Burkina the international donor community continued to hold sway. External involvement such as that introduced by the *importation mode* can be positive if it is *one* input to the process, and if the product is allowed to be internalized; it can serve as a way for international organizations to 'connect' the developing countries to the world system, and to provide cross-fertilization among countries. If care is not taken, however, external influence can be a means by which the international community imposes its fads and fashions upon less developed countries. The fact that the French experts chose a synoptic approach to reform in Burkina Faso permitting little input from interest groups there, contributed to its later failure. In the case of Jordan and Thailand, the introduction of diversified education was strongly promoted by the international community. But the policies were piloted, and in subsequent cycles adapted and made more country specific, contributing to their later success.

The Process of Evaluating Policy Options

Further dispelling the credibility of the purely technical or scientific approach to policymaking, in which policymakers attempt to objectively project and evaluate the consequences of each possible option, in no case were the consequences of policy options fully drawn and non-prejudicially weighed. In fact, such narrow evaluation was heavily influenced by the values and ideologies of the various interest groups involved. For example, the military government in Peru did not even allow for a full evaluation of the one policy option under consideration. Essentially, the government replaced the evaluation process with planning—that is to say, the military government was convinced that its educational reform was the best policy to pursue (an *a priori* decision) and that it could be made more desirable, through marketing it, and implementable and affordable, through planning efforts. In the three other cases presented (the first policy cycles in Burkina, Thailand and Jordan), international actors predominated in policy option evaluation. In the end their particular ideologies prevailed, largely because of the funding attached. The most extreme example of foreign influence over the evaluation phase is found in Burkina's second policy cycle. When the Ministry of Education had decided that rural education was neither desirable nor feasible, one international actor (the World Bank) found another client ministry to embrace it.

When policy options are evaluated in terms of their desirability, the obvious question that needs to be posed is desirable to whom? In a number of cases policymakers found a particular option desirable, while the beneficiaries of education (students and parents, teachers) did not. Where demand did not exist for a particular policy or was not generated through the inclusion of the beneficiaries in the process, the policy was doomed. Such was the case when rural nonformal education was introduced in Burkina, and when diversified secondary schooling was introduced in Peru, as part of systemwide reform. It is in the later policy cycles that governments recognized and sought to address the multiplicity of interests involved in policymaking. For example, in Burkina, in order to generate and evaluate policy options that would address the continuing problem of providing basic education with limited resources, the World Bank brought together all of the major interest groups in the process (with the exception of parent groups, who had already made their preferences passively known through non-participation in rural nonformal education). A computer program was designed to show the financial implications of any given option, allowing the stakeholders to evaluate, negotiate, and consider tradeoffs, until a consensus was reached. Reform commissions, constituted from representatives of all the major interest groups served much the same purpose in Jordan and Thailand.

Adoption of the Policy Decision

Analysis of the policy choice itself brings up issues related to the degree of radicality and clarity of the decision as well as its implementability. These studies have shown that incremental policymaking in the initial policy cycle is more successful than radical change. Piloting projects in Thailand and Jordan enabled policymakers to refine policies through implementation that fed into the subsequent policy cycles. In both cases where the synoptic approach was taken, the first cycles of Peru and Burkina, the policies later ended in failure. There is decidedly a relationship between the governmental structure and the approach it chooses in policymaking. Authoritarian governments are more inclined to follow a synoptic approach in policymaking, whereas governments whose political power is more disparate are more likely to opt for the incremental approach.

The extent to which the policy is articulated clearly contributes to its success or failure. Peru's decision to introduce secondary comprehensive education was overly theoretical—how goals could realistically be achieved was overlooked, posing problems for implementation. In contrast, the incremental approach pursued by Jordan and Thailand made for a better articulated and therefore more easily implementable policy. Undoubtedly, policies which are conservative and incremental, and especially those launched as pilot projects, have the most chance for success.

Finally, the question of whether the policy seems operational or implausible to implement is certainly in the eye of the beholder. Objectively, where the reform is comprehensive and synoptic, and the absorptive capacity of the country is meager, or where there is no demonstrated demand or acceptance for the policy, the likelihood of its success diminishes. However, as indicated above, some policymakers felt that through careful planning, as in Peru, or simply because they believed the policy to be the correct one, as in Burkina, they could make a particular policy work.

Policy Planning and Implementation

The true test of a policy comes during planning and implementation. Two major issues related to planning for policy implementation have presented themselves as critical. The first involves the degree to which political support has been mobilized for the reform, and the second is the complementarity of micro- and macro-planning. In Thailand, even in the first cycle, policy planners saw the need to involve administrative staff in the process, and developed a project center that would allow supervisors the opportunity to pursue research and plan for the development of the schools, and to assist in the improvement of teaching in the project schools. In the second policy cycle, the reform committee comprised representatives from a broad range of interest groups, including teachers' unions, private schools, universities and the National Economic and Social Development Board. So, from an early time, those who would be affected by the reform were brought in to help decide what form it would take. In addition, planning was to be a continuous process, leaving room for modifications to take place as feedback from the field came in. At the planning and implementation stages, local teachers were consulted over curriculum redesign and assessment; business leaders provided technical and administrative support, and community leaders helped to disseminate information to the local public on area vocational centers and their functions. Finally, throughout implementation, a concerted effort was made to make the objectives of the reform clear to students and parents. In particular, schools would offer "training and awareness" programs, presenting workshop simulations and the like, which would give people in towns and villages the opportunity to observe the schools in action. In addition, an important aspect of the reform was the introduction of a strong guidance component to help the "consumers" make best use of the "product." After students were tested and streamed in the vocational or academic track, guidance counselors were there to explain the results to the students and their parents, and to help the students choose the best course of study. In the case of Jordan, no marketing was done in the first stage; the country profited from this mistake, and in the second policy cycle, a considerable effort was made to involve all—a free exchange of ideas concerning the system was afforded for education authorities, parents and teachers and members of the reform commission (via workshops and seminars), and the Crown Prince himself met with local and regional administrators for this purpose.

However, mobilizing political support does not guarantee acceptance of the reform—in Peru, before a decision had actually been made regarding educational reform, members of the Reform Commission selected a group of young men and women to sensitize and mobilize the public to support the general national reform. When the education reform was being mapped out, planners clarified the objectives, benefits and roles for teachers, administrators, and community members. Incentives were designed to motivate teachers to gain additional training and to participate in the more innovative aspects of the reform, and community members were canvassed about the new opportunities and responsibilities embodied in the reform. This was largely done in a top-down manner, which meant that there was very little opportunity for input from the general population; this reform, as noted above, subsequently failed.

The second issue regarding complementarity of macro (national) planning with micro (project) planning proved to be a problem for a number of countries. Allowing major planning to take place at the project (micro) level encourages local participation, but it does not deal adequately with national (macro) problems. Without detailed plans at the national level, the Jordanian education system found itself short of vocational education teachers. In Burkina's second policy cycle, inadequate overall development planning on the part of the government resulted in disjointed implementation.

It is during implementation that the formulation of a policy is put to the test. As noted in Chapter 1, modification of policy inevitably occurs during the implementation phase. This is due to a number of factors, including the fact that the attempt to implement encounters unanticipated constraints; political, social, or economic circumstances change; or feedback causes a reassessment of the original policy decision. These studies showed that implementation carried out on a "learning by doing" step-by-step basis which permitted modification, proved better than a massive, unitary approach. In Peru, policy implementation was not planned so that policy improvement could take place; the reform was intended to be implemented in a single effort, and this approach to planning diminished the flexibility and learning possibilities in the implementation stages. In addition, a deteriorating political situation, as well as a declining domestic and international economy and extreme financial problems affected support for and consequently implementation of the reform in the country. In the end, the government decided to scratch the idea of systemwide reform in favor of setting up a limited number of experimental schools. But limiting implementation to fewer schools here was a change in scope rather than a genuine experiment, and it failed.

The cost of building comprehensive schools in Thailand during the first cycle was found to be much greater than anticipated. For this reason, building plans were changed; later, during the second cycle, a much less expensive prototype design was developed, as well as an alternative and cheaper means of providing practical instruction.

In Jordan, implementation of comprehensive education met a snag, when the need for vocational teachers was greater than the supply. To remedy this situation, the government had to adopt a number of incentives to attract and retain qualified vocational/technical teachers. Further, as part of its pilot effort the government introduced another form of comprehensive schooling, the general vocational secondary school, as a way to serve thinly populated areas. As discovered during the policy impact assessment stage (see below), this experiment was not successful, because it suffered from the same problems as other comprehensive schools—these schools did not fit the demand by students for a solid general education for all. In the subsequent policy cycle the demand factor was taken very seriously, which contributed to success.

Finally, what looks good on paper does not necessarily work in the real world. Such was the case with Peru. In Burkina Faso, though nonformal rural education appeared to be "objectively" the best solution to the country's dilemma, the radical reform introduced was simply beyond the analytical and managerial capabilities of the country to implement. Though the international aid community strongly believed in and promoted this policy, they could not cover every aspect of implementation. In the subsequent policy cycle, the same problem was multiplied by the expansion of the reform, the lack of coordination among the even larger number of international agencies involved, and the fact that the government itself had not fully developed a reform plan.

Policy Impact Assessment and Subsequent Policy Cycle

Assessing the impact of a policy is obviously important in order to determine whether to maintain, modify, or reject it. In general, policy assessments were not carried out as a "matter of course" in the policymaking process. Often no official assessment was made at all, and the policy was allowed to linger, while new policies are introduced alongside. In cases where an assessment was made, however, three issues can be examined: what prompted the assessment; how was it conducted and by whom; and how were the results interpreted—were deficiencies attributed to implementation or policy?

Most assessments that were conducted in the cases studied were precipitated by events external to the education sector. One of the strongest examples is the case of Jordan, where educational reform once again became a source of concern in the mid-1980s, only after the country began to experience a serious economic slowdown and a growing unemployment problem. Though the idea for a similar reform had been broached in the late 1970s, it was economic difficulty that forced a reassessment of the situation and created a more receptive environment for the idea. In Peru, Burkina Faso, and Thailand, political events brought about policy assessments. In Thailand and the second policy cycle in Burkina, populist demand for democracy brought about the toppling of the governments and ushered in new administrations. They were forced to assess the existing education system largely on equity grounds and to respond to popular demand for change. In Peru, though no formal evaluation was made, the political situation (after a forced election) led to the decision to allow the policy of diversified education to languish.

How, when, and by whom the assessment is conducted clearly prejudices the findings and the subsequent policy cycle. Political factors influence who will perform the assessment as well. For example, an assessment performed at the end of Burkina's first policy cycle, and a mini-assessment conducted during the second policy cycle, were carried out by the international community, which was predisposed to continue rural, nonformal education. This biased their results and contributed to the policy's longevity. Though the Ministry of Education had carried out its own evaluation and had determined that the policy was neither desired by students and their parents, nor affordable, it was international aid that held sway with government decisionmakers. When the international ideology began to change, reasserting the importance of universal primary education, the international community's assessment of rural nonformal education in Burkina changed accordingly. Policy assessment in Jordan was conducted by the National Commission to Assess Educational Policies, constituted by the Crown Prince, as part of the educational reform process. In this case, the Crown Prince had already determined that policy change was in order, before an assessment of existing policy even took place. In Thailand, though the policy of diversified education had been introduced largely because it was promoted by the international community, the government retrieved control of the policy and adapted it to Thai needs. Its assessment, and the subsequent policy cycle reflected more closely the demand issues in Thai education.

Interpretation of the results of the assessment has a very strong influence on what comes next. There are three possibilities: first, that the policy is right on course and should be maintained; second, that the policy outcome is lacking due to problems of implementation and therefore should be modified; and third, that the policy outcome is poor due to the nature of the policy itself, and therefore it should be rejected. When the outcome was not what was expected, often policymakers did not get to the heart of the matter, mistaking implementation problems for inadequacies of the policy itself, which led to a decision to abandon it. As an example, in Peru the military government was ousted eight years after comprehensive education was initiated; the new President interpreted this as a rejection of the policy even though the first students had not yet graduated from the ESEPs. Of the four case studies, only in Burkina was a decision made to modify the implementation of an existing policy, during the second cycle; even in this case, there was a difference in the interpretation of the assessment. The Ministry of Education had concluded that the policy was defective and called for abandoning it, but because the international community believed that only implementation was at fault, it continued to back rural nonformal education.

In conclusion, these studies have made clear that education policymaking is an iterative, and not a linear process. In analyzing it, both the *process* and the *actors* must be investigated, as well as the steps preceding and following the decision itself. This book has attempted to give such breadth to the study of education policy analysis, and concludes that policies which have a good chance of success:

- examine education within its overall context; in addition to the technical elements of education, and political and economic factors, successful policymaking takes into account the dynamics for change and concerns of the many interest groups;
- fully and thoroughly formulate and evaluate policy options, taking account of different rationalities (through interaction and negotiation among the various affected interest groups);
- take an incremental rather than synoptic approach to decisionmaking, introducing change in a step-by-step manner (preferably through pilot programs); and
- devise plans of a broad enough nature that they can be adapted over time, and that complement policy at the national level.

Educational development is extraordinarily complicated because it involves and affects a large number of beneficiaries and providers, as well as political figures, all of whom have a stake in the process and the outcome. Added to this is the long gestation period for any policy to realize its objectives. For these reasons, policy change should not be introduced lightly, nor should it be abandoned without careful examination.

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